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Abstract
The proliferation of software across all aspects of people’s life means that software
failure can bring catastrophic result. It is therefore highly desirable to be able to
develop software that is verified to meet its expected specification. This has also
been identified as a key objective in one of the UK Grand Challenges (GC6) (Jones
et al., 2006; Woodcock, 2006). However, many difficult problems still remain in
achieving this objective, partially due to the wide use of (recursive) shared mutable
data structures which are hard to keep track of statically in a precise and concise
way.
This thesis aims at building a verification system for both memory safety and
functional correctness of programs manipulating pointer-based data structures, which
can deal with two scenarios where only partial information about the program is
available. For instance the verifier may be supplied with only partial program spec-
ification, or with full specification but only part of the program code. For the first
scenario, previous state-of-the-art works (Nguyen et al., 2007; Chin et al., 2007;
Nguyen and Chin, 2008; Chin et al., 2010) generally require users to provide full
specifications for each method of the program to be verified. Their approach seeks
much intellectual effort from users, and meanwhile users are liable to make mistakes
in writing such specifications. This thesis proposes a new approach to program
verification that allows users to provide only partial specification to methods. Our
approach will then refine the given annotation into a more complete specification
by discovering missing constraints. The discovered constraints may involve both
numerical and multiset properties that could be later confirmed or revised by users.
Meanwhile, we further augment our approach by requiring only partial specification
to be given for primary methods of a program. Specifications for loops and auxil-
v
iary methods can then be systematically discovered by our augmented mechanism,
with the help of information propagated from the primary methods. This work is
aimed at verifying beyond shape properties, with the eventual goal of analysing both
memory safety and functional properties for pointer-based data structures. Initial
experiments have confirmed that we can automatically refine partial specifications
with non-trivial constraints, thus making it easier for users to handle specifications
with richer properties.
For the second scenario, many programs contain invocations to unknown com-
ponents and hence only part of the program code is available to the verifier. As
previous works generally require the whole of program code be present, we target
at the verification of memory safety and functional correctness of programs ma-
nipulating pointer-based data structures, where the program code is only partially
available due to invocations to unknown components. Provided with a Hoare-style
specification {Pre} prog {Post} where program prog contains calls to some unknown
procedure unknown, we infer a specification mspecu for unknown from the calling
contexts, such that the problem of verifying prog can be safely reduced to the prob-
lem of proving that the procedure unknown (once its code is available) meets the
derived specification mspecu. The expected specification mspecu is automatically
calculated using an abduction-based shape analysis specifically designed for a com-
bined abstract domain. We have implemented a system to validate the viability of
our approach, with encouraging experimental results.
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Since the invention of computers in the last century, computer-based systems are
playing an increasingly more significant role across all aspects of people’s lives.
Accordingly, software systems behind these computer systems are being widely used
as their souls.
Such proliferation of software means that software failure can bring catastrophic
result. The worst aftermath of software failure could be that, under safety-critical
circumstances, it can put human lives in danger. Two extreme examples include
the Patriot missile system failure resulting in 28 US soldiers killed and another 98
injured, which was caused by float rounding problem (Information Management and
Technology Division, 1992), and the Therac-25 radiation therapy machine having
overdosed at least six people with three deaths, attributed to its race hazard (Leve-
son and Turner, 1993). Currently such safety-critical systems are even more wide-
spread like the embedded systems in airplanes and automobile vehicles, as well as
contemporary medical devices, any of which is highly responsible for human lives.
1
What is more, misbehaviour of software also causes great economical loss. Some
notorious cases follow the Ariane-5 explosion due to an overflow error in the conver-
sion from 64-bit float to 16-bit integer which cost over 370 million US dollars (Lions,
1996), and the loss of another 125 million US dollars by a Mars Orbiter crash re-
sulted from improper usage of Imperial units and metric units (Stephenson et al.,
1999). Other less severe examples can be witnessed by the “blue screens” of unex-
pected system halt from Microsoft Windows as well as “segmentation faults” from
POSIX-oriented operating systems, which cause frustration and loss of productivity.
According to Research Triangle Institute (2002), the annual cost incurred by inad-
equate software quality in the United States is between 22.2 billion and 59.5 billion
US dollars, which corresponds to approximately 0.2 to 0.6 percent of the country’s
gross domestic product (GDP).
Nowadays, to satisfy the fast development of demand from all aspects of the soci-
ety, computer software is still growing in both scale and complexity, and its quality
assurance draws increasing number of eyeballs accordingly. This has also been iden-
tified as a key objective in one of the UK Grand Challenges (GC6) (Jones et al.,
2006; Woodcock, 2006). Cousot has ever addressed this point as “it is preferable to
verify that mission-critical or safety-critical software programs do not go wrong be-
fore running them” (Cousot and Cousot, 2010). Hence people are trying to search
for innovative ways such as verification and analysis leading to software that has
better quality and thus is more dependable.
2
1.1. A Brief Overview of Approaches to Software Quality Assurance
1.1 A Brief Overview of Approaches to Software
Quality Assurance
There are various approaches to the reduction of software bugs and the improvement
of software quality. A brief (and not exhaustive) overview includes programming
language design, software testing, model checking, program verification, program
analysis, and so forth.
To eliminate certain kinds of programming errors, the design of suitable program-
ming languages that totally prevent them may sound a nice idea (Jim et al., 2002;
Condit et al., 2007). A case in point is the programming languages with garbage
collectors, such as Java (Venners, 1999), which claim to free programmers from heap
space exhaustion caused by forgetting to deallocate heap objects. However, this ap-
proach could not solve the class of errors that already exist in current software or
software not developed with such language (say C programs). Meanwhile, the design
of these languages may introduce extra complications, for instance the garbage col-
lector thread in Java virtual machine will block any other threads and thus making
it not very suitable for some real-time systems (Petit-Bianco, 1998).
Another significant approach to software quality guarantee is testing. It is an in-
vestigation conducted to provide people with information about the quality of the
product or service (software) under test (Kaner, 2006). Currently it is the most
prevalent approach employed by people, by setting out certain input for the pro-
gram to execute and observing whether or not it proceeds as expected. For example,
for a piece of code x = x/(y+ 1), when supplied with a test-case x = 0, y = −1 we
will discover a bug of unprotected division by zero. As can be seen, this approach
is relatively easy and straightforward to be applied in the process of software devel-
opment, as essentially it only requires to run the program (although there are also
3
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many investigations and tools to assist such process (Hetzel and Hetzel, 1991; Craig
and Jaskiel, 2002)). Yet one of its most severe defect is that it is not exhaustive,
and hence cannot prove the absence of bugs (as in many cases we cannot exhaust all
inputs to a program for testing). There are methods to alleviate this problem, such
as systematic testing (Godefroid, 1997; Musuvathi et al., 2002) to design test-cases
covering more (or even all of) program execution paths, but it still does not provide
a bug-free proof for every input.
Compared with the “dynamic” method of testing, a number of “static” approaches
attract more and more attention, such as software model checking, program verifica-
tion and program analysis. These approaches do not require running the program;
instead they analyse the code in some way to prove that the program satisfies cer-
tain properties (hence they are categorised as “static”) (Nielson et al., 2005). Un-
like testing, these properties usually exhaust all possible inputs to the program (say
“deadlock-free” or “termination” under all circumstances), so they guarantee that
the program is free of bugs with respect to these properties. The expense to achieve
such merits is that some specific techniques to transform/analyse the program are
necessary, such as abstraction (to avoid undecidability). Meanwhile these methods
are generally quite costly in terms of time/space complexity due to the static rea-
soning performed over the sophisticated software which they check/verify/analyse.
Of all these three approaches, model checking was originally developed to verify
finite-state systems (such as the design of circuits) by exhausting the whole set
of computation states according to some specifications (McMillan, 1992). Later it
was extended to the field of software quality assurance with the help of abstraction
techniques to reduce the scale of possible software states (Ball et al., 2001). In
this thesis we would rather focus on the other two approaches, namely, program
verification and program analysis. Program verification uses a deductive reasoning
system to verify whether a program conforms to user-supplied specifications (Floyd,
4
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1967; Hoare, 1969). These specifications contain additional information that ex-
presses developer’s designs and other application-specific properties, which allows
program verifiers to generate logical formulae whose validity entails the consistency
of the program. For instance, a verifier will accept as consistent a piece of code with
annotation:
{true} if (x > y) z = x else z = y {(x > y ∧ z = x) ∨ (x ≤ y ∧ z = y)}
which addresses that whatever state the if-statement starts with (true), z will be
assigned as the larger value of x and y. Note that the specifications cover infinite
concrete variable values, which is distinct from testing. One problem that verifica-
tion has resides with the annotations: they must be supplied by programmers, which
work is both tedious and error-prone. Therefore program analysis is born to solve
this problem, by analysing the program code and inferring the specifications that
the program should conform to, instead of asking the users to provide them (Niel-
son et al., 2005). To illustrate, for the previous example it may analyse the bare
code to find out the specifications in the curly brackets. This eases much of the
programmers’ work; however, due to the complexity of programs, the analysis could
be very expensive for some interesting program properties. This trade-off partially
motivates the work presented in this thesis, as will be described in the next section.
1.2 Motivation
As aforesaid, it is highly desirable to develop software with assured quality, and one
feasible approach to achieving this objective is program verification and analysis.
However, although research on this aspect has a long and distinguished history
since Floyd (1967); Hoare (1969), it remains a challenging problem to automatically
verify programs written in mainstream imperative languages such as C, C++, C]
and Java. This is in part due to the wide use of (recursive) shared mutable data
5
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structures allocated in heap memory, for example singly or doubly linked lists, binary
trees, and their variants like sorted lists and binary search trees. Compared with
previous concentration of program verification on simpler properties as valuation of
variables (say x 6= 0 and y ≥ x + 1), these data structures are much more difficult
to keep track of in a precise and concise way for program verification/analysis.
The emergence of separation logic (Ishtiaq and O’Hearn, 2001; Reynolds, 2002)
brings dramatic advances in automated verification and analysis of such heap-
manipulating programs. As an extension of Hoare logic (Hoare, 1969), it presents a
framework to reason about these programs by modelling the program memory (both
stack and heap) in a natural and accurate manner. Therefore, on the basis of sep-
aration logic, many works witness the progress of verifying the heap-manipulating
programs, such as the Smallfoot tool (Berdine et al., 2005b) for the verification
on lists’ pointer safety (i.e. program properties asserting that pointers cannot go
wrong), the verification on termination (Berdine et al., 2006), the verification for
object-oriented programs (Chin et al., 2008; Parkinson and Bierman, 2008), and
Dafny (Leino, 2010), andHip/Sleek (Nguyen et al., 2007; Chin et al., 2007; Nguyen
and Chin, 2008; Chin et al., 2010) for more general properties (including both shape
information like linked lists and trees, and relevant quantitative information like list
length and sortedness, and tree height and binary search property, etc). Here (and
throughout the thesis) we use “shape” information/properties to denote the types
of components of data structures located in memory and the spatial relationship
among these components, for example “pointer x points to the head of a singly
linked list, which is disjoint from a binary tree whose root is referenced by pointer
y”, and so on.
On the analysis side, the SpaceInvader tool (Distefano et al., 2006; Yang et al.,
2008; Calcagno et al., 2009) automatically infers method specifications and loop
invariants on pointer safety for list-manipulating programs. Other works such as
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THOR (Magill et al., 2007, 2008, 2010) incorporate simple numerical information
to allow automated synthesis of properties like list length. Their success proves
the necessity and feasibility for program analysis to help automate the verification
process.
Among these works, one state-of-the-art verification system is Hip/Sleek (Nguyen
et al., 2007; Chin et al., 2007; Nguyen and Chin, 2008; Chin et al., 2010). Its capa-
bility covers the verification of memory safety, such as lists’ pointer safety properties
handled by Smallfoot and SpaceInvader, and some relatively simple numerical prop-
erties (also of lists) handled by THOR. Moreover, it also targets at both memory
safety and functional correctness of programs. To achieve this objective, it allows
users to specify their preferred level of program correctness by defining predicates to
depict the data structures employed in their programs. Users may describe the spa-
tial relationship amongst components of their data structures, or their quantitative
features like size/height/sortedness, or even collections of values stored in the data
structures. Reasoning about these predicates enables Hip/Sleek to verify both
memory safety and functional correctness of heap-manipulating programs.
Besides its power and benefit, Hip/Sleek can still be improved in many aspects.
One observation is that, same as many other existing verification systems, it requires
ample information for verification, say the whole of program code and corresponding
specifications. Two accompanying questions are: what if (part of) such information
is not available? If it is unavailable, can we still discover such missing part of
information to complete the verification? This forms the motivation of this thesis.
A first incentive to improve Hip/Sleek dwells in its requirement of user-supplied
annotations. Such annotations include the specification for each method and the
invariant for each loop in programs. Hip/Sleek’s reliance on users to provide these
annotations severely increases users’ workload and can be a source of handmade
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errors. This situation would be made better if some program analysis techniques
could be exploited in such verification systems to reduce human labour by enabling
them to write fewer such annotations.
Another motivation of my thesis is based on the requirement of Hip/Sleek to have
access to the whole code being verified, which is usually not satisfied in contemporary
programs making use of many third-party codes and/or libraries. In this case, part of
the program code to be verified could be unknown to the verifier, andHip/Sleek (as
well as many other similar verification systems) does not have any solution but can
only report “some procedure invoked in the program is not defined”. Therefore,
it should be quite useful if we enhance Hip/Sleek so that it can deal with such
partially available programs with unknown components.
1.3 Objectives
The main objective of my thesis is to improve Hip/Sleek-like verifiers for heap-
manipulating programs such that they can deal with two scenarios where only partial
information about the program code is available. In one of the scenarios, users
are just expected to provide partial specifications of the program, and thus their
workload is reduced; in the other case the program may contain invocations to
unknown components and hence only part of the program is available to the verifier.
The success of such an effort would pave the way for a more powerful software verifier
capable of handling the above two cases. More specifically, we want to achieve the
following goals to enable our verifier to accept the following:
• Partial specifications. Original Hip/Sleek requires full specifications of
programs to verify them. Our first objective is to allow users to provide only
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shape information about data structures but not other information on numer-
ical or content part, in order that their workload is reduced.
• Partially available programs with unknown components. When a pro-
gram contains unknown components, we may still want to verify it, by finding
some extra obligations that the unknown part of the program should conform
to.
Meanwhile, during the meantime of realising these objectives, we will target at ver-
ifying both memory safety properties and functional correctness properties, by pro-
viding users with the flexibility to specify different kinds of data structure invariants
and correctness properties in the same framework, which can then be verified using
the same machinery. This is in contrast to specialised approaches, such as Rug-
ina (2004); Habermehl et al. (2010), which are designed to work with restricted,
“built-in” data structures.
1.4 Challenges
We face several challenges when working on this thesis. These challenges correspond
to the two major objectives: verification automation by inferring missing information
from the given program and partial specifications, and verification for programs with
unknown components.
• Verification automation. The challenge presented by verification automa-
tion is mainly attributed to the inference of missing constraints to complete
the given partial specifications. Such completion may require certain form of
fixed-point calculation in the presence of loops/recursive calls over a combined
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domain, as our verification generally works with both structural properties and
other relevant numerical/content properties. Details of difficulties are listed
as follows:
– Incomplete information during verification. Because user-provided
specifications may be incomplete, both preconditions and postconditions
can be too weak due to missing information. This has two consequences:
a too weak precondition may lead to infeasible abstract program states
during verification (as it might have missed some information necessary
for memory safety), while a too weak postcondition is neither sound for
recursive invocation nor satisfactory in terms of precision. Therefore we
need some techniques to recover information at both sides.
– Combination of various domains/theories. As introduced, we ex-
pect programs to operate on different domains and data structures and
we are able to handle many of these properties over multiple domains.
For example, one single program can handle both lists and numbers at
the same time, and our verification should fully capture all its behav-
iour (instead of only some behaviour over shapes). Therefore we have
to combine provers and decision procedures for a range of theories that
we work on. Existing methods, such as Nelson and Oppen (1979), often
put restrictions that significantly affect the expressivity of the constituent
theories. When we reason about structural and quantitative aspects of
data structures at the same time, we definitely need some way to combine
theories.
– Abstraction. Reasoning about programs in their full details is imprac-
tical. Thus we utilise abstractions to filter out irrelevant details so as to
keep the reasoning within the reach of automated tools. Moreover, ab-
straction can improve efficiency as well. Choosing the right abstraction
that keeps as much of relevant details and drops as much of irrelevant de-
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tails is a non-trivial problem. Furthermore, we may also need abstraction
to handle infinite structures in programs, such as recursive data struc-
tures, loops and recursion for termination purposes.
– Aliasing. Aliasing has long been an elusive problem for program veri-
fiers. Aliases manifest themselves in many different forms (Bornat, 2000):
variable aliasing, parameter aliasing, etc. The major difficulty caused by
aliases is that updates to one component may affect other seemingly un-
related components.
• Verification for programs with unknown components. In this part,
the main challenge is the part of program that is not available, which causes
unknown state of the program during verification. This is detailed in the
aspects below that we need to sidestep:
– Unknown components. The unknown components in the partially
available programs prevent the verification process from obtaining their
code and therefore behaviour (as we do not have any knowledge about
those components), so we cannot progress with the remainder of the
program. We need to search for possible techniques to circumvent them
before continuing with the verification.
– Verification framework. As aforementioned, a program verifier should
be a deductive reasoning system over program code and specifications.
However, in the scenario where some code is missing, we must revise
slightly the whole framework of verification to cater for it. This results in
a verification framework based on both traditional program reasoning and
abductive reasoning, which will be portrayed in more detail in Chapter 6.
– Combination of various domains/theories. This issue plus the un-
known components presents a new challenge for us, as we also work with




The goal of this thesis is to develop mechanisms for verification of heap-manipulating
programs with respect to both memory safety and functional correctness, based on
only partial information (either specifications or program code). Accordingly we set
the evaluation criteria for this thesis in two aspects, viz., successful program veri-
fication with only partial specifications or only partial program code, respectively.
This is detailed as follows:
• One objective is to allow users to provide only partial specifications
for verification, in order to reduce the amount of annotations pro-
vided by users. With the thesis’ work, users should only provide shape
information about data structures but not the information on numerical/con-
tent part. Our proposed verifier will take over the rest of the work to refine the
specification by discovering the missing part to make the specification become
sound with respect to the program being verified.
• The other objective is to verify partially available programs with
unknown components. When the program code is only partially available
because of the existence of unknown components, we should still be able to
verify the program in some way, by discovering an obligation for the unknown
components to satisfy in order that the whole program is verified as correct.
• Both objectives should be fulfilled with proper implementation and
experiments to prove their feasibility. The targeted experimental pro-
grams are programs implementing classical algorithms for pointer-based data
structures, which manipulate the heap memory with subtle operations, result-
ing in rich specifications expressing shape, numerical and content properties
of the algorithms.
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1.6 Organisation of the Thesis
The current thesis comprises 8 chapters including this introductory chapter. The
remainder of the thesis is organised as follows.
Chapter 2 presents a survey of the state-of-the-art works that are relevant to my
work. It mainly introduces contemporary program verification and program analysis
techniques, as well as separation logic as the foundation of my work to model abstract
program memory states.
Chapter 3 presents the programming language we aim to verify, together with its
operational semantics for soundness issue. The specification language describing the
abstract domain will also be introduced with examples and semantics.
Chapter 4 presents the first contribution of this thesis, namely, the refinement of
partial specifications for verification. It illustrates the main approach with some
examples and formalises the pure abduction mechanism and the program analysis
for verification purpose thereafter.
Chapter 5 presents the thesis’ second contribution: the synthesis of specifications
for auxiliary methods. It first illustrates how the users’ workload can be further cut
down for the example in the previous chapter, followed by the formalisation details.
Chapter 6 presents the third contribution of the thesis, viz. the verification of
programs with unknown components. In a similar fashion as previous chapters, there
is a motivating example to illuminate the approach, before the formal mechanism
of enhanced abduction and framework of verification are gathered.
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Chapter 7 presents our system implementation, the experimental results, and our
observations and experience with the evaluation of the proposed approaches.
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis and discusses possible future works.
1.7 Summary
This chapter has presented an overall view of this thesis. It introduces briefly the
current approaches to software quality assurance, sets out the motivation and ob-
jectives of this thesis, describes the challenges faced and the criteria to evaluate the
work accomplished by the whole thesis. Finally it exhibits the organisation of the




The general idea of program verification and analysis has a long and distinguished
history in computer science. As early as in the 1960s and 1970s, provident people
have already foreseen the potential need of approaches to formal reasoning of increas-
ingly sophisticated computer programs (Floyd, 1967; Hoare, 1969; Dijkstra, 1976).
After having developed for over 40 years, this field has witnessed many significant
techniques (such as modelling, verification and analysis) grown up, and it always
encourages prominent researchers to pay their effort and form an active community
of research. Upon their achievements, this chapter will provide a brief survey from
the initialisation to the state-of-the-art in this area, so as to locate the position of
my thesis among them.
As we target at the verification of pointer-based programs with partial information,
the survey presented here mainly comprises relevant research of this work. Its main
content is divided into two parts. The first part is about some techniques exploited
in our work, including Hoare logic which we use to verify programs, separation logic
to model the memory state of programs, and abstract interpretation which we take
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as the standard framework to analyse programs. The second part concerns appli-
cations of these techniques to verify/analyse programs, including the verification of
shape (and related) properties, some program analyses built on the basis of abstract
interpretation, shape analysis to infer shape properties about programs, and verifi-
cation of software systems with unknown components. Finally we will take a note of
model checking, which represents another important stream of program verification
(yet fairly different from what is used in this thesis).
2.1 Hoare Logic and Program Verification
Hoping to verify that people’s programs will run according to their intention, the
first two outrunners of Hoare logic are R. W. Floyd and C. A. R. Hoare, with
two foundational papers for program verification (Floyd, 1967; Hoare, 1969). They
introduce the concept of partial and total correctness and set up the logical base of
program verification. Especially the latter one proposes an approach that uses an
elucidation of sets of axioms and rules of inference which can be used in deductive
reasoning and proofs of the properties of computer programs to set up the axiomatic
semantics of computer programs. Therefore such semantics is sometimes called
Hoare logic from then on. A later work (Dijkstra, 1976) presents the notion of
weakest precondition proven as equivalent as the former. Burstall (1974) integrates
operational semantics for programs with the formal verification method mentioned
here.
Since then a large number of publications are devoted to Hoare logic. The total cor-
rectness version of Hoare calculus is presented in Manna and Pnueli (1974), capable
of proving that a program can terminate and is logically correct, which extends
Hoare’s method by proving correctness and termination at once. The notions of
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expressiveness and relative completeness are introduced in Cook (1978), which finds
that Hoare logic is only complete in a certain sense, relative to his interpretive se-
mantics. Clarke (1979) researches on the expressiveness of finite interpretations,
with the result that certain programming languages can not possess a sound and
relatively complete Hoare calculus, because the halting problem is undecidable for
the languages, even if the underlying interpretation is finite. Lipton (1977) claims
that the only expressive interpretations should be the standard interpretation of
Peano arithmetic and the finite interpretation.
The verification and analysis presented in this thesis are essentially founded on
the basis of Hoare logic. As will be seen in later chapters, our abstract program
semantics used for symbolic executions of programs are based on Hoare logic, or
more specifically separation logic (as an extension of Hoare logic), which is surveyed
in the next section.
2.2 Separation Logic
For the modelling of program’s memory state, we use the technique of separation
logic (O’Hearn and Pym, 1999; Reynolds, 1999; O’Hearn et al., 2001; Reynolds,
2002). In this section we will have a brief introduction to its history.
As a prototype of separation logic, O’Hearn and Pym (1999) introduces a logic of
bunched implications (BI) which is merged from two parts: additive intuitionistic
logic and multiplicative intuitionistic linear logic. Models of propositional BI’s proofs
are given by bi-cartesian doubly closed categories, combining freely semantics from
both logic families. This work also develops a first-order predicate version of BI
with newly invented universal and existential quantifiers.
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However, BI is no more than a theoretical logic model until Reynolds has presented
his work (Reynolds, 1999) to reason about resource-sensitive programs, whose logic
model is analogous to BI’s. Generally it is an extension of Hoare’s approach to
proving the correctness of imperative programs that perform destructive updates to
data structures containing more than one pointer to the same location. It invents an
“independent conjunction” P & Q that holds only when P and Q are both true and
depend upon distinct areas of storage, whose semantics is exactly the same as the
linear conjunction of BI. It is a nice coincidence that they come to the same point
from two different ways, which happened several times in the history of computer
science such as Turing’s computing machine and Church’s λ-calculus.
After that these two branches of research group have cooperated to deliver a series of
works (O’Hearn et al., 2001; Reynolds, 2002) to set up the foundation of separation
logic which can be used to reason about heap memory state. Reynolds (2002)
adds two more connectives to classical logic: separation conjunction ∗ and spacial
implication −∗. The formula ∆1 ∗ ∆2 asserts that two heaps described by ∆1 and ∆2
are domain-disjoint, while ∆1−∗ ∆2 asserts that if the current heap is extended with a
disjoint heap described by ∆1, then ∆2 holds in the extended heap. Such connectives
are supported by a low-level storage model based on both the stack and the heap
memory. In this model, four sets are assumed: Loc of memory locations, Val of
primitive values (with 0 ∈ Val denoting null), Var of variables (program and logical
variables), and ObjVal of object values stored in the heap, with c[f1 7→ν1, . . . , fn 7→νn]
denoting an object value of data type c where ν1, . . . , νn are current values of the
corresponding fields f1, . . . , fn. Then a concrete memory state h, s, consisting of
heap and stack, is from the following concrete domains:
h ∈ Heaps =df Loc ⇀fin ObjVal
s ∈ Stacks =df Var→ Val ∪ Loc
This model supports the basic program operations such as lookup, update, allocation
and deallocation with a series of Hoare logic style reasoning rules. It also provides
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unrestricted memory address arithmetic. In the paper the frame rule
{P} C {Q}
{P ∗R} C {Q ∗R} mods(C) ∩ fv(R) = ∅
is emphasised as the base of local reasoning, because it allows the reasoning of pro-
grams to concentrate on programs’ footprint, namely, the variables that the program
actually manipulates, instead of a large global heap state. This is important as it
entitles the reasoning with the potential to scale up. Separation logic’s assertion
language is also formalised on a possible worlds model of BI. The soundness and
relative completeness are also discussed in the paper, as well as latest results of sep-
aration logic with the illustration of its possible applications in the field of program
reasoning.
For separation logic itself, there are some other works to address. Yang and O’Hearn
(2002) presents a semantic analysis of the soundness and relative completeness of
separation logic for the frame axiom to be inferred automatically, with the result
that it can be avoided when writing specifications. Calcagno et al. (2001) discusses
on some computability and complexity results of separation logic, where it points
out that the validity of separation logic formulae is not decidable; however the
validity over a restricted subset of separation logic formulae is fortunately decidable
with certain complexity. Following it, Berdine et al. (2004) provides a fragment
of separation logic whose entailment checking problem is decidable with a sound
and complete algorithm to solve it, which plays an important theoretical role in
their later works of program analysis. Calcagno et al. (2007) studies the semantic
structures lying behind separation logic by the concept of local action, which is a
state transformer that mutates the state in a local way. It formulates local actions for
a class of models called separation algebras, abstracting from the memory and other
specific concrete models used in work on separation logic. Local actions provide a
semantics for a generalised form of (sequential) separation logic, and allow a general




As for the analysis of programs, Cousot has proposed a series of foundational
works (Cousot and Cousot, 1976, 1977; Cousot and Halbwachs, 1978) to introduce
the framework of abstract interpretation. The first one (Cousot and Cousot, 1976)
introduces the basic way to use “abstract” (symbolic) values associated with vari-
ables instead of the “concrete” values during real execution of the program. For
example, if we choose two domains, one being natural numbers N as the concrete
domain recording concrete values of variables, and the other being the set S of
integer intervals as the abstract domain, then we define two functions α and γ as
α(N) = [min(N),max(N)], N ⊆ N
γ(s) = s, s ⊆ N
where we write [n,+∞) as [n,+∞] for expression convenience. Here we call α the
abstraction function and γ the concretisation function, since the first one maps
a set of concrete values to an abstract value, and the second one runs in the re-
versed way. Note that we have the relationship ∀N ∈ P(N) ·N ⊆ γ(α(N)) and
∀s ∈ S · s = α(γ(s)). Thus these two functions create a Galois connection to link
the two domains together. In an analysis when we are confronted with an infinite
increasing chain 1, 2, 3, . . . as the value sequence of some variable, we can condense
it as an abstract value [1,+∞] in S to force convergence. The paper then interprets
the basic operations of the programming language in this setting accordingly.
On the basis of the first work, the second one (Cousot and Cousot, 1977) proposes
an approach to an approximation of fixed-point to construct a unified lattice model
for static program analysis. Its general idea is to have some ordering over both
concrete and abstract states and an induced (complete) semi-lattice over them, and
regard the (recursive) program being analysed as a transition function f , which is
monotonic over the concrete domain (and lifted to the abstract domain). Then the
20
2.3. Abstract Interpretation
least fixed-point of f (lfp f) can be considered as the semantics of f , which may be
computed with a fixed-point iteration process.
The third work (Cousot and Halbwachs, 1978) is a utilisation of the first two to
discover the assertions (of linear type) that can be deduced from the semantics of
the program. It can often discover relations which are never stated explicitly in the
program.
After that Cousots still have consequent works to make the framework of abstract
interpretation more complete. Cousot and Cousot (1979) exhibits a systematic way
to design program analysis frameworks. It shows a (both forward and backward)
deductive semantics of programs as the standard of soundness, based on which
it studies the design of a space of approximate assertions, and the design of the
approximate predicate transformer induced by such assertions. In this way it brings
forward some global program analysis methods. This framework is an excellent
foundation for other program analysis practice, while its semantics is rectified again
in a later work (Cousot, 1981).
For the approximation methods in the fixed-point calculation of abstract interpre-
tation, Cousot and Cousot (1977) also introduces some initial ways which are still
frequently referenced today. One is static in that it can be understood as the sim-
plification of the equation involved in the concrete semantics into an approximate
abstract equation, whose solution provides the abstract semantics. Galois connec-
tions are used in this method to formalise this discrete approximation process. The
second is dynamic in that it takes place during the iterative resolution of the abstract
equation (or system of equations). This separation introduces additional flexibility
allowing for both expressiveness and efficiency. It also introduces the idea of using
widening and narrowing operators (∇ and 4) to accelerate/force convergence for
fixed-point approximation (especially when the lattice is of infinite height and does
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not satisfy the ascending chain condition). An instance of this follows the previous
example of natural real numbers and intervals. For this example we may have a
widening operator ∇ by choosing a finite ramp
0 = r0 < r1 < · · · < rk = +∞
and the widening’s definition is
∅∇ [l′, h′] = [l′, h′], or
[l, h]∇ [l′, h′] = [ if l
′ < l then max{ri|ri ≤ l′} else l,
if h′ > h then min{ri|h′ ≤ ri} else h ]
such that if we choose rk−1 = 1, then when we have an infinite ascending chain
during the analysis [0, 0], [0, 1], [0, 2], . . . we can use ∇ to widen each state with its
consecutive state in order to make the chain converge as [0, 0], [0, 1], [0,+∞]. This
idea is essential in the work because it offers a way to deal with infinite lattices
not satisfying the ascending chain condition or to speed up convergence in case of
combinatorial explosion.
In this thesis we also apply a technique related to abstract interpretation to im-
plement our analysis, viz. constraint abstraction (Gustavsson and Svenningsson,
2001). Its kernel idea is to view the program being analysed as a transition function
(constraint), then abstract this function as an appropriate form according to the
program’s denotational semantics, and solve the obtained constraint abstraction on
the program state lattice to get the analysis result. For example, for a while loop
while(x > 0) { x = x− 1; y = y+ 1; }
to start in a state {x>0 ∧ y=0}, we can utilise constraint abstraction to infer its
invariant, as the invariant reflects the transition from the initial state to the current
state by the while loop. We denote the constraint abstraction representing this loop
as Q(x, y, x′, y′) where x and y are initial values of variables x and y, and x′ and y′
are their current values, then Q can be computed from the loop body as
Q(x, y, x′, y′) ≡ (x≤0 ∧ x=x′ ∧ y=y′) ∨ (x>0 ∧ Q(x−1, y+1, x′, y′))
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where we can observe that Q is inductively defined on itself, suggesting the recursive
nature of the while loop. For this constraint abstraction, we may execute a stan-
dard fixed-point iteration process armed with widening operations from Cousot and
Cousot (1977) to find one of its fixed-points as x−x′ = y′−y, which is exactly the
loop invariant that we are after.
2.4 Verification of Shape Properties
From this section on we will turn away from techniques we use to relevant works of
this thesis. Our aim of research is to provide a verification system to verify shape
and relevant properties of heap-manipulating programs with partial information. In
this field there have been active similar efforts, especially for the verification and
analysis of memory consumption and manipulation, as discussed below.
Smallfoot (Berdine et al., 2005b) is a verification tool based on separation logic.
It makes use of a symbolic execution designed to work with a fixed set of shape
predicates, most notably the list segment predicate (Berdine et al., 2005a). It is
the first attempt to use separation logic in the verification of pointer safety and
simple shape properties. The data structures and properties that they verify are
quite simple compared with our user-defined predicates.
Another work on this aspect, Java Modelling Language (JML), is a behavioural
interface specification language designed to specify the behaviours and interfaces
of Java programs (Leavens et al., 2000; Burdy et al., 2005; Leavens et al., 2006).
The design of JML is heavily influenced by the model-based approach of Larch,
in particular the Larch/C++ works by Leavens and others (Cheon and Leavens,
1994; Leavens and Baker, 1999). The language has attracted significant research
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attention, resulting in a number of tools supporting JML, ranging from run-time
assertion checking tools (Cheon, 2003) to static time verifiers (Catan˜o and Huisman,
2003; Cok and Kiniry, 2004). There have also been efforts to apply JML on a larger
scale (Poll et al., 2001; Schmitt et al., 2006).
For the features of JML, its specifications, which consist of Java expressions and
some additional keywords, are embedded as specially-formatted comments in Java
source code. JML supports specification constructs such as model fields, ghost fields,
and model methods. A model field is an abstract representation of some concrete
states; the link between these two are given using the JML’s represents clause,
which syntactically distinguishes whether the relationship is functional, or relational.
Our approach, on the other hand, uses predicate parameters in lieu of specification
variables. The dependency of the predicate parameters and concrete program states
are captured by the predicate definitions, which can capture both functional and
relational dependencies in a uniform manner.
Extended Static Checking for Java (ESC/Java) (Flanagan et al., 2002), developed
at Compaq Systems Research Centre, aims to detect more errors than “traditional”
static checking tools, but is not designed to be a program verification system. The
stated goals of ESC/Java are scalability and usability. For that, it forgoes soundness
for the potential benefits of more automation and faster verification time. However,
it is not a sound checker in the sense that it may miss errors, i.e. it cannot guarantee
the absence of certain class of errors. The ESC/Java effort is continued with ES-
C/Java2 (Cok and Kiniry, 2004), which adds support for current versions of Java,
and verifies more JML constructs. One significant addition is the support for model
fields and method calls within annotations (Cok, 2005).
Spec] (Barnett et al., 2004b) is a programming system developed at Microsoft Re-
search. It is an attempt at verifying programs written in the C] programming
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language. It adds constructs tailored to program verification such as pre- and post-
conditions, frame conditions, non-null types, object invariants, etc. Spec] programs
are verified by the Boogie verifier (Barnett et al., 2006), which uses Simplify (Detlefs
et al., 2005) and Z3 (de Moura and Bjørner, 2008) to discharge its proof obligations.
Spec] also supports runtime assertion checking.
Spec] supports object invariants but leaves the decision of when to enforce/assume
object invariants to the user. It adds special fields to each object, which can be
mentioned explicitly in method pre- and post-conditions. The values of these fields
determine if the object invariant is enforced by the corresponding method con-
tract (Barnett et al., 2004a). In order to verify object invariant modularly, Spec]
employs an ownership scheme that allows an object o to own its representation —-
objects that are reachable from o and are part of o’s abstract state. The owner-
ship scheme in Spec] forces a top-down unpacking of the objects for updates, and a
bottom-up packing for re-establishing the object invariant. The packing and unpack-
ing of objects are done explicitly by having programmers writing special commands
in method bodies.
There is yet another success in shape analysis and verification, that is, Hob and
Jahob. The former one is designed to verify data structure consistency proper-
ties (Lam, 2007), which incorporates multiple analyses, called analysis plug-ins,
to verify diverse properties of global data structures (Kuncak et al., 2006). Dif-
ferent analysis plug-ins communicate program states by using boolean algebra of
sets with cardinality constraints. The language is expressive enough to allow Hob
to encode and verify a number of application-specific properties. Apart from this
common specification language, each analysis plug-in maintains its own internal
representation of program states. Hob provides a way for the plug-ins to link their
own representation with the common abstraction by using abstraction modules.
The analysis-plug-in architecture has the important flexibility of allowing different
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analyses with different precision/scalability trade-offs to work on different modules
of the same program, which could open up the possibility of having larger programs
verified.
Jahob (Kuncak et al., 2006; Kuncak, 2007) continues Hob’s effort in using different
analyses to verify complex properties of linked data structures. However, Jahob
deviates from Hob in some important aspects. Instead of using specially-designed
implementation and specification languages like Hob does, it uses a subset of Java
as its implementation language and a subset of the Isabelle/HOL (Nipkow et al.,
2002) language as its specification language; it also works on instantiable data struc-
tures, as opposed to Hob’s global data structures. Jahob develops a technique to
combine multiple theorem provers (Klarlund and Møller, 2001; Nipkow et al., 2002;
Detlefs et al., 2005) to reason about expressive logical formulas in Higher Order
Logic (HOL). It makes full use of each theorem prover’s advantageous point, which
is the key feature of this verification system.
Finally, our work is based on the improvement of another state-of-the-art program
verifier Hip/Sleek (Nguyen et al., 2007; Chin et al., 2007; Nguyen and Chin, 2008).
Its overview is given in Figure 2.1. The front-end of the system is a standard Hoare-
style forward verifier Hip, which invokes the separation logic prover Sleek. The
Hip verifier comprises a set of forward verification rules to systematically check that
the precondition is satisfied at each call site, and that the declared postcondition is
successfully verified (assuming the given precondition) for each method definition.
For the separation logic prover Sleek, given two program states ∆1 and ∆2, it
attempts to prove that ∆1 entails ∆2; if it succeeds, it returns a frame R such that
∆1 ` ∆2 ∗ R. As discussed previously, it can express and process multiple types
of program properties such as shape, quantitative and content ones in program
states ∆. We want to keep all its merits and improve it by dealing with partial
information in verification. Meanwhile, we also use the Sleek tool as our main
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Figure 2.1: The Hip/Sleek verification system.
solver for entailment checking.
Our project will be different from the aforementioned ones in the techniques em-
ployed (like separation logic and entailment checking) in that we can describe the
shape properties in a more natural way from the user’s perspective and still remain
expressive and computationally feasible. Meanwhile we also try to verify programs
that are provided with only partial information by inferring constraints to complete
the partial specification and to describe the missing part of the partial program.
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2.5 Program Analysis for General Program Prop-
erties
To automate the verification process, program analysis techniques are widely ap-
plied on the basis of abstract interpretation. This section surveys those analyses
for general program properties, such as numerical properties like the value range
of program variables. The pioneer work in this field is what we have already intro-
duced (Cousot and Cousot, 1976). It begins with the basic “program units” to study
each’s behaviour in an intra-procedural analysis, and then the behaviour among dif-
ferent procedures is put into consideration to form the inter-procedural analysis. In
this way it initialises the research in this area. Next we will survey some more recent
ones.
Reps et al. (1995) shows how to analyse programs precisely with finite abstract
domains and distributive transfer functions. Its means is to transform such dataflow
analysis problems into a special kind of graph reachability problem. It promises
precision while also controls the time complexity in polynomial scale.
For more recent works, Mu¨ller-Olm and Seidl (2004); Popeea and Chin (2006); Gul-
wani and Tiwari (2007) present precise inter-procedural analyses with linear equal-
ities. The first (Mu¨ller-Olm and Seidl, 2004) applies linear algebra techniques to
precise dataflow analysis to describe analyses determined for each program point
identities that are valid among the program variables whenever control reaches that
program point (as their main approach). They fully interpret assignment state-
ments with affine expressions on the right hand side to compute the set of all affine
relations and polynomial relations of bounded degree. Their complexity is worth
noting to be linear to program size and polynomial to the number of variables. The
second (Popeea and Chin, 2006) also introduces the notion of affinity to characterise
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how closely related a pair of polyhedra is. Then they try to find related elements in
the polyhedron (base) domain to allow the formulation of precise hull and widening
operators lifted to the disjunctive (powerset extension of the) polyhedron domain.
In this way they effectively prevent the original convex-hull’s loss of precision. The
third (Gulwani and Tiwari, 2007) uses a backward analysis to propagate information
with “generic assertions” facilitating inter-procedural analysis and simplify such as-
sertions with unification. Their analysis and implementation are constructed on this
technique. In our work, we can utilise their achievements as solvers to some part of
our combined domain, for example, the numerical constraint abstraction generated
from the original program we want to verify.
2.6 Pointer, Alias and Shape Analysis
As a significant branch of program analysis, the analysis of pointer and memory
safety became a heated research topic in early 1990s (Landi and Ryder, 1992; Choi
et al., 1993). Pointer analysis is a static code analysis technique that establishes
which pointers, or heap references, can point to which variables or storage locations,
and such result may be used in a program verification for pointer-related properties.
Pointer analysis itself still has several branches such as alias analysis (Emami, 1993)
and shape analysis (Sagiv et al., 2002), which are investigated in sequence.
For aliasing analyses, Chatterjee et al. (1999); Cheng and Hwu (2000) propose two
modular approaches. The first (Chatterjee et al., 1999) presents a modular tech-
nique for flow-sensitive and context-sensitive dataflow analysis of statically typed
object-oriented programming languages such as C++ and Java, namely, relevant
context inference. It can be used to analyse complete programs as well as partial
programs such as libraries and is totally statical. The main part of their method is
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a modular way of analysing the method bodies separately before the calling context
information, while they also study all the valid program paths in an analysis. The
second work (Cheng and Hwu, 2000) is similar in the light that it uses access paths
as well to perform a modular pointer analysis, while it addresses the context in the
analysis, including program flow and context sensitivity, to avoid the overhead of
representing context-sensitive transfer functions.
Recently Yorsh et al. (2008) shows how to combine finite type state with aliasing
analysis. It advocates that their framework for generating procedure summaries is
both precise (applying the summary in a given context yields the same result as
re-analysing the procedure in that context) and concise (the summary exploits the
commonalities in the exact ways the procedure manipulates abstract values). For
this sake they define a class of abstract domains and transformers, which can be
instantiated to perform the analysis.
In the field of shape analysis, there are also a series of distinguished works. Sagiv
et al. (1999, 2002) represent the initial works on this aspect. It is a summating
work as it provides a parametric framework for shape analysis that can be instan-
tiated in different ways to create different shape analysis algorithms that provide
varying degrees of efficiency and precision. Many works have been built on this
framework, such as Mo¨ller and Schwartzbach (2001) and Wies et al. (2007), etc. It
is also extended by Lee et al. (2005) which exhibits a grammar-based shape analysis
with grammar annotations in order to express the shape of complex data structures
precisely.
Rinetzky et al. (2005) presents a shape analysis method that uses a characterisation
of a procedure’s behaviour in which parts of the heap not relevant to the procedure
are ignored. Actually this shares the same idea as separation logic does, but its
semantics is LSL, and their static analysis algorithm is founded on the abstract
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interpretation of LSL.
Similar as our motivation, Lahiri and Qadeer (2006) bases shape analysis on ver-
ification. Its main technical contribution is a novel method for verifying linked
lists based on two new predicates that characterise reachability of heap cells; these
two predicates also allow reasoning about both acyclic and cyclic lists. Meanwhile,
it proposes a concept of well-foundedness which is useful for our preceding work
Hip/Sleek (Nguyen et al., 2007).
Hackett and Rugina (2005) uses local reasoning about individual heap locations,
instead of global reasoning about entire heap abstractions. They build the shape
abstraction and analysis on top of a pointer analysis, and decompose the shape
abstraction into a set of independent configurations, each of which characterises one
single heap location. One key feature of their analysis is that it can be used to
enable the static detection of memory errors in programs with explicit deallocation.
Manevich (2009) presents some new “partially disjunctive” shape analyses aimed at
taming the size of the state space by abstracting disjunctions, as well as soundly
approximating program statements. It implements and applies these analyses to
prove properties of sequential programs and fine-grained concurrent programs, with
respect to several properties, including cleanness properties, shape invariants, and
linearisability of concurrent data structure implementations.
Another important stream of analysis work done in separation logic is Berdine
et al. (2005a); Distefano et al. (2006); Gotsman et al. (2006); Yang et al. (2008);
Calcagno et al. (2009). Among them, Distefano et al. (2006) follows the method of
Smallfoot’s symbolic execution of certain separation logic formulae called symbolic
heaps (Berdine et al., 2005a). As a result, it also uses the linked list and its segment
predicates, as in their former verification work, to perform intra-procedure inference
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on while-loops. Gotsman et al. (2006) proposes an inter-procedural shape analysis
that makes use of spatial locality (i.e. the fact that most procedures modify only a
small subset of the heap) in its representation of abstract states. In fact they uses
separation logic itself to express the shape properties. However, they only use the
original pointing-to assertion provided by separation logic instead of one more level
of abstraction. They track reachability information indirectly and aliasing informa-
tion directly, which is an important feature of their work. Following these works,
two other significant papers (Yang et al., 2008; Calcagno et al., 2009) prove the fea-
sibility of their approaches by successfully analysing parts of medium- and large-size
scales software, including device drivers and system software such as OpenSSH and
Linux distributions. They accomplished these objectives by tuning the join operator
used in the analysis and applying abductive reasoning to discover full specifications
for programs.
There are also works addressing program analyses for both shape and other program
properties on the basis of separation logic. THOR (Magill et al., 2007, 2008) advo-
cates to separate the analysis of shape properties from that of other properties, by
deriving an approximated numerical program from the original heap-manipulating
program. This idea is similar as this thesis. In the development of the THOR tool,
Magill et al. (2007, 2008) propose an adaptive shape analysis where additional nu-
merical analysis can be used to help gain better precision. Its abstraction mechanism
is also employed in C-to-gate hardware synthesis (Cook et al., 2009). Very recently,
Magill et al. (2010) formulates a novel instrumentation process which inserts nu-
merical instructions into programs, based on their shape analysis and user-provided
predicates. Instrumented programs can then be used to generate pure numerical
programs for further analysis.
With respect to the content of data structure, Ireland (2007) proposes a coopera-
tive approach. In that work the author applies the symbolic evaluation technique
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of THOR’s, and specifies the loop invariant as a combination of two parts: the
shape part and the schematic content part. This approach concentrates more on
the automation of the analysis, at the cost of generating possibly unsound invari-
ants. Therefore a middle-out proof planning procedure is employed to rule out such
invariants. As an improvement, Maclean et al. (2009) attempts to refine the ob-
tained invariants and uses IsaPlanner (Dixon, 2005) to handle meta-variables and
goal-naming issues. With these techniques it can perform analysis (for instance over
its illustrative array example) for both memory safety and functional correctness.
Combining the two features above together, Bouajjani et al. (2010) can handle both
numerical and (restricted) content of linked lists at the same time. They synthesise
list-related invariants over infinite data domains using graph heap representation.
The synthesised invariants are able to capture various aspects of data structures,
such as the size, the sum or the multiset of linked list, relations of the data at linearly
ordered or successive positions.
The above groups of works mainly focus on list data structure. For non-linear data
structures, Chang et al. (2007); Chang and Rival (2008) design an abstract domain
in separation logic that is parameterised both by an abstract domain for pure data
properties and by user-supplied specifications of the data structure invariants to
check. It supports various types of invariants about shape and data and features
a mechanism for materialising summaries. Upon this domain, they build a shape
analysis using abstract interpretation and a widening operator over the combined
shape and data domain.
Compared in general with the works stated above, this thesis focuses more on the
verification of shape and its relevant properties, whereas it also exploits shape analy-
sis techniques to deal with the partial information in target programs. To handle
memory safety as well as functional correctness of heap-manipulating programs, we
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work on a combined abstract domain which is more complex than previous works,
and we aim to infer both preconditions and postconditions for methods starting
from partial information, which is outstanding from the aforementioned results.
2.7 Verification of Programs with Unknown Com-
ponents
Program analysis techniques are employed to discover unknown program specifica-
tions/invariants, while there are also techniques to verify programs with unknown
components, where some program code is not available to the verifier.
Black-box testing (Beizer, 1996) views the unknown components in programs as
black-boxes to test their functionality. It has certain patterns for users to design
pairs of input and output, and use them to test whether the program meets people’s
expectations. This approach is now widely applied in software industry; however, in
essence it is a method of testing instead of verification; therefore it cannot formally
prove the absence of program bugs. Especially in safety-critical systems a bug failed
to be found by such testing may cause catastrophic result, as described in Chap-
ter 1. The same problem also applies to some similar approaches like specification
mining (Ammons et al., 2002). For unknown components of a program, It discovers
possible specifications for them by observing the program’s execution and traces,
which is also dynamically performed and bears the same non-exhaustion problem.
For such problem, static verifiers/analysers are more proficient, as they can ex-
plore all possible program states. However, for programs with unknown compo-
nents, existing verifiers/analysers usually do not perform very well. For example,
SpaceInvader (Calcagno et al., 2009) simply assumes the program and the unknown
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procedure have disjoint memory footprints so that the unknown call can be safely
ignored due to the hypothetical frame rule (O’Hearn et al., 2004), whereas this as-
sumption does not hold in many cases. Some other verification approaches (Emami
et al., 1994; Gopan and Reps, 2007) attempt to take into account all possible im-
plementations for the unknown component. The first one (Emami et al., 1994) is
founded on a points-to analysis with context-sensitive inter-procedural information
which captures all calling contexts. The second one (Gopan and Reps, 2007) looks
at library functions’ low-level implementation to construct summary information for
linked libraries with no source code available. However, for these methods, there
can be too many such candidates in general, and hence the verification might be
infeasible for large-scaled programs.
It is also notable that the similar problem is addressed by some model checking
works. (Model checking is yet another stream of program correctness proof which
will be introduced in the next section.) Peled et al. (1999) tries to test whether an im-
plementation with unknown structure satisfies some given properties, and proposes
an approach by learning and adjusting the checking process via experiments, known
as black box checking. Li et al. (2002) represents a decompositional approach able
to check feature-oriented (open) software designs which may cause false alarms. Xie
and Dang (2005) is also a decompositional method integrating features from both
testing and model checking. They reduce the testing of the global system down to
the testing of each black-box, and generate test sequences for each individual box
using an automata-theoretic approach. Their method is sound and complete, but
the properties that it may test are very limited.
Compared with the approaches above, our work is exhaustive in finding a specific
type of program bugs, is sound with respect to program semantics, and meanwhile
still have the potential to scale up because we do not consider all possible implemen-
tations to an unknown component. The program properties that we focus on include
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strong program invariants about data structure’s shape, size, relational information
and content, which are rather difficult for existing tools that can verify programs
with unknown components.
2.8 Model Checking
Model checking (Clarke and Emerson, 1981) represents a fairly different approach
to the proof of software correctness. It was originally designed to verify finite-state
systems by exhausting the whole set of computation states according to some spec-
ification described in temporal logic, and achieved great success on circuit design
and implementation (McMillan, 1992). Such success intrigued researchers’ interest in
applying model checking to the field of software. The key technique for such applica-
tion is abstraction (like predicate abstraction (Ball et al., 2001) and counterexample-
guided abstraction refinement (Clarke et al., 2000, 2003)), as software usually has in-
finite computation states which are beyond the capability of model checking. These
abstractions are even borrowed in some analysis works, such as Sagiv et al. (2002);
Balaban et al. (2005). With appropriate abstraction techniques, model checking
tools are generally automatic and thus requires no user intervention. Some repre-
sentatives of such tools include the general framework of model checkers SPIN (Holz-
mann, 2004), the SLAM model checker for drivers (Ball and Rajamani, 2001), the
BLAST model checker for C programs with lazy counterexample-guided abstrac-
tion refinement (Henzinger et al., 2003) and Java PathFinder for Java programs by
NASA (Visser et al., 2003). In this thesis, we employ a slightly different Hoare logic
based approach to verify the program properties (including shape and others) with




This chapter has surveyed the state-of-the-art in the field of software quality as-
surance, especially program verification and analysis. It mainly covers two types
of topics, one being the foundational techniques that we use in this thesis, and the







In this chapter our programming and specification languages are introduced to-
gether with their semantics. We use a standard object-based programming language
(to write the programs being verified) and a predicate-based specification language
(to express program specifications and abstract program states). Our predicates
are inductively defined as in Hip/Sleek (Nguyen et al., 2007; Chin et al., 2007;
Nguyen and Chin, 2008; Chin et al., 2010), and can capture recursive data struc-
tures with sophisticated program properties involving not only structural aspects
but also quantitative aspects as well as content of data structures. In what follows,
we will first define the programming language, then give a brief introduction to the
separation logic we use as a base for our specification language, and finally design





The programming language used in our system is a typed object-based language
which may be viewed as a subset of popular type-safe programming languages such
as Java or C]. Its grammar is formally defined in Figure 3.1.
A program Prog in our language consists of a list of type declarations tdecl and a list
of procedure definitions meth. The type declarations include class types classt used
in programs, user-defined predicates spred for specifications, and lemmas lemma.
(We will leave spred and lemma until Section 3.3 as they are more for the spec-
ification language.) Compared with those fully-fledged object-oriented languages,
our language has omitted some features orthogonal to this thesis’ interest, such as
inheritance and dynamic dispatch, concurrency, array, exception, and so on. The
semantics of most constructs of the language are understood in the usual sense that
one would find in languages such as Java or C], except for the class declaration,
which declares a class type without instance procedures or dynamic dispatch. Other
than that, they behave like normal classes: instances of a class type can be (dynam-
ically) allocated, their fields read (v.f) and updated (v.f = w), references to them
passed to and from procedures, etc. (In this sense they are more like a struct in
the C language.) A type t can either be a class type or a primitive built-in type.
For the users to express program specifications, our language includes annotations
for procedures and loops. Each procedure meth is decorated with its specifications
mspec. Note that annotations for loops are not written in the traditional style of loop
invariants, but rather in the same way as procedure contracts (where Φpr ∗→Φpo).
This facilitates our conversion from loops to tail-recursive procedures so as to treat
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Program Prog ::= tdecl meth
Type declaration tdecl ::= classt | spred | lemma
Class declaration classt ::= class c { field }
Field declaration field ::= t v
Type t ::= c | τ
Procedure declaration meth ::= t mn ((t v); (t v)) mspec {e}
Built-in type τ ::= int | bool | void
Expression e ::= d heap-insensitive atomic
| d[v] heap-sensitive atomic
| v=e assignment
| e1; e2 sequence
| t v; e local variable
| if (v) e1 else e2
| while v {e} where Φpr ∗→Φpo
Heap-insensitive atomic d ::= - skip
| null null reference
| kτ constant
| v variable
| new c(v) allocation
| mn(u;v) method call
Heap-sensitive atomic d[v] ::= v.f field read
| v.f=w field write
| free(v) deallocation
Figure 3.1: A core (Java-like) imperative language.
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them in the same manner as normal procedures. For this sake, we support both pass-
by-value and pass-by-reference parameters, which are separated with a semicolon ;
where the ones before ; are pass-by-value and the ones after are pass-by-reference.
The grammar for these annotations will be presented in Section 3.3. The meaning
of a pair of precondition and postcondition is that if the procedure is invoked in a
program state satisfying its precondition, the procedure will not have any memory
faults such as null or dangling pointer dereferences. Furthermore, if the procedure
terminates, it terminates in a state that satisfies the postcondition. Otherwise, if
the program state does not satisfy the precondition, then the verification fails and
a catastrophic error is reported with its location in the program. In other words,
we adopt the partial correctness semantics of Hoare triples with tight interpreta-
tion (Yang and O’Hearn, 2002).
Without loss of generality, our language is expression-oriented, so the body of a
method is an expression composed of standard instructions and constructors of the
language. e is the (recursively defined) program constructor, and d and d[v] are
atomic instructions. Here d[v] has some specific requirement over the memory state
(such that v must be allocated at a valid part of heap memory) and is therefore
named heap-sensitive atomic instruction, whereas d does not have such require-
ments and is called heap-insensitive atomic instruction. As will be seen in later
chapters, these two sorts of instructions are treated differently during the analysis
of a program.
We have some further assumptions over the programs, so that they are well-formed
according to the following rules. Each program should be type-safe. Classes, predi-
cates and procedures should have distinct names. Local variables in the same scope
are distinct. Meanwhile, we do not allow the syntactic sugar for local variables to




This section defines the operational semantics of our programming language. Before
doing that, we first define the semantic domains. Locations in our system correspond
to object identifiers (which can be practically regarded as memory locations). Val-
ues include primitive values, locations, and the special value null that does not
correspond to any object identifier. Objects are finite partial maps that map field
names to values. Primitive values include integer numbers and boolean values.
The operational semantics for our language is a small-step semantics which are
essentially transitions between machine configurations. Each machine configuration
is a triple consisting of:
• Heap h. We model heaps as finite partial maps from locations to objects.
Objects are expected to conform to their defined class types.
• Stack s. Stacks are modelled as finite partial maps from variables to values.
Note that it is viewed as a “stackable” mapping, where a variable v may occur
several times, and s(v) always refers to the value of the variable v that was
popped in most recently.1
• Current program code e. Program execution terminates when e is -, a value
of type void.
For simplicity, we assume that all while loops are already transformed to tail-
recursive methods with pass-by-reference parameters. Each reduction step can then
1A more formal definition for s would mark different occurrences of the same variable with
different “frame” numbers. We omit the details here.
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be formalised as a small-step transition of the form:
〈s, h, e〉↪→〈s1, h1, e1〉
The full set of transitions is given in Figure 3.2. We explain some of the notations
used in them. The operation [v 7→ ν] + s “pushes” the variable v to s with the
value ν, and ([v 7→ ν] + s)(v) = ν. The operation s− v “pops out” variables v from
the stack s. s[v 7→k] is a mapping which keeps all the mappings in s except that
of v (which is now specified to be mapped to k). We also abuse this notation
for a class type identifier c to denote a region of heap (mappings) in the form
c[f1 7→s(v1), . . . , fn 7→s(vn)], which is essentially a heap location where fields fi are
further mapped to values s(vi), i = 1, . . . , n. ⊥ represents an arbitrary value. We
also introduce an intermediate construct as results returned by expressions/method
calls ret(v, e), where v will be dropped from s after the evaluation/invocation of e,
to simulate the behaviour of stack. Whenever such a result is yielded, we assume it
is stored in a special logical variable res, although res is never explicitly put in the
stack s.
3.2 Separation Logic
Our specification language is built on top of separation logic (O’Hearn and Pym,
1999; Reynolds, 1999; Ishtiaq and O’Hearn, 2001; Reynolds, 2002), designed for rea-
soning about programs that manipulate shared mutable pointer-based data struc-
tures. The distinguished feature of separation logic is its local reasoning about data
structures linked with pointers and allocated in heap (Distefano et al., 2006). It
means that reasoning about a command concerns only the part of the heap that the
command accesses, a.k.a. the command’s footprint. Note that local reasoning is
not registered patent for separation logic; it also exists in the original formulation of
Hoare logic (Hoare, 1969) with the substitution treatment in assignment. However,
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OS-VAR 〈s, h, v〉↪→〈s, h, s(v)〉
OS-CONST 〈s, h, k〉↪→〈s, h, k〉
OS-SEQ 〈s, h, -; e〉↪→〈s, h, e〉
OS-ASSIGN-1 〈s, h, v=k〉↪→〈s[v 7→k], h, -〉
OS-FIELD-READ 〈s, h, v.f〉↪→〈s, h, h(s(v))(f)〉
OS-LOCAL 〈s, h, {t v; e}〉↪→〈[v 7→⊥]+s, h, ret(v, e)〉
OS-RET-1 〈s, h, ret(v, k)〉↪→〈s−{v}, h, k〉
OS-PROG
〈s, h, e1〉↪→〈s1, h1, e3〉
〈s, h, e1; e2〉↪→〈s1, h1, e3; e2〉
OS-ASSIGN-2
〈s, h, e〉↪→〈s1, h1, e1〉
〈s, h, v=e〉↪→〈s1, h1, v=e1〉
OS-RET-2
〈s, h, e〉↪→〈s1, h1, e1〉
〈s, h, ret(v, e)〉↪→〈s1, h1, ret(v, e1)〉
OS-FIELD-WRITE
r = h(s(v1))[f 7→s(v2)] h1 = h[s(v1)7→r]
〈s, h, v1.f = v2〉↪→〈(s, h1, -)〉
OS-IF-1
s(v)=true
〈s, h, if (v) e1 else e2〉↪→〈s, h, e1〉
OS-IF-2
s(v)=false
〈s, h, if (v) e1 else e2〉↪→〈s, h, e2〉
OS-NEW
class c {t1 f1, .., tn fn}
ι/∈dom(h) r=c[f1 7→s(v1), .., fn 7→s(vn)]
〈s, h, new c(v)〉↪→〈s, h[ι 7→ r], ι〉
OS-CALL
s1=[wi 7→s(vi)]m−1i=1 + s
t0 mn((ti wi)
m−1
i=1 ; (ti wi)
n
i=m) {e}
〈s, h,mn(v)〉↪→〈s1, h, ret({wi}m−1i=1 , [vi/wi]ni=me)〉
Figure 3.2: Operational semantics.
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such local reasoning is lost if heap-based data structure and aliasing are introduced
to the programming language. This loss of locality is noted as the pointer swing
problem by Hoare and He (1999). In this scenario, separation logic restores the
capability to reason locally by means of two technical novelties: 1) the separation
conjunction ∗ and 2) tight interpretation of Hoare triples (Yang and O’Hearn, 2002).
A key insight leading to separation logic is that program logics for reasoning about
heap-manipulating programs should be explicit about the heap. In other words,
program heaps should be part of the model of a program logic. The satisfiability
of a separation logic formula ∆ in a program state is thus typically enforced by the
semantics relation
s, h |= ∆
where s is a model of the program stack, h the program heap.
Some novel notations that separation logic has introduced include the points-to re-
lationship 7→ and empty heap emp, and two new connectives (separation conjunction
∗ and spatial implication −∗). A points-to formula x 7→ y describes a singleton heap
with only one cell at address x that stores value y. Formula emp holds on empty
heaps. Formula ∆1 ∗∆2 describes a heap that can be partitioned into two domain-
disjoint heaps described by ∆1 and ∆2. Formula ∆1 −∗∆2 describes a heap that
if extended with a disjoint heap represented by ∆1, then ∆2 holds in the extended
heap. In other words, ∆1 −∗∆2 captures the heap described by ∆2, where the heap
corresponding to ∆1 is “taken away”. The formal semantics of these operators will
be defined formally in Section 3.3.4.
Tight interpretation is another key aspect of separation logic, which ensures that
“well-specified programs do not go wrong” (Reynolds, 2005). Under this interpre-
tation, a valid Hoare triple {∆1} e {∆2} guarantees that command e should never
encounter a memory fault if started in a program state satisfying ∆1. One signifi-
cant prerequisite of this interpretation requires the precondition ∆1 of a command
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to guarantee that all memory locations accessed by the command, except for the
freshly allocated ones, are allocated beforehand. In the setting of separation logic,
a memory location x is considered allocated if the points-to fact x 7→ is present.
More specifically, Hoare triples for heap-accessing commands in separation logic are
as follows:
• Field read:
{x 7→ [v1, . . . , vi, . . . , vn]} x.fi {x 7→ [v1, . . . , vi, . . . , vn] ∧ res=vi}
where res is the special variable denoting the resulted value of an expression.
• Field write:
{x 7→ [v1, ..., vi−1, vi, vi+1, ..., vn]} x.fi=v {x 7→ [v1, ..., vi−1, v, vi+1, ..., vn]}
The above axioms illustrate the main characteristics of separation logic: in order
to analyse a heap-accessing command, it must be explicitly proved that the heap
location under consideration is allocated. Meanwhile, the reward is that any other
heap locations can be ignored safely.
The interplay of separation conjunction and tight interpretation makes local reason-
ing possible, which is formalised by the frame rule in separation logic:
{∆1} e {∆2}
{∆1 ∗∆3} e {∆2 ∗∆3} mods(e) ∩ fv(∆3) = ∅
where mods(e) returns the set of variables modified by command e. Note that
mods(e) includes neither modified fields, nor the variables used to reach these fields.
fv(∆3) returns the set of free variables occurring in formula ∆3. The crucial power
of the frame rule is that it allows a global property to be derived from a local one,




Our specification language is on the basis of a predicate-based specification method-
ology, wherein the main annotation construct is the shape predicate, each of which
describes a data structure. Our aim of using this scheme is to allow users to design
their own predicates for shapes and relevant properties (numerical and content ones),
to capture the desired level of program correctness to be verified. The advantages of
this methodology include that it unifies heterogeneous techniques and annotations
in a homogeneous way for the verification of linked data structures. Predicates also
eliminate the need for an explicit ownership scheme; they capture sufficient infor-
mation for us to perform verification of properties that involve closures. Finally, it
permits us to easily decompose the properties to be verified for a shape predicate,
which is beneficial for our aim of various levels of program correctness.
Before concrete examples of our shape predicates given in the next section, we intro-
duce the grammar for the specification language in Figure 3.3. Each shape predicate
spred has a name c, a list of parameters v, and a body Φ. Each predicate also has a
parameter root, written to the left of the predicate name c, which denotes a root
pointer to the data structure captured by the predicate. A root pointer is one from
which all objects in the data structure can be reached. root is a reserved identifier
used only in predicate definitions. Φ is a normalised state which is essentially a
separation logic formula in disjunctive normal form. The procedure specifications
mspec are written in these states where Φpr and Φpo denote the precondition and
postcondition, respectively. Each disjunct σ consists of a heap formula κ and a pure
formula pi. The heap formula κ consists of ∗-conjoined atomic heap formulae p::c〈v〉.
Such atomic heap formula p::c〈v〉 can denote either (i) a points-to fact p 7→ c[v] if c
is a class name, or (ii) a predicate instance c(p,v) if c is a predicate name. The pure
part pi consists of heap-independent formulae, such as formulae for Presburger arith-
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metic, formulae for pointer equality/disequality and formulae in multiset theory. As
shown in the figure, Presburger arithmetic formulae (s) is made up of integer con-
straints, variables, addition, subtraction, scalar multiplication, maximum/minimum
values and cardinality of multiset. For multiset (bag) theory, we allow expression
of (quantified) value membership, subset relationship and bag arithmetic (such as
union, intersection and subtraction). To make automated verification possible, we
require that there is a sound and terminating procedure to decide the validity of
heap-independent logic.
For the verification of programs, we regard σ as a conjunctive abstract program
state, and use SH to denote a set of such conjunctive states. During a verification
process, the abstract program state at each program point will be a disjunction of σ’s
denoted as ∆, and we name the set of such formulae as PSH. Note that constraint
abstractions (Q(v)) may occur in ∆ during the analysis. A closed-form ∆ (containing
no constraint abstractions) can be normalised to the Φ form (Nguyen et al., 2007).
Meanwhile, we also have counterparts of σ and ∆ in the pure (heap-independent)
domain, say ω and Υ. We distinguish them here because later in our verification
approach we will reduce the heap-relevant abstract states down to heap-independent
pure states, and use existing provers to solve the pure constraints composed by these
pure states.
Using entailment provided by the Sleek prover (Nguyen et al., 2007), we define a
partial order over the abstract states
∆ ¹ ∆′ =df ∆ ` ∆′ ∗ true
A last notation to be described here, lemma, represents the lemmas defined in the
program. They provide ways to soundly coerce predicates beyond their original de-
finitions, and to specify the entailment relationship among predicates. For instance,
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we can view a sorted list as a normal list as well, and our entailment prover will be
capable of reasoning that a sorted list implies a normal list. Concrete examples of
lemmas are also given in the subsequent sections.
Finally, when we write abstract program states or program specifications, we use
three kinds of variables: program variables, logical variables related to program
variables’ shapes (such as a list’s length), and logical variables to record intermediate
states. For the first two groups we use variables without subscription (such as x and
xn), and denote a program variable’s initial value as unprimed, and its current (and
hence latest) value as primed (Nguyen et al., 2007; Chin et al., 2007). For the third
group, we use subscript ones like x1 and xn1. For instance, for a code segment
x = x + 1; x = x − 2 starting with state {x>1}, we have the following reasoning
procedure:
{x′=x ∧ x>1} x=x+1 {x>1 ∧ x′=x+1} x=x-2 {x>1 ∧ x′=x1−2 ∧ x1=x+1}
where the final value of x is recorded in variable x′ and x1 keeps an intermediate
state of x.
3.3.1 Shape Predicates and Lemmas
Our specification language allows user to describe both the shape of data structures
as well as their quantitative properties and contents, and to use them to capture
the desired level of program correctness. Shape invariants of the data structures
are described using separation logic. Quantitative invariants, such as numerical
properties and content of collections, are described using arithmetic or multiset
formulae. For example, with a singly-linked list node
class Node { int val; Node next; }
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Shape predicate spred ::= root::c〈v〉 ≡ Φ
Lemma lemma ::= root::c〈v〉 ∧ pi ←− Φ
Specification mspec ::= requires Φpr ensures Φpo
Abstract state ∆ ::= Q(v) | Φ | ∆1∨∆2 | ∆∧pi | ∆1∗∆2 | ∃v·∆
Normalised state Φ ::=
∨
σ
Conjunctive state σ ::= ∃v·κ∧pi
Heap formula κ ::= emp | v::c〈v〉 | κ1 ∗ κ2
Pure state Υ ::= P(v) | ∨ω | Υ1∧Υ2 | Υ1∨Υ2 | ∃v·Υ
Pure conj. state ω ::= ∃v·pi
Pure formula pi ::= γ∧φ | pi1 ∧ pi2
Aliasing γ ::= v1=v2 | v=null | v1 6=v2 | v 6=null | γ1∧γ2
Pure constr. φ ::= ϕ | b | a | φ1∧φ2 | φ1∨φ2 | ¬φ | ∃v · φ | ∀v · φ
Boolean b ::=true | false | v | b1=b2
Numerical constr. a ::=s1=s2 | s1≤s2
Presburger arith. s ::= kint | v | kint×s | s1+s2 | −s | max(s1,s2) |
min(s1,s2) | |B|
Bag constr. ϕ ::= v∈B | B1=B2 | B1<B2 | B1vB2 | ∀v∈B·φ | ∃v∈B·φ
Bag arith. B ::= B1unionsqB2 | B1uB2 | B1−B2 | {} | {v}
Figure 3.3: The specification language.
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as data structure, a user interested in pointer-safety may define a predicate to depict
the list shape as in Distefano et al. (2006); Calcagno et al. (2009):
root::list〈〉 ≡ (root=null) ∨ (∃i, q · root::Node〈i, q〉 ∗ q::list〈〉)
The sole parameter root for the predicate list is the root pointer referring to the
list. As mentioned earlier, we use a uniform notation p::c〈v〉 to denote either a
singleton heap or a predicate. If c is a class type node, the notation represents a
singleton heap, p7→c[v], e.g. the root::Node〈i, q〉 above. If c is a predicate name,
then the data structure pointed to by p has the shape c with parameters v, e.g.,
the q::list〈〉 above. In the inductive case, the separation conjunction ∗ ensures
that two heap portions (representing respectively the head node and the tail list)
are domain-disjoint. Our predicates use existential quantifiers for local values and
pointers, such as i and q.
Yet another user may be interested to track also the length of a list to analyse
quantitative measures, such as heap/stack resource usage. Therefore the predicate
can be defined in a similar manner as in Magill et al. (2008):
ll〈n〉 ≡ (root=null ∧ n=0) ∨ (root::Node〈 , q〉 ∗ q::ll〈m〉 ∧ n=m+1)
where we use the following shortened notation: (i) default root parameter in LHS
may be omitted, (ii) unbound variables, such as q and m, are implicitly existentially
quantified, and (iii) denotes existentially quantified anonymous variable. The
parameter n of the predicate represents an abstract value. Such value is not taken
from a concrete heap location, but rather is computed from the pure formulae, which
are usually based on the structure of the underlying heap. During a verification,
this value is derived automatically by entailment, when a predicate is proved from
a program state.
Meanwhile, this predicate may still be extended to support a higher-level of correct-
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ness with multiset (bag) property to capture the list’s content:
llB〈S〉 ≡ (root=null ∧ S=∅) ∨ (root::Node〈v, q〉 ∗ q::llB〈S1〉 ∧ S={v}unionsqS1)
which also implicitly suggests the list’s length with |S|. This predicate can be
strengthened furthermore if necessary, so as to verify a sorting algorithm:
sllB〈S〉 ≡ (root=null ∧ S=∅) ∨
(root::Node〈v, q〉 ∗ q::sllB〈S1〉 ∧ S={v}unionsqS1 ∧ (∀x∈S1·v≤x))
The constraint ∀x∈S1·v≤x guarantees the sortedness property is adhered in the
predicate. Therefore, it can be seen that the user is expected to provide predicate
definitions in terms of their required correctness level and program properties. These
predicates may be non-trivial but can be reused multiple times for specifications
of different methods. We have also built a library of predicates with respect to
commonly-used data structures and useful program properties.
One more note about the predicates is that we allow users to write lemmas to
express their coercion relationship, which informally means some ways to observe a
predicate other than its original definition. For example, if we define a predicate for
a list segment with length n as
ls〈p, n〉 ≡ (root=p ∧ n=0) ∨ (root::Node〈 , q〉 ∗ q::ls〈p, m〉 ∧ n=m+1)
where p represents the next field of the list’s tail (last node). In this case, we may
use lemma to present one more way to view a list as
root::ll〈n〉 ∧ n=m+k←− root::ls〈p, m〉 ∗ p::ll〈k〉
which says a list of length n can be combined from two parts, one being a list segment
with m nodes ending at p and the other a list with length k pointed to by p, with an
additional constraint n=m+k. Also we can write a similar lemma to express that a
list segment can be formed in an analogous way from two shorter list segments:
root::ls〈q, n〉 ∧ n=m+k←− root::ls〈p, m〉 ∗ p::ls〈q, k〉
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Such lemma is beneficial for our abstraction, abduction and specification synthesis
procedures introduced in later chapters, since it provides another perspective to
view the predicates other than their original definition. Therefore it offers more
opportunity for the techniques above to succeed.
3.3.2 Well-Formedness and Well-Foundedness
To ensure the soundness and termination of our reasoning procedures, as in Nguyen
et al. (2007), we require the shape predicates and specifications written with them
be well-formed. To define this concept we first need to clarify the reachability of a
heap constraint node from a variable:
Definition 3.3.1 (Reachability) Given a heap constraint κ = p::c〈v〉 ∗ κ1, node
p::c〈v〉 is reachable from a variable q if and only if the following recursively defined
relation holds:
reach(κ, q, p::c〈v〉) =df (p = q) ∨
(κ1 = q::cq〈. . . , r, . . .〉∗κ2 ∧ reach(κ2, r, p::c〈v〉))
On the basis of such reachability we define the well-formedness of predicate:
Definition 3.3.2 (Well-Formed Predicate) A shape predicate root::c〈v〉 ≡ Φ is
well-formed if (i) every class node and shape predicate in Φ is reachable from either
the parameters v or one of the special variables ( root/res), (ii) Φ is in a dis-
junctive normal form
∨
(∃v · κ∧γ∧φ) where κ is for heap nodes, γ is for pointer
constraints, and φ is for arithmetic and multiset formulae.
The well-formed condition is significant in the light that all heap nodes of a heap
formula must be reachable from the parameters and/or special variables. When
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our entailment checking procedure (Sleek) checks an entailment relationship, this
condition allows it to correctly match nodes from the consequence with nodes from
the antecedent.
Another potential problem during the reasoning is that arbitrary recursive shape
relation can lead to non-termination entailment checking. To avoid that problem,
we propose to use only well-founded shape predicates in our framework:
Definition 3.3.3 (Well-Founded Predicate) A shape predicate is said to be well-
founded if it satisfies four conditions, namely: (i) it is a well-formed predicate, (ii)
the parameter root may only be bound to a class node and not a predicate, (iii) only
root is allowed to be bound to a class node and (iv) every predicate is reachable from
root.
The shape predicates given in the last section are all well-founded. In contrast, the
following three shape definitions are not well-founded (Nguyen et al., 2007):
foo〈n〉 ≡ root::foo〈m〉 ∧ n=m+1
goo〈〉 ≡ root::Node〈 , 〉 ∗ q::goo〈〉
too〈〉 ≡ root::Node〈 , q〉 ∗ q::Node〈 , 〉
For foo, the root identifier is bound to a shape predicate. For goo, the heap node
pointed by q is not reachable from variable root (therefore it is even not well-
formed). For too, an extra object node is bound to a non-root variable. The first
example may cause non-termination of entailment proof: when we want to rearrange
a heap part of foo to expose an object from it we simply get another foo which re-
quires another unfolding leading to non-termination. The second example captures
an unreachable (junk) heap that cannot be located by our entailment procedure.
The last example is just a syntactic restriction to facilitate termination proof of




3.3.3 Precondition and Postcondition
We allow procedures to be annotated with preconditions and postconditions. A pre-
condition is an assertion that should be satisfied when a procedure is called, therefore
the procedure body can assume it when the procedure starts. A postcondition is an
assertion that should be established when the procedure exits, therefore the caller
can assume it after the call, if the procedure is successfully verified. According to
separation logic semantics, a precondition furthermore guarantees the existence of
all memory locations that the procedure accesses, and thus guarantees executions
free of memory errors.
For example, using the llB and sllB predicates, we can specify insertion sort algo-
rithm operating on linked lists. The algorithm recursively sorts the tail of the input
list, and inserts the first element into a sorted list such that order is maintained. Its
code is in Figure 3.4.
From the code we can see the insert sort procedure sorts a singly-linked list. As
its precondition x::llB〈S〉∧ |S|≥1 suggests, it takes in an unsorted list starting from
x with content S, whose size should be at least one (this constraint is equivalent to
x6=null and S6=∅, which, if the user specifies, can be captured by our entailment
checker). Upon successful return it gives a sorted list with the same content, as
captured by the postcondition res::sllB〈T〉 ∧ S=T.
The procedure insert inserts an object pointed to by x into a sorted list referenced
by r. The separation conjunction ∗ constrains the object x not to belong to the list
r, thereby the resulting list has one more element. Meanwhile, the returned pointer




1 class Node { int val; Node next; }
2 Node insert_sort(Node x)
3 requires x::llB〈S〉 ∧ |S|≥1
4 ensures res::sllB〈T〉 ∧ S=T {
5 if (x.next == null) return x;
6 else { Node s = x.next;
7 Node r = insert_sort(s);
8 return insert(r, x);
9 }
10 }
11 Node insert(Node r, Node x)
12 requires r::sllB〈S〉 ∗ x::Node〈v, 〉
13 ensures res::sllB〈T〉 ∧ T=Sunionsq{v} {
14 if (r == null) {
15 x.next = null; return x;
16 } else if (x.val <= r.val) {
17 x.next = r; return x;
18 } else {




Figure 3.4: The insertion sort program for singly linked lists.
3.3.4 The Semantic Model
The semantics of our specification formulae is adapted from what is given for the
“early versions” of separation logic (Ishtiaq and O’Hearn, 2001; Reynolds, 2002),
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except that we have extensions to handle user-defined shape predicates and related
pure properties. We assume sets Loc of memory locations, Val of primitive values
(with 0 ∈ Val denoting null), Var of variables (program and logical variables), and
ObjVal of object values stored in the heap, with c[f1 7→ν1, . . . , fn 7→νn] denoting an
object value of class c where ν1, . . . , νn are current values of the corresponding fields
f1, . . . , fn. Let s, h |= ∆ denote the model relation, i.e. the stack s and heap h
satisfy ∆, with h, s from the following concrete domains:
h ∈ Heaps =df Loc ⇀fin ObjVal
s ∈ Stacks =df Var→ Val ∪ Loc
Note that each heap h is a finite partial mapping while each stack s is a total
mapping, as in the classical separation logic (Ishtiaq and O’Hearn, 2001; Reynolds,
2002). The detailed model definition is in Figure 3.5.
s, h |= Φ1 ∨ Φ2 iff s, h |= Φ1 or s, h |= Φ2
s, h |= ∃v · κ ∧ pi iff ∃ν · s[v 7→ ν], h |= κ and s[v 7→ ν] |= pi
s, h |= κ1 ∗ κ2 iff ∃h1, h2 · h1⊥h2 and h = h1 · h2 and
s, h1 |= κ1 and s, h2 |= κ2
s, h |= emp iff dom(h) = ∅
s, h |= p::c〈v1, . . . , vn〉 iff IsObj(c) and s(p) ∈ Loc and h = [s(p) 7→ r] and
r = c[f1 7→s(v1), . . . , fn 7→s(vn)]
or IsPred(c) and s, h |= [p/root]Φ
s |= pi1 ∧ pi2 iff s |= pi1 and s |= pi2
s |= pi iff s |=A pi
Figure 3.5: The semantic model.
We do not provide a semantics for the placeholder Q of constraint abstraction here, as
its meaning is described by the formula it represents. For pure formulae pi, as noted
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in the last line of Figure 3.5, their semantics are defined with a specific notation
|=A, which is preserved by the pure constraint provers that we use for soundness
purpose. Its definition is given in Figure 3.6.
s |=A γ1 ∧ γ2 iff s |=A γ1 and s |=A γ2
s |=A p1 ./ p2 iff s(p1) ./ s(p2), where ./∈ {=, 6=}
s |=A p ./ null iff s(p) ./ 0, where ./∈ {=, 6=}
s |=A true always
s |=A false never
s |=A v iff s(v) = true
s |=A b1 = b2 iff s(b1) = s(b2)
s |=A v1 = v2 iff s(v1) = s(v2)
s |=A v1 ≤ v2 iff s(v1) ≤ s(v2)
s |=A φ1 ∧ φ2 iff s |=A φ1 and s |=A φ2
s |=A φ1 ∨ φ2 iff s |=A φ1 or s |=A φ2
s |=A ¬φ iff s |=A φ does not hold
s |=A ∃v · φ iff s |=A [k/v]φ for some k
s |=A ∀v · φ iff s |=A [k/v]φ for all k
s |=A v ∈ B iff s(v) ∈ s(B)
s |=A B1 = B2 iff s(B1) = s(B2)
s |=A B1 < B2 iff s(B1) ⊂ s(B2)
s |=A B1 v B2 iff s(B1) ⊆ s(B2)
s |=A ∀v ∈ B · φ iff s |=A [k/v]φ for all k ∈ s(B)
s |=A ∃v ∈ B · φ iff s |=A [k/v]φ for some k ∈ s(B)




This chapter defines the programming language as our verification target as well as
the specification language to depict program contracts, where the latter is founded
on the basis of separation logic (Reynolds, 2002). For the purpose to prove our
approach’s soundness, we introduce the operational semantics of the programming
language and the semantic model for the specification language. Meanwhile, we also
illustrate the language settings with several informal examples.
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Chapter 4
Refining Partial Specifications for
Verification
Automatically verifying the functional correctness of heap-manipulating programs
with complex data structures is a challenging task. This process can greatly ben-
efit from human assistance through specification annotations. However, it requires
much intellectual effort from users, and meanwhile users are liable to make mistakes
in writing such specifications. In this chapter, we propose a new approach to pro-
gram verification that allows users to provide only partial specifications to methods.
Our approach will then refine the given annotations into more complete specifica-
tions by discovering missing constraints. The discovered constraints may involve
both numerical and multiset properties that could be later confirmed or revised by
users. Therefore, with our approach, we are able to increase the level of verification




As discussed in previous chapters, the research on software verification has a long
and distinguished history dating back to the 1960’s. Nevertheless, it remains a
challenging problem to automatically verify heap-manipulating programs written in
mainstream imperative languages. This is in part due to the shared mutable data
structures lying in programs, and the need to track related “pure” properties, such as
structural numerical information (size and height), relational numerical information
(balanced and sortedness properties), and content information (multiset of symbolic
values). These properties, intertwined with each other, are non-trivial to reason
about in a precise and concise way. The crux is that they span over several abstract
domains (shape, numerical and multiset), each of which has infinite state space and
various reasoning rules, resulting in an even larger combined state space and hence
making the whole verification work exceptionally complicated.
Human assistance is often essential in (semi-) automated program verification. The
user may supply annotations at certain program point, such as loop invariants
and/or method specifications. These annotations can greatly narrow down the pos-
sible program states at that point, and avoid fixed-point calculation which could be
expensive and may be less precise than the user’s insight.
However, an obvious disadvantage of user annotation concerns its scalability, since
programs to be verified may be complicated and their functions are also diverse.
Accordingly their specifications are difficult to compose, especially for a complex
program of many modules and methods. Therefore, it is not preferable to require
the user to provide specification for each method and invariant for each loop when
verifying a relatively large software system, as such workload would counteract the
guarantee of program correctness brought by verification. Meanwhile, human is
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liable to make mistakes. A programmer may under-specify with too weak a precon-
dition or over-specify with too strong a postcondition. Such mistakes could lead to
failed verification, and it may be difficult for the user to discover whether the error
is due to a real bug in the program, or an inappropriately supplied annotation.
To balance verification quality and human effort, we provide a novel approach to
the verification of heap-manipulating programs. Under our framework, the user is
expected to provide partial specifications for programs with only shape information.
Our verification will then take over the rest of the work to refine those partial specifi-
cations with derived (pure) constraints which should be satisfied by the program, or
report a possible program bug if the given specifications are rejected by our verifier.
This is more beneficial compared with previous works (Nguyen et al., 2007; Chin
et al., 2007; Nguyen and Chin, 2008), where users must provide full specifications
to verify programs, including not only shape information but also pure properties
such as size and multiset.
As introduced in Chapter 3, we allow users to design their own predicates and use
such predicates to capture their required correctness level and program properties.
For example, with the data structure class Node { int val; Node next; } defined
in the last chapter, we may have four different predicates to express various program
properties according to our demand: list, ll, llB and sllB (page 50). Based on
these predicates, the user is expected to provide partial specifications for procedures
in programs. Say, for the main procedure of the insertion sort algorithm in the
previous chapter (page 57) taking x as an input parameter that is expected to be non-
null, the user may provide x::llB〈S〉 as precondition and x::sllB〈T〉 as postcondition,
and our approach will refine the specification as x::llB〈S〉 ∧ |S|≥1 for pre, and
x::sllB〈T〉∧S=T for post. Here we need the user annotations as initial specification,
because we reserve the flexibility of verification with respect to different program
properties at various correctness levels. For example, our approach can also verify
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the same algorithm, but for the following refined specifications:
requires x::list〈〉 ∧ x6=null ensures x::list〈〉
requires x::ll〈m〉 ∧ m>0 ensures x::ll〈n〉 ∧ m=n
requires x::llB〈S〉 ∧ |S|≥1 ensures x::llB〈T〉 ∧ S=T
requires x::llB〈S〉 ∧ |S|≥1 ensures x::ll〈n〉 ∧ |S|=n
where the discovered missing constraints are shown in shaded form. This can help
reduce the number of redundant specifications considered.
To summarise, our proposal for refining partial specification is aimed at harness-
ing the synergy between human’s insights and machine’s capability at automated
program analysis. In particular, human’s guidance can help narrow down on the
most important of the numerous specifications that are possible with each program
code, while automation by machine is important for minimising on the tedium faced
by users, and to support easier adoption of automated verification technology. Our
proposal has the following characteristics:
• Specification completion: This verification refines the specification from three
aspects, namely, the constraints needed in the precondition for memory and
code safety, the constraints in postcondition to link the method’s pre- and
post-states, and the constraints that the method’s post-state satisfies.
• Flexibility: We allow the user to define their own predicates for the program
properties they want to verify, so as to provide different levels of correctness.
Meanwhile we aim at, and have covered much of, both memory safety and
functional correctness of pointer-manipulating programs such as data struc-
ture shapes, pointer safety, structural/relational numerical constraints, and
multiset information.
• Reduction of user annotations: Our approach uses program analysis techniques




The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. We will first depict our
approach informally using a motivating example in Section 4.2, and present technical
details thereafter in Section 4.3. More related works and concluding remarks come
at last.
4.2 The Approach
In this section, we use two motivating examples to informally illustrate our approach.
The first example is about the insertion sort in the previous chapter, while the second
example is more sophisticated involving both lists and trees, and a transformation
between their shapes, which witnesses our approach’s enhanced capability compared
with related works.
4.2.1 An Illustrative Example
We illustrate our approach using method insert sort in Figure 4.1. We show how
our verification infers missing constraints to improve the user-supplied incomplete
specification.
The program code of insert sort and insert are exactly the same as that in Fig-
ure 3.4. Their difference resides in the annotations, as the one in Figure 4.1 does
not have pure constraints (quantitative or content ones). As may be observed, the
main procedure’s specification just addresses that the algorithm will transfer an un-
sorted list into a sorted one, yet without any further obligations over the length of
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1 class Node { int val; Node next; }
2 Node insert_sort(Node x)
3 requires x::llB〈S〉
4 ensures res::sllB〈T〉 {
5 if (x.next == null) return x;
6 else { Node s = x.next;
7 Node r = insert_sort(s);
8 return insert(r, x);
9 }
10 }
11 Node insert(Node r, Node x)
12 requires r::sllB〈S〉 ∗ x::Node〈v, 〉
13 ensures res::sllB〈T〉 {
14 if (r == null) {
15 x.next = null; return x;
16 } else if (x.val <= r.val) {
17 x.next = r; return x;
18 } else {




Figure 4.1: The insertion sort program for singly linked lists.
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the list or its content. This has two problems: one is unsoundness and the other is
loss of precision. Here the second problem suggests that the specification loses the
information that the content of the transferred list should be identical as the input,
which is crucial for the functional correctness proof of the algorithm but missing
in the postcondition. The first problem is more severe as the given precondition
even does not guarantee memory safety of the program execution (when the input
list is empty the program will fail). Meanwhile, the second problem also applies to
insert’s partial specifications. Therefore we need to infer such constraints in order
that the specifications become both sound and precise.
To verify insert sort, our approach proceeds in two steps. Firstly, starting from the
partial precondition, a forward analysis is conducted to compute the postcondition
of the method in the form of a constraint abstraction, as mentioned in Chapter 2.
This constraint abstraction is effectively a transfer function for the method, which
may be recursively defined. During this analysis, abductive reasoning may be used
whenever the current state fails to establish the precondition of the next program
command. Secondly, instead of a direct fixed-point computation in the combined
abstract domain (with shape, numerical and multiset information), a “pure” con-
straint abstraction (without heap shape information) is derived from the generated
constraint abstraction and the user-given partial postcondition. This pure con-
straint abstraction is then solved by fixed-point solvers in pure (numerical/multiset)
domains, such as Nipkow et al. (2002); Popeea and Chin (2006).
The constraint abstraction of a code segment (say, a method) in our settings is
an abstraction form of that code’s postcondition, given a certain precondition. As
the code may contain loops or recursive calls, its constraint abstraction can also be
recursive, or in an open form, accordingly. To illustrate, for the following while loop





we have its constraint abstraction as
Q(x, x′, y, y′) ::= x≤0 ∧ x=x′ ∧ y=y′ ∨ x>0 ∧ Q(x−1, x′, y+2, y′)
where we denote x and y as their values before the loop, and the primed versions as
their current values. Such constraint abstraction presents the invariant of the while
loop. Its fixed-point can normally be achieved with a standard fixed-point calcula-
tion process, with result 2(x−x′) = y′ − y. However, such fixed-point calculation is
generally in the pure domain at present, whereas our constraint abstraction should
be more complicated involving both shape and pure constraints, requiring us to split
them for solution somehow.
As for the example, our forward analysis runs on the body of insert sort to con-
struct the constraint abstraction. For lines 5-9, it produces a disjunction as the
effect of if-else (according to the if-else rule in page 90):
Q(x, S, res, T) ::= (post-state of if) ∨ (post-state of else)
where Q represents the post-state of the if-else statement (as well as the method),
and its parameters x, S, res and T are the (program and logical) variables involved
in the state.
For the if branch, after the unfolding over x::llB〈S〉 (rule unfold in page 86), we
know from the condition that the input sorted list x has only one node, and thus its
post-state will be
∃v · x::Node〈v, null〉 ∧ res=x ∧ S={v}
Meanwhile, for the else branch, the sorted list will firstly be unrolled by one node
at line 6 (rule unfold), making x.next point to s (rule assign in page 90), which
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references a sub-list one node shorter than the input list beginning from x:
∃Ss, v · x::Node〈v, s〉 ∗ s::llB〈Ss〉 ∧ S=Ssunionsq{v}
After that, insert sort is invoked recursively with s. It will consume the precon-
dition (s::llB〈Ss〉) and ensure the postcondition (in terms of Q, partially according
to the rule in page 88; however it will be substituted as described later). In that
case, the state immediately after symbolic execution of line 7 is
Q(x, S, res, T) ::= ∃v · x::Node〈v, null〉 ∧ res=x ∧ S={v} ∨
∃v, s, Ss, r, Sr · x::Node〈v, s〉 ∗ Q(s, Ss, r, Sr) ∧ |S|>1 ∧ S=Ssunionsq{v}
Here the first disjunctive branch corresponds to the base case in the method body,
and the second branch captures the effect of the recursive call (with Q). Note
that existential variables (not in the parameter list of Q) are local variables whose
quantification may be omitted for brevity (as we will do so later).
Then the forward analysis continues over line 8 to invoke insert. Before the invoca-
tion we must ensure insert’s precondition is satisfied. However, part of its require-
ment, the sorted list referenced by r, is within the instance of constraint abstraction
Q(s, Ss, r, Sr) in the second branch. For this purpose we replace Q(s, Ss, r, Sr) with
r::sllB〈Sr〉 ∧ P(s, Ss, r, Sr) to make explicit the heap portion referred to by r before
we analyse the call insert(r, x) (rule call-inf in page 88). This is safe because the
following entailment relationship is added to our assumption:
Q(x, S, res, T) ` res::sllB〈T〉 ∧ P(x, S, res, T) (4.1)
which signifies that Q can be abstracted as a sorted list referenced by res plus some
pure constraints P (also in constraint abstraction form, whose definition is to be
derived in the next step). Based on this fact we may complete the replacement and
invoke insert, whose specification can be obtained in a same manner as:1
requires r::sllB〈S〉 ∗ x::Node〈v, 〉 ensures res::sllB〈T〉 ∧ T=Sunionsq{v}
1We should apply the current approach over insert to refine its specifications with missing
constraints beforehand. This process is introduced in Section 4.2.2.
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which indicates that the returned sorted list has the same content as the input list
(x) plus {v}. Applying it, we obtain the following post-state for insert sort:
Q(x, S, res, T) ::= x::Node〈v, null〉 ∧ res=x ∧ S={v} ∨
res::sllB〈Sres〉 ∧ P(s, Ss, r, Sr) ∧ |S|>1 ∧ S=Ssunionsq{v} ∧ Sres=Srunionsq{v}
The first disjunctive branch corresponds to the base case, and the second branch
captures the effect of the recursive call as well as insert. In the base case, the
method’s return pointer (res) points to one node with value v. The recursive branch
signifies that the post-state of the method concerns the recursive call and the call
to insert (over s and r), as the constraint abstraction denotes. Note that T will be
not available (as well as its relationship with Sres) until the next step.
In the second step, we first derive the definition of the pure constraint abstraction P
from the above post-state Q. Each disjunctive branch of Q is used to entail the user-
given post-shape (with appropriate instantiations of the parameters). The obtained
frames form (via disjunction) the definition of P. For insert sort, according to the
entailment relationship (4.1), we obtain the following pure constraint abstraction:
P(x, S, res, T) ::= (T=S ∧ |S|=1) ∨
(P(s, Ss, r, Sr) ∧ |S|>1 ∧ S=Ssunionsq{v} ∧ T=Srunionsq{v})
We then use pure fixed-point solvers (Nipkow et al., 2002; Popeea and Chin, 2006)
to obtain a closed-form formula |S|≥1 ∧ T=S for P. On the basis of (4.1), we now
obtain the closed-form approximation for Q:
Q(x, S, res, T) ::= res::sllB〈T〉 ∧ |S|≥1 ∧ T=S
The obtained pure formula is then used to refine the method’s specification as
requires x::llB〈S〉 ∧ |S|≥1 ensures res::sllB〈T〉 ∧ T=S
which imposes more requirement in the precondition, stating that there should be
at least one node in the list to be sorted for the sake of memory safety. With
that obligation, the method guarantees that the result list is sorted and its content
remains the same as the input list.
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4.2.2 Refinement for the Specification of insert
The process to verify insert and refine its specification is analogous to the one for
insert sort. In the first step, we apply the forward analysis over insert to obtain
the constraint abstraction representing the whole method as follows:
Q(r, S, x, v, res, T) ::= x::Node〈v, null〉 ∧ res=x ∧ r=null ∧ S=∅ ∨
x::Node〈v, r〉 ∗ r::sllB〈S〉 ∧ res=x ∧ (∀u∈S·v≤u) ∨
r::Node〈u, p〉 ∗ Q(q, Sq, x, v, p, Tp) ∧ res=r ∧ u<v
Then a replacement of the constraint abstraction instance with the post-shape is
performed to yield
Q(r, S, x, v, res, T) ::= x::Node〈v, null〉 ∧ res=x ∧ r=null ∧ S=∅ ∨
x::Node〈v, r〉 ∗ r::sllB〈S〉 ∧ res=x ∧ (∀u∈S·v≤u) ∨
r::Node〈u, p〉 ∗ p::sllB〈Tp〉 ∧ P(q, Sq, x, v, p, Tp) ∧ res=r ∧ u<v
Note that we do not have the relation S=Squnionsq{u} until we perform the entailment
checking in the next step.
In the second step, applying the entailment relationship
Q(r, S, x, v, res, T) ` res::sllB〈T〉 ∧ P(r, S, x, v, res, T)
we reduce the constraint abstraction into the pure domain for solution:
P(r, S, x, v, res, T) ::= res=x ∧ r=null ∧ S=∅ ∧ T={v} ∨
res=x ∧ T=Sunionsq{v} ∧ (∀u∈S·v≤u) ∨
P(q, Sq, x, v, p, Tp) ∧ res=r ∧ S=Squnionsq{u} ∧ T=Tpunionsq{u} ∧ u<v
which gives T=Sunionsq{v}. Therefore we refine the original shape-only specification as
requires r::sllB〈S〉 ∗ x::Node〈v, 〉 ensures res::sllB〈T〉 ∧ T=Sunionsq{v}
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4.2.3 Another Illustrative Example
In this section we illustrate our approach with another more interesting example,
which involves both linear data structures (lists) and non-linear ones (trees) as well
as subtle pure properties.
Let us consider the method sdl2nbt shown in Figure 4.2. In the user-given (partial)
specification, two predicates are used. The predicate below is used to represent
sorted doubly-linked list segments:
sdlB〈p, q, S〉 ≡ (root=q ∧ S=∅) ∨ (root::Node2〈v, p, r〉 ∗ r::sdlB〈root, q, S1〉 ∧
root6=q ∧ S={v} unionsq S1 ∧ (∀x∈S1·v≤x))
where the parameters p and q denote the prev field of root and the next field of
the list’s last node, respectively. Meanwhile S is a multiset parameter to represent
the list’s content. We can see in the base case of definition that S=∅, and in the
recursive case that all values stored after root must be no less than root’s value.
The predicate below is used to specify node-balanced trees with binary search prop-
erty:
nbt〈S〉 ≡ (root=null ∧ S=∅) ∨
(root::Node2〈v, p, q〉 ∗ p::nbt〈Sp〉 ∗ q::nbt〈Sq〉 ∧ S={s} unionsq Sp unionsq Sq ∧
(∀x∈Sp·x≤s) ∧ (∀x∈Sq·s≤x) ∧ −1≤|Sp|−|Sq|≤1)
where S captures the content of the tree. We require the difference in node numbers
of the left and right sub-trees be within one, as the node-balanced property indicates.
Now let us return to the program itself. Taking a sorted doubly-linked list (head)
as input, sdl2nbt will convert it into a node-balanced tree together with binary
search properties, as indicated in lines 2 and 3. Its algorithm proceeds as follows:
first it finds the “centre” node in the list (root), where the difference of numbers of
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0 class Node2 { int val; Node2 prev;
Node2 next; }
1 Node2 sdl2nbt(Node2 head, Node2 tail)
2 requires head::sdlB〈p, q, S〉
3 ensures res::nbt〈Sres〉
4 {
5 Node2 root = head;
6 Node2 end = head;
7 while(end != tail) {
8 end = end.next;
9 if (end != tail) {
10 end = end.next;
11 root = root.next;
12 }
13 } where head::sdlB〈p,q,S〉 ∗→ head::sdlB〈ph,qh,Sh〉
∗ root::sdlB〈pr, qr, Sr〉 ∗ end::sdlB〈pe, qe, Se〉
14 if (head == root)
15 root.prev = null;
16 else
17 root.prev = sdl2nbt(head, root);
18 Node2 tmp = root.next;
19 if (tmp == tail)
20 root.next = null;
21 else {
22 tmp.prev = null;




Figure 4.2: Algorithm to convert a sorted doubly-linked list to a node-balanced tree.
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its left and right nodes is at most one, as Figure 4.3 (a) indicates (lines 5-13). Then
it applies the algorithm recursively on both list segments on the centre’s left and
right hand sides, and regards the centre node as the tree’s root, whose left and right
children are the resulted subtrees’ roots from the recursive calls, as in Figure 4.3 (b)
and (c) (lines 14-25). As the data structure of doubly-linked list and binary tree are
homomorphic (line 0), we reuse the nodes in the input list instead of creating a new
tree, making this algorithm in-place. The parameter head in line 1 denotes the first
node of the input list, and tail is where the list’s last node’s next field points to.
When using this method tail should be set as null initially.





















Figure 4.3: Transferring from a sorted doubly-linked list to a node-balanced BST.
Our framework allows the user to verify and/or refine a number of properties about
this code. Firstly, the transformation of shapes from initial to final states (namely,
from a doubly-linked list to a binary tree) must be captured. Secondly, some struc-
tural numerical information should be inferred, so as to prove the node counts before
and after the method invocation are the same and the node-balanced property of
the tree, etc. Meanwhile, we also want to derive relational numerical information as
lists’ sortedness and trees’ binary search property, and finally multiset information
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like the symbolic content of the list’s and the tree’s (in order to prove the values
stored in the list and the resulted tree are the same). Finally, some obligation for
memory safety should be found in the precondition, to ensure the input list is non-
empty (otherwise the dereference in line 15/17 will fail). To deal with all these
properties, we expect the user to provide shape information for the method’s (and
loop’s) specifications as in Figure 4.2. Based on that, we compute the remaining
constraints, viz. the missing parts of pure specifications.
As for the example, as the user has provided the pre- and post-shapes for method
sdl2nbt, our verification proceeds in two steps: generating the constraint abstrac-
tion, and solving it. The first step is mainly a forward analysis over the program to
find its postcondition, so as to generate the constraint abstraction. Before this step,
we assume that the while loop in lines 7-13 is already verified with its specification
refined using the same approach. Therefore we take the while loop’s postcondition
as
head::sdlB〈null, root, Sh〉 ∗ root::sdlB〈p, tail, Sr〉 ∧
end=tail ∧ S=ShunionsqSr ∧ (∀x∈Sh, y∈Sr·x≤y) ∧ 0≤|Sr|−|Sh|≤1
which indicates that the original list segment starting from head is cut into two
pieces with a cutpoint root, where both are still sorted and the content is also
preserved. Meanwhile, the essential constraint (the underlined part, saying the list
beginning with head is at most one node shorter than that with root) to ensure the
node-balanced property is derived as well.
When the forward analysis finishes, it generates the following constraint abstraction
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as the postcondition of the method:
Q(head, p, q, S, res, Sres) ::=
root::Node2〈v, null, null〉 ∧ head=root=res ∧ tmp=q=tail ∧ p=null ∧
S={v} ∨
head::Node2〈s, null, root〉 ∗ root::Node2〈v, resh, null〉 ∧ res=root ∧
tmp=q=tail ∧ p=null ∧ S={s, v} ∧ s≤v ∨
resh::nbt〈Shres〉 ∗ resr::nbt〈Srres〉 ∗ root::Node2〈v, resh, resr〉 ∧
P(head, p, root, Sh, resh, S
h
res) ∧ P(tmp, null, tail, Sr, resr, Srres) ∧
head6=root ∧ root=res ∧ tmp6=tail ∧ q=tail ∧
S=Shunionsq{v}unionsqSr ∧ (∀x∈Sh, y∈Sr·x≤v≤y) ∧ 0≤|Sr|−|Sh|≤1
where P stands for corresponding pure constraint abstraction as in the previous ex-
ample. The first two disjunctive branches are base cases of the method’s invocation,
and the last denotes the effect of recursive calls combined into the postcondition.
The first case represents the scenario where there is only one node in the original list
(with res as the method’s return value). The second is for the case of two nodes,
one referenced by head, pointing to the other one, root. In this case the value of
head is no more than that of root. The third case is defined recursively with the
constraint abstraction itself, meaning that the post-state concerns the root node
and the post-states of two recursive calls over head and tmp, respectively. Note that
Sres does not appear in Q’s definition. Since it stands for pure properties in user-
provided post-shape, it will be involved when we abstract Q against that post-shape
in the next step.
The second step solves the constraint abstraction Q by finding its closed-form ap-
proximation. Instead of performing a fixed-point iteration directly on Q over the
combined domain, we first derive a pure constraint abstraction P (with the help of
Sleek) from Q and the user-provided heap part of postcondition. Then we are able
to use existing conventional solvers (Nipkow et al., 2002; Popeea and Chin, 2006)
to compute the pure fixed-point. For the sdl2nbt method, we generate the pure
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constraint abstraction P based on the following entailment relation:
Q(head, p, q, S, res, Sres) ` res::nbt〈Sres〉 ∧ P(head, p, q, S, res, Sres)
which produces the following pure constraint abstraction P:
P(head, p, q, S, res, Sres) ::=
head=root=res ∧ tmp=q=tail ∧ p=null ∧ S=Sres={v} ∨
head6=root ∧ res=root ∧ tmp=q=tail ∧ p=null ∧
S=Sres={s, v} ∧ s≤v ∨
P(head, p, root, Sh, resh, S
h
res) ∧ P(tmp, null, tail, Sr, resr, Srres) ∧
head6=root ∧ root=res ∧ tmp6=tail ∧ q=tail ∧ S=Shunionsq{v}unionsqSr ∧
Sres=S
h
resunionsq{v}unionsqSrres ∧ (∀x∈Sh, y∈Sr·x≤v≤y) ∧ 0≤|Sr|−|Sh|≤1
Note that the heap information is already eliminated from P; instead the constraints
over Sres are included during the entailment checking procedure. This allows us to
solve P to refine the user-provided shape-only specification.
After solving P, we achieve the following constraint:
p=null ∧ q=tail ∧ S=Sres ∧ |S|≥1
with which we can refine the method’s specifications as
requires head::sdlB〈p, q, S〉 ∧ p=null ∧ q=tail ∧ |S|≥1
ensures res::nbt〈Sres〉 ∧ S=Sres
which proposes more requirements in the precondition, as the head’s prev field
should be null, and the whole list’s last node’s next field must point to tail.
Meanwhile, there should be at least one node in the list for the sake of memory
safety. With those obligations, the method guarantees that the result is a node-





In this section, we formulate our verification algorithm for methods with partial spec-
ifications given, together with the pure abduction mechanism and forward analysis
rules it uses.
4.3.1 Refining Partial Specifications
Algorithm CA Gen Solve(T ,mn, e,Φpr,Φpo,u,v)
1 ∆ := Symb Exec(T ,mn, e,Φpr)
2 if ∆ = fail then return fail end if
3 Normalise ∆ to DNF, and denote as
∨m
i=1∆i
4 w:={u,v,v′} ∪ pureV({u,v,v′}, Φpr ∨ Φpo)
5 ∆P := Pure CA Gen(Φpo, Q(w)::=
∨m
i=1∆i)
6 if ∆P = fail then return fail end if
7 pi := Pure CA Solve(P(w)::=∆P)
8 R := t mn ((t u); (t v)) requires
! ex quan(Φpr, pi) ensures ex quan(Φpo, pi)
9 if HipVerify(T ,mn,R) then return T ∪ {R} \
! { tmn ((t u); (t v)) requiresΦpr ensuresΦpo }
10 else return fail end if
end Algorithm
Figure 4.4: Refining method specifications.
The algorithm for refinement (CA Gen Solve) is given in Figure 4.4. As illustrated
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in Section 4.2, the verification proceeds in two steps for a method with shape in-
formation given in specification, namely (1) forward analysis (at lines 1-2) and (2)
pure constraint abstraction generation and solving (at lines 3-10).
Lines 1-2 analyse the method body starting from the given pre-shape to compute the
post-state in constraint abstraction form. Along the analysis, missing pure require-
ments are derived (via our abduction mechanism) to strengthen the precondition.
The forward analysis (line 3 in Figure 4.5 invoked by line 1 in Figure 4.4) is conducted
using a set of symbolic execution rules to be explained in Section 4.3.3. If the
symbolic execution of the method body succeeds (suggesting that the pre-shape
is sufficiently strong), the verification moves on to the second step (lines 3-10).
However, if the symbolic execution fails at some point, where the current symbolic
state cannot meet the requirement of the next instruction, it can be due to the lack
of pure (i.e. numerical/multiset) constraints in the precondition. To deal with this,
we enhance the symbolic execution with pure abduction mechanism (whose details
are given later). For example, if we have x::ll〈n〉 as the current state and we require
x::Node〈 , p〉 to update the value of p, then it will fail as x::ll〈n〉 does not necessarily
guarantee x::Node〈 , p〉. In this case we conduct the pure abduction as
x::ll〈n〉 ∧ [n≥1]¤ x::Node〈 , p〉 ∗ true
to compute the missing pure information (in the squared bracket) such that the left
hand side (including the newly gained pure part) entails the right hand side.
The Symb Exec in Figure 4.5 is our symbolic execution algorithm. The variable er-
rLbls (initialised at line 1) is to record the program locations in which previous pure
abductions occurred. Whenever the symbolic execution fails, it returns a state ∆
that contains the pure abduction result and the location l where failure was detected,
as shown in line 3. If the current abduction location l is not recorded in errLbls, it
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Algorithm Symb Exec(T ,mn, e,Φpr)
1 errLbls := ∅
2 do
3 (∆, l) := |[e]|T (Φpr, 0)
4 if l>0 ∧ l /∈errLbls then
5 T := T \ {t mn ((ti ui)mi=1; (ti vi)ni=1) requires Φpr ensures Φpo}
6 Φpr := ex quan(Φpr,∆)
7 T := T ∪ {t mn ((ti ui)mi=1; (ti vi)ni=1) requires Φpr ensures Φpo}
8 errLbls := errLbls ∪ {l}
9 else if l>0 ∧ l∈errLbls then return fail
10 end if
11 while l > 0
12 return ∆
end Algorithm
Figure 4.5: Symbolic execution.
80
4.3. The Verification
indicates that this is a new failure. The abduction result is added to the precondition
of the current method to obtain a stronger Φpr (which also replaces the previous one
in T ), before the algorithm enters again the symbolic execution loop with variable
errLbls updated to add in the new failure location l.2 This loop is repeated until
symbolic execution succeeds with no memory error, or a previous failure point was
re-encountered. The latter indicates either a program bug or a specification error.
For example, for a method void foo (...) {node w = new node(0, null); goo(w); ...}
invoking a method goo(x) whose precondition is x::ll〈n〉∧n≥2, our verification will
perform an abduction to get n≥2 since it is not implied by the current state. How-
ever, as n is for the shape of local variable w, it will be quantified away when n≥2
is propagated back, ending up with true being added to foo’s precondition. In the
next round of symbolic execution, our verification will have the same abduction at
the same point. Such case is reported as fail. In this way, the symbolic execution
continues until it reports an error or reaches the end of the method body (exiting
line 11).
Back to the main algorithm CA Gen Solve, the verification next builds a heap-based
constraint abstraction mechanism, named Q(w), for the post-state in lines 3-5. This
constraint abstraction is possibly recursive. We then make use of another algorithm
in Figure 4.6, named Pure CA Gen, to extract a pure constraint abstraction P(w)
without any heap property. This algorithm tries to derive a branch Pi for each
branch ∆i of Q. For every ∆i it proceeds in two steps. In the first step (lines 2-4),
it replaces the recursive occurrence of Q in ∆i with σ ∗ P(w). In the second step
(lines 5-7) it tries to derive Pi via the entailment. If the entailment fails, then pure
abduction is used to discover any missing pure constraint σ′i for ρ∆i to allow the
entailment to succeed. In this case, σ′i is incorporated into σi (and eventually Pi).
2ex quan(Φpr,XPure(∆)) is to combine Φpr with a pure approximation of ∆ where XPure is a
strengthened version of that in Nguyen et al. (2007), as it also takes pure parts in ∆ and keeps
them in the resulted pure constraints.
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Once this is done, we use some existing fixed-point analysis (Nipkow et al., 2002;
Popeea and Chin, 2006) to derive non-recursive constraint pi, as a simplification of
P(w). This result is then incorporated into the pre/post specifications in line 8,
before we perform a post-verification in line 9 using the Hip verifier (Chin et al.,
2010), to ensure the strengthened precondition is strong enough for memory safety.
Algorithm Pure CA Gen(σ, Q(w)::=
∨m
i=1∆i)
1 for i = 1 to m
2 Denote all appearances of Q(w) in ∆i as Qj(wj), j = 1, ..., p
3 Denote substitutions ρj = [([wj/w]σ ∗ P(wj))/Qj(wj)]
4 Let substitution ρ := ρ1 ◦ ρ2 ◦ ... ◦ ρp as applying all
! substitutions defined above in sequence
5 if (ρ∆i ` σ ∗ σi or ρ∆i ∧ [σ′i]¤ σ ∗ σi) and ispure(σi)
6 then Pi := σi






Figure 4.6: Pure constraint abstraction generation algorithm.
Two auxiliary functions used in the algorithm are described here. The function
pureV(V,∆) retrieves from ∆ the shapes referred to by all pointer variables from V ,
and returns the set of logical variables used to record numerical (size and bag) prop-
erties in these shapes, for example, pureV({x}, x::ll〈n〉) returns {n}. This function
is used in the algorithm to ensure that all free variables in Φpr and Φpo are added
into the parameter list of the constraint abstraction Q. The function ex quan(∆, pi)
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is to strengthen the state ∆ with the abduction result pi:
ex quan(∆, pi) =df ∆ ∧ ∃(fv(pi) \ fv(∆)) · pi
It is used to incorporate the discovered missing pure constraints into the original
specification. For example, ex quan(x::ll〈n〉, 0<m ∧ m≤n) returns x::ll〈n〉 ∧ 0<n.
4.3.2 Pure Abduction Mechanism
We assume that the user has supplied necessary shape information in the specifi-
cations for primary methods. When an entailment fails (during symbolic execution
or pure constraint abstraction derivation), we use our pure abduction mechanism
(Figure 4.7) to discover missing pure constraints. Note that we focus on pure ab-
duction in this chapter (as it is sufficient and efficient for our approach), though it
might be possible to adapt the shape abduction technique (Calcagno et al., 2009)
(to those with strong invariants) in case that shape information is missing from the
given precondition, which will be introduced in Chapter 6. For example, if we have
x::ll〈n〉 as the current state and we require ∃v, p · x::Node〈v, p〉 to update the value
of p, then it will fail as x::ll〈n〉 does not necessarily guarantee ∃v, p · x::Node〈v, p〉.
In this case we conduct the pure abduction as
x::ll〈n〉 ∗ [n≥1]¤ ∃v, p · x::Node〈v, p〉 ∗ true
to compute the missing pure information (in the squared bracket) such that the left
hand side (including the newly gained pure part) entails the right hand side. Later
this information will be used to strengthen the program’s precondition.
Our pure abduction deals with three different cases. The first rule applies when
the left hand side (σ) does not entail the right hand side (σ1) but the right hand
side entails the left hand side with some pure formula (σ′) as the frame; for in-
stance, in x::ll〈n〉 0 x::Node〈 , null〉, the right hand side can entail the left hand
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σ 0 σ1 ∗ true σ1 ` σ ∗ σ′ ispure(σ′) σ ∧ σ′ ` σ1 ∗ σ2
σ ∧ [σ′]¤ σ1 ∗ σ2
σ 0 σ1 ∗ true σ1 0 σ ∗ true
σ0 ∈ unroll(σ) data no(σ0) ≤ data no(σ1)
σ0 ` σ1 ∗ σ′ or σ0 ∧ [σ′0]¤ σ1 ∗ σ′
ispure(σ′) σ ∧ σ′ ` σ1 ∗ σ2
σ ∧ [σ′]¤ σ1 ∗ σ2
σ 0 σ1 ∗ true σ1 0 σ ∗ true
σ1 ∧ [σ′1]¤ σ ∗ σ′ ispure(σ′)
σ ∧ σ′ ` σ1 ∗ σ2
σ ∧ [σ′]¤ σ1 ∗ σ2
Figure 4.7: Pure abduction rules.
side with pure frame n=1. The abduction then checks to ensure x::ll〈n〉 ∧ n=1 `
x::Node〈 , null〉∗σ2 for some σ2, and returns the result n=1. Note the check ispure(σ′)
ensures that σ′ contains no heap information.
In the second rule, neither side entails the other (first row), say σ = x::sllB〈S〉 and
σ1 = ∃p, u, v · x::Node〈u, p〉 ∗ p::Node〈v, null〉. As the shape predicates in the an-
tecedent are formed by disjunctions according to their definitions (like the sllB),
certain branches of σ may entail σ1. As the rule suggests, to accomplish abduction
σ ∧ [σ′]¤ σ1 ∗ σ2, we first unfold σ (second row) and try entailment or further ab-
duction with the results (σ0) against σ1 (third row). If it succeeds with a pure frame
σ′, then we confirm the abduction by checking σ ∧ σ′ ` σ1 ∗ σ2 (fourth row). For
the example above, the abduction returns |S|=2 (σ′) and discovers the nontrivial
frame S={u, v} ∧ u≤v (σ2). Note the function data no returns the number of object
nodes in a state, for instance it returns one for x::Node〈v, p〉∗p::ll〈m〉. (This syntac-
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tic check is important for the termination of the abduction.) The unroll unfolds all




returns the result as a set of formulae ({σ1, ..., σu}). An instance is that it expands
x::Node〈v, p〉 ∗ p::ll〈m〉 to be {x::Node〈v, p〉 ∧ p=null∧ m=0,∃u, q, k · x::Node〈v, p〉 ∗
p::Node〈u, q〉 ∗ q::ll〈k〉 ∧ m=k+1}.
In the third rule, neither side entails the other, and the second rule does not apply,
This happens frequently during the abstraction stage in the verification when we
need to fold up a “concrete” state of nodes against an abstracted shape predicate,
say, σ = ∃p, u, v · x::Node〈u, p〉 ∗ p::Node〈v, null〉, σ1 = ∃S · x::sllB〈S〉. In this case
the antecedent cannot be unfolded as they are object nodes. As the rule suggests,
it reverses two sides of the entailment and applying the second rule to uncover the
pure constraints σ′1 and σ
′ (second row). It checks that adding σ′ to the left hand
side (σ) does entail the right hand side (σ1) (third row) before it returns σ
′. For the
example above, the abduction returns u≤v which is essential for the two nodes to
form a sorted list (right hand side).
4.3.3 Symbolic Execution Rules
This section defines the symbolic execution rules used in the first step of the con-
straint abstraction generation. If the program contains recursive calls to itself, the
postcondition will be in a recursive (open) form.
The type of our symbolic execution is defined as
|[e]| =df AllSpec→ (PSH × Int)→ (PSH × Int)
where AllSpec contains all the specifications of all methods (extracted from the
program Prog). The integer (label) in both input and output is used to record a
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program location where abduction is needed. If the integer remains zero after the
symbolic execution of e, then the output state denotes the post-state of e. However,
a positive number indicates that an abduction must have occurred and the resulting
state (the abduction result) will be propagated back to the the method’s precondition
by our verification, so that the next round of symbolic execution should succeed in
the same location.
The foundation of the symbolic execution is the basic transition functions from a
conjunctive abstract state to a conjunctive or disjunctive abstract state below:
unfold(x) =df SH→ PSH[x] Unfolding
exec(d[x]) =df AllSpec→ (SH[x]× Int)→ (SH× Int)Heap-sensitive execution
exec(d) =df AllSpec→ (SH× Int)→ (SH× Int) Heap-insensitive execution
where SH[x] denotes the set of conjunctive abstract states in which each element
has x exposed as the head of an object node (x::c〈v〉), and PSH[x] contains all the
(disjunctive) abstract states, each of which is composed by such conjunctive states.
Here unfold(x) unfolds the symbolic heap so that the cell referred to by x is ex-
posed for access by heap sensitive commands d[x] via the second transition function
exec(d[x]). The third function defined for other (heap insensitive) commands d does
not require such exposure of x.
For the unfolding operation unfold(x), there are two possible scenarios. If x refers to
an object node in the current state σ, no unfolding is required and the exec operation
can proceed directly. However, if x refers to a (user-defined) shape predicate, then
unfold(x) will unfold the current state σ according to the definition of the predicate
in order to expose the object node referred to by x:
isobj(c)
σ ` x::c〈v〉 ∗ σ′
unfold(x)σ Ã σ
isspred(c) σ ` x::c〈u〉 ∗ σ′
root::c〈v〉≡Φ
unfold(x)σ Ã σ′ ∗ [x/root,u/v]Φ
The test isobj(c) returns true only if c is an object node and isspred(c) returns true
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only if c is a shape predicate.
The symbolic execution of heap-sensitive commands d[x] (i.e. x.f, x.f := w, or
free(x)) assumes that the unfolding unfold(x) has been done prior to the execution.
The first three rules below are for normal symbolic execution where the current
state is sufficiently strong for safe execution. The last two rules handle the cases
where the symbolic execution fails and abductive reasoning can be used to discover
missing pure information.
isobj(c) σ ` x::c〈v1, .., vn〉 ∗ σ′
exec(x.fi)(T )(σ, 0)Ã (σ′ ∗ x::c〈v1, .., vn〉 ∧ res=vi, 0)
isobj(c) σ ` x::c〈v1, .., vn〉 ∗ σ′
exec(x.fi := w)(T )(σ, 0)Ã (σ′ ∗ x::c〈v1, .., vi−1, w, vi+1, .., vn〉, 0)
isobj(c) σ ` x::c〈u〉 ∗ σ′
exec(free(x))(T )(σ, 0)Ã (σ′, 0)
isobj(c) σ 0 x::c〈u〉∗true σ∗[σ′]¤ x::c〈u〉∗true
exec(d[x])(T )(σ, 0)Ã (σ′, lbl(d[x]))
isobj(c) σ 0 x::c〈u〉∗true σ∗[σ′] 7 x::c〈u〉∗true
exec(d[x])(T )(σ, 0)Ã (false, lbl(d[x]))
Note that the second to last rule uses an abductive reasoning (via Sleek) to dis-
cover the missing numerical information σ′. Here we use a mapping lbl(−) to map
any instruction in the program being analysed to a unique positive integer label
(namely the aforementioned program location). The rule changes the second ele-
ment of the result to lbl(d[x]) which will be used by the verification to record the
instruction causing an abduction, quits the current execution, propagates the dis-
covered information back to the precondition of the current method, and restarts
the symbolic execution with the strengthened precondition. The last rule covers




The symbolic execution rules for heap-insensitive commands are as follows:
exec(k)(T )(σ, 0)Ã (σ ∧ res=k, 0) exec(v)(T )(σ, 0)Ã (σ ∧ res=v, 0)
isobj(c)
exec(new c(v))(T )(σ, 0)Ã (σ ∗ res::c〈v〉, 0)




i=1) requires Φpr ensures Φpo ∈ T
ρ = [x′i/ui]
m
i=1 ◦ [y′i/vi]ni=1 σ ` ρΦpr ∗ σ′
ρo = [ri/vi]
n
i=1 ◦ [x′i/u′i]mi=1 ◦ [y′i/v′i]ni=1 ρl = [ri/y′i]ni=1 fresh logical ri
exec(mn(x1..xm; y1..yn))(T )(σ, 0)Ã ((ρl σ′) ∗ (ρoΦpo), 0)




i=1) requires Φpr ensures Φpo ∈ T
ρ = [x′i/ui]
m
i=1 ◦ [y′i/vi]ni=1 σ ` ρΦpr ∗ σ′
ρo = [ri/vi]
n
i=1 ◦ [x′i/u′i]mi=1 ◦ [y′i/v′i]ni=1 ρl = [ri/y′i]ni=1 fresh logical ri
exec(mn(x1..xm; y1..yn))(T )(σ, 0)Ã ((ρl σ′) ∗ (ρo (Φpo∧P(u,v))), 0)
t mn...∈T ρ = [x′i/ui]mi=1 ◦ [y′i/vi]ni=1 σ 0 ρΦpr ∗ true σ ∧ [σ′]¤ ρΦpr ∗ true
exec(mn(x1..xm; y1..yn))(T )(σ, 0)Ã (σ′, lbl(mn(...)))
t mn...∈T ρ = [x′i/ui]mi=1 ◦ [y′i/vi]ni=1 σ 0 ρΦpr ∗ true σ ∧ [σ′] 7 ρΦpr ∗ true
exec(mn(x1..xm; y1..yn))(T )(σ, 0)Ã (false, lbl(mn(...)))
Note that the first three rules deal with constant (k), variable (v) and object node
creation (new c(v)), respectively, while the remaining rules handle method invoca-
tion. The fourth rule is used for the invocation of another method mn which has
already been annotated, and the call site meets the precondition of mn, as checked
by the entailment σ ` ρΦpr ∗ σ′. In this case, the execution succeeds and moves
on. The fifth rule is for a recursive call to the current method, similar as above
except that a constraint abstraction is in place as postcondition. The last two rules
are for the cases where the call site cannot establish the precondition of the callee
method and where abductive reasoning is employed. In both cases, the execution
discontinues. The sixth rule returns the abduction result σ′, which is a pure formula
88
4.3. The Verification
and will be propagated back by the verification to strengthen the caller method’s
precondition. The last rule captures the scenario in which the abduction fails. Note
that the operator ◦ is used to compose two substitutions: the substitution ρ2◦ρ1
works by first applying ρ1 and then ρ2.
To keep presentation simple, we assume there are no mutual recursions in the pro-
grams to analyse; therefore each method to be analysed should only call itself re-
cursively. This assumption does not lose generality, as we can always transform
mutual recursion into single recursion (Rubio-Sa´nchez et al., 2008) to have only one
constraint abstraction Q in our verification for one method.
The following rule for all commands signifies that when starting from a configuration
in which the second element is positive (i.e. a faulty state), the execution will
not change the state. This rule is used to skip all remaining instructions when
abductive reasoning is used as a new round of symbolic execution with strengthened
precondition should be started instead:
l > 0
exec(−)(T )(σ, l)Ã (σ, l)






and similarly for exec:
exec†(d)(T )(∨σi, l) =df (∨σ′i, max{li}) where (σ′i, li)=exec(d)(T )(σi, l)
The symbolic execution rules for program constructors e can now be defined using
the lifted transition functions above. Firstly, no change will be made if starting
from a faulty state, as the first rule shows. In all other cases, the symbolic execution
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transforms one abstract state to another w.r.t. the program instruction:
|[−]|T (∆, l) =df (∆, l), where l > 0
|[d[x]]|T (∆, 0) =df exec†(d[x])(T )(unfold†(x)∆, 0)
|[d]|T (∆, 0) =df exec†(d)(T )(∆, 0)
|[e1; e2]|T (∆, 0) =df |[e2]|T ◦ |[e1]|T (∆, 0)
|[v := e]|T (∆, 0) =df [v1/v′, r1/res](|[e]|T (∆, 0)) ∧ v′=r1, fresh v1, r1
(∆′1, l1) = |[e1]|T (v∧∆, 0) (∆′2, l2) = |[e2]|T (¬v∧∆, 0)
|[if (v) e1 else e2]|T (∆, 0) =df (∆′1 ∨∆′2,max{l1, l2})
4.3.4 Soundness
We have defined the underlying operational semantics of our language in Chapter 3.
Its concrete program state consists of stack s and heap h. We have also defined the
relation s, h |= ∆ and the transition 〈s, h, e〉↪→∗〈s′, h′, ν〉. Before proceeding to the
soundness definition, recalling that we have both unprimed variables (for their initial
values in abstract states) and primed ones (for their current values), we realise that
the concrete program states should always be linked to the primed ones. For this
reason we have the following definition:
Definition 4.3.1 (Poststate) Given an abstract state ∆, Post(∆) captures the
relation between primed variables of ∆. That is,
Post(∆) =df ρ(∃V ·∆), where
V = {v1, . . . , vn} denotes all unprimed program variables in ∆, and
ρ = [v1/v
′
1, . . . , vn/v
′
n].
For example, for ∆ = x′::Node〈v′, y′〉 ∧ v′=v ∧ y′=null, we have Post(∆) =
x::Node〈v, y〉 ∧ y=null.
Then we define the soundness of our refinement as follows:
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Definition 4.3.2 (Soundness) For a method definition t mn ((t u); (t v)) {e},
if our verification refines its specification as t mn ((t u); (t v)) requires Φpr en-
sures Φpo {e}, then for all s, h |= Post(Φpr), if 〈s, h, e〉↪→∗〈s′, h′, -〉, then we have
s′, h′ |= Post(Φpo).
The soundness of our analysis is ensured by the soundness of the following: the en-
tailment prover, the pure abduction mechanism, the abstract semantics (with respect
to the underlying operational semantics), the pure constraint abstraction generation
process, and the fixed-point calculation. Among the above, the soundness of the en-
tailment prover and pure fixed-point calculation are already confirmed (Chin et al.,
2010; Nipkow et al., 2002; Popeea and Chin, 2006), and hence we will concentrate
on the soundness of abstract semantics and pure constraint abstraction derivation.
Lemma 4.3.3 (Sound pure abduction) If σ1 ∧ [σ′]¤ σ2 ∗ σ3, then ∀s, h |=
Post(σ1 ∧ σ′), we have s, h |= Post(σ2 ∗ σ3).
Proof This is ensured by the entailment relationship in the premise of each of
the pure abduction rules and the soundness of the entailment checking (Chin et al.,
2010). 2
Lemma 4.3.4 (Sound abstract semantics) If |[e]|T (∆, 0) = (∆1, 0), then for all
s, h, if s, h |= Post(∆) and 〈s, h, e〉↪→〈s1, h1, e1〉, then there always exists ∆0 such
that
s1, h1 |= Post(∆0) and |[e1]|T (∆0, 0) = (∆1, 0)
Proof The proof is done by structural induction over program constructors and
is in Appendix A. 2
Lemma 4.3.5 (Sound pure constraint abstraction) Given a method with pre/-
post shape templates pre and post, if our analysis successfully computes a constraint
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abstraction Q in the first step without abduction, and derives a pure constraint P in
the second step, then we have Q ` post ∧ P.
Proof This proof follows directly our procedure to compute the pure constraint
abstraction from the shape one. It is also in Appendix A. 2
Then based on the discussion above we have:
Theorem 4.3.6 (Soundness) Our verification is sound with respect to the under-
lying operational semantics.
4.4 Related Work
In recent years, dramatic advances have been made in automated verification of
pointer safety for heap-manipulating programs. We highlight some of them here.
The local shape analysis by Distefano et al. (2006) is able to infer automatically loop
invariants for list-processing programs, which forms the early-version SpaceInvader
tool. Gotsman et al. (2006) proposes an interprocedural shape analysis for the
SLAyer tool. Berdine et al. (2007) extends the local shape analysis (Distefano et al.,
2006) to handle higher-order list predicate so that more complicated real-world data
structures can be analysed. Yang et al. (2008) proposs a novel abstraction operation
which significantly improves the scalability of the analysis. Recently, more large
industrial code can be verified by the SpaceInvader tool using the compositional
analysis with bi-abductive inference (Calcagno et al., 2009; Distefano, 2009).
Several shape analyses also tried to make good use of size information. In the devel-
opment of the THOR tool, Magill et al. (2007) proposes an adaptive shape analysis
where additional numerical analysis can be used to help gain better precision. Its ab-
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straction mechanism is also employed in C-to-gate hardware synthesis (Cook et al.,
2009). Very recently, Magill et al. (2010) formulates a novel instrumentation process
which inserts numerical instructions into programs, based on their shape analysis
and user-provided predicates. Instrumented programs can then be used to generate
pure numerical programs for further analysis. Ireland (2007) applies the symbolic
evaluation technique of THOR’s, and specifies the loop invariant as a combination
of two parts: the shape part and the schematic content part. It can also handle
the content of data structures. Different from their work, we take both shape and
pure information into consideration when performing the abstraction, and derive
the pure abstraction from the shape constraint abstraction. Our approach can be
more precise as we have more information for the abstraction. Furthermore, we
can directly handle data structures with stronger invariants, like sortedness and
height-balanced, which have not been addressed in THOR, to the best of our knowl-
edge. Gulwani et al. (2009) combines a set domain with its cardinality domain in a
general framework. Compared with these, our approach can handle data structures
with stronger invariants like sortedness, height-balanced and multiset-related invari-
ants, which have not been addressed in the previous works. Another piece of work,
by Chang et al. (2007) and Chang and Rival (2008), employs inductive checkers
and checker segments to express shape and numerical information. Compared with
their work, ours addresses specification refinement with pure properties (including
numerical and multiset ones) in both pre- and postconditions by processing shape
and pure information in two phases with the help of pure abduction. Meanwhile, our
previous loop invariant synthesis (Qin et al., 2010) also infers strong loop invariants
with a one-phase heavyweight abstract interpretation. Compared with this thesis, it
is limited to loop analysis, whereas this thesis tackles not only loops but also meth-
ods; meanwhile this thesis is more lightweight as it solves the constraint abstraction
in two phases where the second phase (pure constraint abstraction solving) utilises
existing provers and is hence more modular and efficient.
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There are also many other approaches to expressing heap-based domains than sepa-
ration logic. Hackett and Rugina (2005) can deal with AVL-trees but is customised
to handle only tree-like structures with height property. The shape analysis frame-
work TVLA (Sagiv et al., 2002) is based on three-valued logic. It is capable of han-
dling complicated data structures and properties, such as sortedness. LRP (Yorsh
et al., 2006) is fully decidable over multiple linked data structures and has a finite
model property. Guo et al. (2007) reports a global shape analysis that discover
inductive structural shape invariants from the code. Kuncak et al. (2002) develops
a role system to express and track referencing relationships among objects, where
an object’s role (type) depends on, and changes according to, the mutation of its
referencing. Bouajjani et al. (2010) synthesises list-related invariants over infinite
data domains using graph heap representation. The synthesised invariants are able
to capture various aspects of data structures, such as the size, the sum or the content
of linked list, relations of the data at linearly ordered or successive positions. Com-
pared with these works, separation logic based approach benefits from the frame
rule and hence supports local reasoning. Meanwhile, our approach heads towards
program functional correctness including multiset-related properties, which many of
previous works do not generally handle.
There are also numerous works on automated assertion discovery, for example those
based on abstract interpretation (Cousot and Cousot, 1977). Compared with our
work, they mainly focus on finding numerical program properties, and hence our
work is complementary to theirs in the light that we also discover heap/shape infor-
mation. Meanwhile, we can utilise such works as our pure solver, for example the
disjunction inference (Popeea and Chin, 2006).
On the verification side, Smallfoot (Berdine et al., 2005b) is the first verification
system based on separation logic. The Hip/Sleek verification system (Nguyen
et al., 2007; Nguyen and Chin, 2008) supports user-defined shape predicates over
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the combined shape and numerical domain. The Sleek tool has played a very im-
portant role in our verification. The PALE system (Mo¨ller and Schwartzbach, 2001)
transforms constraints in the pointer assertion logic (PAL) into monadic second-
order logic (MSO) and discharge them with MONA (Henriksen et al., 1995). It can
also be used for analysis purpose once a graph type has been abstractly described
with PAL. Hob (Wies et al., 2006) is a modular program verification tool for shape
properties. It models relationship of objects and data structures with contents of
abstract sets and uses set algebra to reason about those properties. It also allows
new plug-ins to be developed to improve its power. Based on Hob, Jahob (Kun-
cak, 2007) takes Java as its target language and allows more general specification
language with relations, specification of data structures, and combination of rea-
soning techniques not only at the level of modules, but also procedures, individual
statements, and verification conditions. Havoc (Chatterjee et al., 2007) is another
verification tool for C language about heap-allocated data structures, using a novel
reachability predicate. There is another recent work on refining specifications via
counterexample-guided abstraction refinement (Taghdiri, 2008) which is goal-driven
and incrementally improves for given safety requirements. Among these works, our
verification is distinguished because we free users from writing whole specifications
by requiring only partial specifications.
4.5 Summary
We have reported in this chapter a new approach to program verification that ac-
cepts partial specifications of methods, and refines them by discovering missing
constraints for numerical and multiset properties, aiming at both memory safety
and functional correctness for pointer-based data structures. We employed two ex-
amples to illustrate our approach and demonstrate its viability. More detailed proof
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of the feasibility of our approach can be found from the system that we built and





We have showed how our approach allows partial specifications to be given for pro-
grams to be verified and refines these specifications into more complete ones by
discovering missing constraints. In this chapter, we further augment our approach
to provide the user with more flexibility and automation. We propose a framework
where some procedures are the main procedures of the whole program (for example
program entry point with relatively simpler specifications and invoking other pro-
cedures) which are annotated with partial specifications, namely, primary methods.
In contrast, specifications for loops and auxiliary methods (which are invoked by the
primary methods) can then be systematically discovered by our augmented mech-
anism, with the help of information propagated from the primary methods. This
mechanism brings more agility to our verification and may reduce users’ annotation




In the previous chapter, we demonstrated an approach to the reduction of user-
supplied specifications for program verification, which only requires users to provide
annotations expressing shape information of programs’ input and output, and will
help users to refine such specifications with inferred obligations for numerical and/or
content constraints, such that the shape-only specifications become sound. However,
a direct question to this approach is: is there any opportunity for the specifications
to be reduced further?
This question may be originated from the requirement of our verification, which runs
in a modular way by refining the partial specifications for each method. Therefore,
to verify a whole program, users still need to annotate every procedure with its shape
specifications. Sometimes this could be difficult for the users: they might be more
familiar with some of the procedures which are main methods to implement certain
functions, but less knowledgeable about some other procedures which are invoked
by those main methods to perform auxiliary functions. Meanwhile, it is quite often
that such procedures for auxiliary functions have sophisticated annotations, while
the main procedures, in contrast, come up with relatively simple specifications. For
example, this situation applies to the insertion method of an AVL-tree, which has
several procedures for tree rotations with quite complex specifications.
As an answer to this question, we propose a solution by dividing the procedures in a
program into two types: primary procedures which are the main/entry methods to
implement some functions, and auxiliary ones invoked by the primary procedures.
As an instance, the insert sort procedure in the previous chapter (page 66) can
be regarded as a primary procedure, and its callee insert as an auxiliary one. In
this setting, we allow the user to annotate only the primary procedures with shape-
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based specifications, and leave blank for the auxiliary ones.1 For the procedures
marked as primary by the user, we still employ previous chapter’s algorithm to in-
fer their missing constraints. For the auxiliary ones, as the user does not provide
a pair of (shape-only) specifications, we will first synthesise their specifications of
shape information based on its calling context in the caller procedure, and utilise
the same algorithm presented in the previous chapter to obtain the remaining con-
straints. This approach may increase the time-consumption of verification (as it has
to synthesise the shape specifications) and lose some modularity (as such synthesis
requires calling context information from the caller during the verification of callee;
we denote it as semi-modular since it is still modular if we regard a primary method
and its affiliating auxiliary methods as a whole integrity). However, at such expense
we can further reduce users’ workload of marking annotations and provide them
with more flexibility as they can omit the auxiliary procedures’ specifications if they
want to.
To summarise, our division of auxiliary methods from primary ones and synthesis
of auxiliary methods’ specifications represent one more step towards an automated
verification of heap-manipulating programs. It applies more program analysis tech-
niques in the verification process and offers more agility to end-users by enabling
them to choose primary methods to annotate and auxiliary methods to leave for
computers. By such a choice they can further balance the trade-off between hu-
man intelligence’s assistance to the verification and its level of automation. This
framework has the following characteristics:
• Further reduction of user annotations: As it is not necessary to annotate the
auxiliary methods, user annotations are further reduced compared with the
1The user can also choose to annotate an auxiliary method for time-saving or precision purposes;
in such a situation this approach degenerates into the one in the previous chapter.
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results from the last chapter. This will also be exhibited by our experiments
in subsequent chapters.
• Flexibility: Apart from allowing users to define their own predicates, we enable
them to decide which methods to annotate and which not. They are now more
involved in the verification process, because if they are dissatisfied by the time
cost or precision achieved of some automatically calculated specifications, then
they can specify those by themselves; and vice versa.
• Semi-automation: We classify our approach as semi-automatic, because the
user is allowed to interfere and guide the verification at any point, which is
linked to the previous feature.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 illustrates how our
improved method works for the motivating examples in the last chapter. Section 5.3
revises our programming language according to this improvement. Then Section 5.4
formulates how such synthesis of specifications for auxiliary methods is performed.
The last section will discuss about related works and conclude this chapter.
5.2 The Approach




5.2.1 First Illustrative Example Revisited
We first illustrate our approach of specification synthesis using method insert
in Figure 5.1. We show how our synthesis infers missing specifications for auxiliary
methods so that the refinement of both primary and auxiliary methods’ specifica-
tions may continue.
Most of the program in Figure 5.1 is identical as the one in the last chapter, including
all the code and the shape-only specification provided for procedure insert sort.
The focus is now on insert, which inserts a node x into a sorted list r. It judges
three cases and has a non-tail-recursive call to itself in the last case (to insert x after
list r’s head). It could be noticed that now the formerly existing partial specification
for insert is gone.
As can be imagined from the fact above, currently the program is divided into
two parts: the primary (entry) procedure for the implementation of the algorithm,
i.e. insert sort, and the auxiliary (invoked) procedure insert. For these two
procedures, we suppose that the user chooses not to provide a specification for the
auxiliary one, and hence we must synthesise its specifications so that the refinement
of its specifications can continue.
To achieve this objective, we alter slightly the way in which we verify the whole pro-
gram. Previously we first refine the shape specification for insert (when insert
has its user-supplied annotation) to obtain a completed specification for it, and ap-
ply such specification in the verification of insert sort (in line 8 of the program).
Now as we do not have insert’s annotation, we firstly begin with the verification
of insert sort since it has shape specifications to start with. Then, when the for-
ward analysis reaches line 8 to invoke insert, we assume that the current program
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1 class Node { int val; Node next; }
2 Node insert_sort(Node x)
3 requires x::llB〈S〉
4 ensures res::sllB〈T〉 {
5 if (x.next == null) return x;
6 else { Node s = x.next;
7 Node r = insert_sort(s);
8 return insert(r, x);
9 }
10 }
11 Node insert(Node r, Node x)
12 if (r == null) {
13 x.next = null; return x;
14 } else if (x.val <= r.val) {
15 x.next = r; return x;
16 } else {




Figure 5.1: The insertion sort program for singly linked lists.
state satisfies its precondition, and try to discover its pre-shape accordingly. For
insert’s post-shape, we conduct another analysis over its procedure body to syn-
thesise it. Finally, when both pre-shape and post-shape are ready for insert, we
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exploit the means in Chapter 4 to refine its specification with (possible) extra quan-
titative/multiset constraints, and use this specification so as to continue to verify
insert sort.2
Let us roll back to the forward analysis of insert sort. When it approaches line
8, the abstract program state at the call site is
x::Node〈v,s〉 ∗ r::sllB〈Sr〉
Then insert should be invoked; however we do not know its specifications. As afore-
mentioned, the pre-shape is directly synthesised from the abstract program state at
the call site. To synthesise post-shapes, we unroll the recursive call once, symbol-
ically execute the unrolled method body (starting from the pre-shape) to obtain a
post-state, and then use the post-state to filter out any invalid post-shapes from
the set of possible post-shapes (drawn from all available shape predicates). For this
example, the possible post-shape candidates can be (a) x::sllB〈S1〉 ∗ res::sllB〈S2〉,
and (b) res::sllB〈S〉, etc. The symbolic execution gives the following post-state:
x::Node〈v, null〉 ∧ x=res ∨
x::Node〈v, r〉 ∗ r::sllB〈S1〉 ∧ x=res ∧ (∀u∈S1·v≤u) ∨
r::Node〈u, x〉 ∗ x::Node〈v, null〉 ∧ r=res ∧ u≤v ∨
r::Node〈u, x〉 ∗ x::Node〈v, r1〉 ∗ r1::sllB〈S1〉 ∧ r=res ∧ u≤v ∧ (∀w∈S1·v≤w)
which does not entail the candidate (a), so we filter it out. Taking (b) as the
post-shape, we now have a shape specification for insert:
requires r::sllB〈S〉 ∗ x::Node〈v, 〉 ensures res::sllB〈T〉
Then we can employ the same refinement process for primary procedures to obtain
the specification
requires r::sllB〈S〉 ∗ x::Node〈v, 〉 ensures res::sllB〈T〉 ∧ T=Sunionsq{v}
2Note that here we actually pay more attention to the postcondition of the specification, as it
is more important for us to proceed with the remaining verification.
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for insert and continue with the verification of insert sort.
5.2.2 Second Illustrative Example Revisited
Now we prove that our approach is also feasible for the second example in the
previous chapter.
The code we verify now is in Figure 5.2. In this example there is only one procedure
to verify; therefore it is the primary procedure with shape annotations. The auxil-
iary procedure in this scenario is the while loop in lines 7-13. Compared with the
previous example in Figure 4.2, we note that the very sophisticated annotation for
the while loop head::sdlB〈p, q, S〉 ∗→ head::sdlB〈ph, qh, Sh〉 ∗root::sdlB〈pr, qr, Sr〉 ∗
end::sdlB〈pe, qe, Se〉 has already gone. This fact again signifies the importance to
eliminate auxiliary procedures’ annotations, because such procedures often help the
primary ones handle auxiliary tasks with complicated input/output, and accordingly
their annotations are usually more complex than the primary procedures’ counter-
parts.
The task of this while loop is to discover the centre node of the given list segment
referenced by head. It traverses the list segment with two pointers root and end.
The end pointer goes towards the list segment’s tail twice as fast as root. When
end arrives at the tail of the segment (tail), root will point to the list segment’s
centre node.
We utilise the same framework as in the last example to verify the whole program.
Firstly the verification begins with the outer primary procedure sdl2nbt until the
loop at line 7. This time it does not have user annotations; as aforementioned, our
verification must first synthesise its pre- and post-states with shape information,
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0 class Node2 { int val; Node2 prev;
Node2 next; }
1 Node2 sdl2nbt(Node2 head, Node2 tail)
2 requires head::sdlB〈p, q, S〉
3 ensures res::nbt〈Sres〉
4 {
5 Node2 root = head;
6 Node2 end = head;
7 while(end != tail) {
8 end = end.next;
9 if (end != tail) {
10 end = end.next;
11 root = root.next;
12 }
13 }
14 if (head == root)
15 root.prev = null;
16 else
17 root.prev = sdl2nbt(head, root);
18 Node2 tmp = root.next;
19 if (tmp == tail)
20 root.next = null;
21 else {
22 tmp.prev = null;




Figure 5.2: Algorithm to convert a sorted doubly-linked list to a node-balanced tree.
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and then proceed with its constraint abstraction. For pre-shape it is straightfor-
ward as the program state before the loop will provide relevant shape information.
For post it is done by checking the loop body (unrolled once)’s symbolic execution
result against all possible abstracted shapes. For the previous example, we first
generate all possible shapes according to the variables accessed by the loop, such
as (a) head::sdlB〈ph, qh, Sh〉 ∗ root::sdlB〈pr, qr, Sr〉, and (b) head::sdlB〈ph, qh, Sh〉 ∗
root::nbt〈hr, br, Sr〉, and many so forth. Then the unrolled loop body is symboli-
cally executed several times to filter out any invalid shape as an invariant. In the
example’s case, executing the loop body will yield the following result:
head::Node2〈v, p, end〉 ∧ head=root ∧ end=tail ∨
head::Node2〈vh, p, root〉 ∗ root::Node2〈vr, head, end〉 ∧ end=tail
(5.1)
where (b) is directly filtered out since (5.1) ` (b) ∗ true fails. However (a) remains
a candidate, as both (5.1) ` (a) ∗ true holds. Therefore, regarding (a) as a possible
shape post, we can employ the same approach for the whole method to generate a
constraint abstraction for the while loop, and solve it to obtain its postcondition
head::sdlB〈null, root, Sh〉 ∗ root::sdlB〈p, tail, Sr〉 ∧
end=tail ∧ S=ShunionsqSr ∧ (∀x∈Sh, y∈Sr·x≤y) ∧ 0≤|Sr|−|Sh|≤1
to continue with the verification.
One more note for the while loop in this example is that the symbolic execution
may actually permit more than one shapes to enter as candidates, for instance,
head::sdlB〈ph, qh, Sh〉. Generally this does not affect the analysis result, as we al-
low the analysis to continue with all possible postconditions computed from this
while loop, and always choose the most precise final result. In the motivating ex-
ample, both head::sdlB〈ph, qh, Sh〉 and (a) are valid shape postconditions for the
loop, but later the former one will cause the analysis to fail in line 15/17, because it
inappropriately approximated the invariant and hence lost information about root.
Since we synthesise all possible shapes, we can always select those shapes sufficiently




To cater for our specification synthesis approach, we have revised the programming
language definition slightly. As shown in Figure 5.3, the language now allows both
primary procedures and auxiliary procedures. Their status is decided implicitly by
the specifications they have: the procedures with shape specifications are primary
procedures, and the ones without any specification are auxiliary ones (in need of
synthesis).
5.4 The Verification
This section formulates our whole framework to verify a program consisting of both
primary and auxiliary methods, as well as the algorithms for shape specification
synthesis.
5.4.1 The Overall Approach
Generally speaking, our whole framework of verification is still founded on the gener-
ation of constraint abstractions from the program being verified and also solving such
constraint abstractions. For the primary methods, we expect the user to provide
shape information in both pre- and postconditions to help the constraint abstrac-
tion generation. For loops and auxiliary methods, we produce a set of candidate
abstractions for their specifications from both their program body and the current
state to invoke them, such that their corresponding constraint abstractions can be




Program Prog ::= tdecl meth
Type declaration tdecl ::= classt | spred | lemma
Class declaration classt ::= class c { field }
Field declaration field ::= t v
Type t ::= c | τ
Procedure declaration meth ::= t mn ((t v); (t v)) {e}
| t mn ((t v); (t v)) mspec {e}
Built-in type τ ::= int | bool | void
Expression e ::= d heap-insensitive atomic
| d[v] heap-sensitive atomic
| v=e assignment
| e1; e2 sequence
| t v; e local variable
| if (v) e1 else e2
| while v {e}
Heap-insensitive atomic d ::= - skip
| null null reference
| kτ constant
| v variable
| new c(v) allocation
| mn(u;v) method call
Heap-sensitive atomic d[v] ::= v.f field read
| v.f=w field write
| free(v) deallocation
Figure 5.3: The programming language for the specification synthesis framework.
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Algorithm Verify(T ,S,mn, σ,x,y)
1 case mn of
2 | while (w) {e0} → f := fresh name(); e := if (w) {e0; f(x;y)};
! (u,v) := (x,y); ([(Φipr,Φ
i
po)], n) := Preproc(T ,S, f,x,y, e0, σ,x,y);
! prim := false;
3 | t mn ((t u0); (t v0)) {e0} → f := mn; e := e0; (u,v) := (u0,v0);
! ([(Φipr,Φ
i
po)], n) := Preproc(T ,S, f,u,v, e0, σ,x,y); prim := false;
4 | t mn ((t u0); (t v0)) (requires Φpri ensures Φpoi )mi=1 {e0} → f := mn;













! prim := true;
5 end case
6 sps := ∅
7 for i := 1 to n do
8 sp := CA Gen Solve(T , f, e,Φipr,Φipo,u,v)
9 if prim = false and sp 6= fail then return (f, sp)
10 else if prim = true then sps := sps ∪ sp
11 end if
12 end for
13 return (f, sps)
end Algorithm
Figure 5.4: Main verification algorithm.
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Our verification algorithm takes as input all available specifications and shapes, and
the code segment to be verified, together with an optional conjunctive program state
and two variable sequences (mainly for loops and auxiliary procedures). It runs in
two steps. The first step recognises whether the procedure is transformed from a
loop (line 2) or an auxiliary one (line 3), or a primary procedure with user-supplied
shape specifications (line 4). If it is a loop originally or an auxiliary procedure, then
it will undergo a pre-processing step (Figure 5.5) which discovers a list of candidate
shape specifications for that procedure.
Algorithm Preproc(T ,S, f,u,v, e, σ,x,y)
1 sps := [ ];
2 prs := SynPre(S, f,u,v, σ,x,y)
3 for Φpr ∈ prs do
4 pos := SynPost(T ,S, f, e,Φpr,u,v)
5 sps := concat(sps, pos)
6 end for
7 return (sps, |sps|)
end Algorithm
Figure 5.5: Pre-processing algorithm.
The pre-processing algorithm Preproc in Figure 5.5 mainly invokes the shape synthe-
sis procedures to discover all possible pre- and post-shapes for loops and auxiliary
procedures, as shown in lines 1 and 4. Then the list of shape pairs (specifications)
are returned and used in further analysis. The details of shape synthesis algorithms
will be introduced in Section 5.4.2.
After the first step, the procedure to be verified is guaranteed with some shape
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specifications. Then the second step will generate constraint abstractions and solve
them according to the shapes given in the specifications (at line 8 and described in
detail in Section 4.3.1). The solutions are then used to refine the shape specifications
with pure constraints.
For the auxiliary procedures and loops, we apply a lazy scheme: as the pre-processing
may yield several possible shape specifications in a list (ordered with heuristics such
that the specifications with more possibility to make the whole verification succeed
are closer to the list head), we try to verify each in sequence. Once a specification can
be verified against the program, then it is returned and the other ones are omitted.
This is reasonable as our main purpose is to verify and refine the specification for
the primary procedure, and thus we view the specifications gained for the auxiliary
procedures as affiliated results. In this way we try to make our verification more
scalable, as will be described in later sections.
5.4.2 Specification Synthesis for Auxiliary Methods
and Loops
For auxiliary procedures, as we do not expect the user to provide specification
annotations, we conduct a pre-analysis (Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7) to synthesise the
pre- and post-shapes before invoking the constraint abstraction generation algorithm
(Figure 4.4). Loops are dealt with by analysing their tail-recursive versions in the
same way.
The pre-shape synthesis algorithm SynPre (Figure 5.6) takes in as input the set of
shape predicates (S), the auxiliary method name (f), its formal parameters (u,v),
the current symbolic state in which f is called (σ), and the corresponding actual
parameters (x,y) of the invocation. The algorithm first obtains possible shape
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Algorithm SynPre(S, f,u,v, σ,x,y)
1 C := ShpCand(S,u,v)
2 for σC ∈ C do
3 if σ 0 [x/u,y/v]σC





Figure 5.6: Precondition synthesis algorithm.
candidates from the parameters u,v with ShpCand (line 1), tests for each shape
whether it is a sound abstraction for the method’s pre-shape with entailment (line
3), then picks up a sound abstraction for the method’s pre-shape with entailment,
and filter out the ones which fail (line 4). Finally the pre-shape abstraction is
returned. While we use an enumeration strategy here, the number of possible shape
candidates per type is small as it is strictly limited by what the user provides in the
primary methods, and further filtered and prioritised by our system.
To synthesise post-shapes (SynPost in Figure 5.7), we also assign C as possible shape
candidates (line 1). We unroll f ’s body e once (i.e. replace recursive calls to f in e
with a substituted e) and symbolically execute it with the algorithm in Figure 4.5
(line 3), assuming f has a specification requires Φpr ensures false (line 2). The
postcondition false is used to ensure that the execution only considers the effect of
the program branches with no recursive calls (to f itself). We then use ∆ to find out
appropriate abstraction of post-shape (line 5), which is paired with Φpr and returned
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Algorithm SynPost (T ,S, f, e,Φpr,u,v)
1 C := ShpCand(S,u,v)
2 T ′ := T ∪ {f(u,v) requires Φpr ensures false {e}}
3 ∆ := Symb Exec(T ′, f, syn unroll(f, e),Φpr)
4 for σC ∈ C do
5 if ∆∧[σ] 7 σC then C := C\{σC} end if
6 end for
7 return pair spec list(Φpr, C)
end Algorithm
Figure 5.7: Postcondition synthesis algorithm.
as result. The function pair spec list forms an ordered list of pre-/post-shape pairs,
each of which has Φpr as pre-shape and a Φpo in C as post-shape.
As can be seen, the generation of possible shape candidates plays an important role
in our synthesis. Its implementation is a recursive algorithm, each recursion of which
decides whether or not to include a given variable and its shape in the produced
separation conjunction as result. The algorithm is listed in Figure 5.8.
This algorithm is the foundation of ShpCand. It invokes length to obtain the length
of a list, and isCompatible(v, S) is a type checker to test whether variable v’s type
is consistent with the shape predicate S, namely, whether the recursive branches of
S’s definition look like root::c〈v〉 ∗ . . . where c is the type of v. Therefore, based
on ShpCandRec, the definition of ShpCand is straightforward as follows:
ShpCand(S,u,v) =df ShpCandRec(S, concat(u,v), 1)
Now we illustrate ShpCand with an example. If we have two parameters x and y
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Algorithm ShpCandRec (S,v, d)
1 R := ∅
2 if d = length(v) then
3 for S ∈ S do
4 if isCompatible(vd, S) then
5 R := R∪{vd::S〈u〉}, where u are fresh logical variables
6 end if
7 R := R∪{emp}
8 end for
9 else
10 R0 := ShpCandRec(S,v, d+1)
11 for σ ∈ R0 do
12 for S ∈ S do
13 if isCompatible(vd, S) then
14 R := R∪{vd::S〈u〉 ∗ σ}, where u are fresh logical variables
15 end if
16 end for





Figure 5.8: Shape candidate generation algorithm.
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with type Node, and the user has defined two shape predicates llB and sllB with
Node, then the list of all possible shape candidates for the two variables (C) will be
[x::sllB〈S〉 ∗ y::sllB〈T〉, x::llB〈S〉 ∗ y::sllB〈T〉, x::sllB〈S〉 ∗ y::llB〈T〉, x::llB〈S〉 ∗
y::llB〈T〉, x::sllB〈S〉, y::sllB〈S〉, x::llB〈S〉, y::llB〈S〉, emp]. Then elements of this
list will be checked against appropriate abstract states (line 3 in Figure 5.6 and line
5 in Figure 5.7) where most elements should be reduced because they are not sound
abstractions. For example, in the previous list, only x::llB〈S〉 ∗ y::llB〈T〉 remains
in the list and participates in further verification. Meanwhile, for any candidate
variable, ShpCand only picks up compatible shape predicates from S, which reduces
more shape candidates. For instance, if the data structure manipulated by the
method is of type Node, then ShpCand rules out shape predicates specifying other
types of data structures, for example doubly-linked lists and trees, etc.
Our shape synthesis generally keeps only highly relevant abstractions. For the while
loop in Section 5.2.2, we filtered out 24 (of 26) abstractions. Generally, in case that
there are several abstractions as candidate specifications, we employ some other
mechanisms to reduce them further. Firstly, we prioritise post-shapes with same (or
stronger) predicates as in precondition since it is more likely that the output will
have the same or similar shape predicates as the input, e.g. x is expected to remain
as sllB (or stronger) if it points to sllB as input. Secondly, we employ a lazy
scheme when refining the synthesised pre/post-shapes (to complete specifications).
We retrieve (and remove) the pre/post-shape pair from the head of the list, (1)
use the refinement algorithm (Figure 4.4) to obtain a specification for the auxiliary
method, and (2) continue the analysis for the primary method. If the analysis for
the primary method succeeds, we will ignore all other synthesised pre/post-shapes
from the list. If either (1) or (2) fails, we will try the next one from the list.
Note that our synthesis of shape specification could only cater to one predicate per
parameter/result. In cases where more complex shape specifications are needed,
we allow users to specify them directly for the respective auxiliary method. These
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mechanisms help to keep attempts over candidate specifications at a minimum level.
A final note on this synthesis approach is on the fact that it carries on with primary
procedure’s verification until the call site of an auxiliary procedure, and then verifies
the auxiliary procedure before completing the verification for the primary procedure.
Therefore, it is at the expense of loss of modularity, if we consider both primary
and auxiliary procedures as having equivalent status (both are procedures of the
program). However, from a pragmatic perspective, we tend to regard this approach
as semi-modular, since if we take every primary procedure and its affiliated auxiliary
procedures as an integrated part, then this approach is modular in this sense. As
long as such “integrated parts” in programs are not oversized, it will not affect the
scalability of our approach.
5.4.3 Revised Symbolic Execution Rules
Applying the framework described in this chapter, we need to make some slight
alterations to the symbolic execution rules when we invoke the algorithm in Fig-
ure 4.5 (line 3) to cater for the newly added feature of auxiliary procedures. The
added rules are as follows:
(x,y) = vars(w, e) (f, T1) = Verify(T ,S, while(w){e}, σ,x,y) T ′ = T ∪T1
exec(while(w){e})(T )(σ, 0)Ã exec(f(x;y))(T ′)(σ, 0)




i=1) /∈ T (f, T1) = Verify(T ,S,mn, σ,x,y) T ′ = T ∪T1
exec(mn(x1..xm; y1..yn))(T )(σ, 0)Ã exec(mn(x1..xm; y1..yn))(T ′)(σ, 0)
where the set S is supposed to contain all the shape definitions provided by user.
As can be seen, these two new rules are used for the invocation of a while loop
or an auxiliary method which has not been verified, where we employ the verifica-
tion algorithm in Figure 5.4 recursively to obtain its postcondition. Therefore we
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know that when the verification over a procedure’s body meets an invocation to a
loop/auxiliary procedure, these two rules will be triggered to fill in the specifications
of the loop/auxiliary procedure, allowing the verification of its caller to carry on.
5.4.4 Soundness
The approach presented in this chapter is essentially an extension of the one in the
previous chapter. Its soundness definition also follows the previous one, referring to
the underlying operational semantics:
Definition 5.4.1 (Soundness) For a method definition t mn ((t u); (t v)) {e},
if our analysis synthesises its specification as t mn ((t u); (t v)) requires Φpr en-
sures Φpo {e}, then for all s, h |= Post(Φpr), if 〈s, h, e〉↪→∗〈s′, h′, -〉, then we have
s′, h′ |= Post(Φpo).
Therefore the soundness of the whole approach can be reduced to the soundness
of our synthesis of shape specifications. To prove this, we need to review our pre-
condition/postcondition synthesis algorithms. From these two algorithms, we can
see that our synthesised pre-shape must satisfy the abstract state at the calling
context (because of the entailment relationship), and the post-shape is checked to
see whether it could possibly be abstracted as the execution result of the unfolded
program. From the soundness of entailment checking and abduction, we have
Theorem 5.4.2 (Soundness) Our verification is still sound with respect to the
underlying operational semantics, with the specification synthesis mechanism added.




The verification framework in this chapter, which divides the program into primary
and auxiliary procedures, applies some program analysis techniques to synthesise
raw specifications for auxiliary procedures and complete them. Its counterparts in
the state-of-the-art are introduced in the previous chapter in several categories. The
shape-only analyses include Distefano et al. (2006); Gotsman et al. (2006); Berdine
et al. (2007); Yang et al. (2008); Calcagno et al. (2009). Some works capable of
handling numerical or content information include Magill et al. (2007, 2008, 2010);
Ireland (2007); Maclean et al. (2009); Gulwani et al. (2009); Chang et al. (2007);
Chang and Rival (2008). On the contrary to these works, we only apply program
analysis techniques over loops/auxiliary procedures, and we do not attempt to com-
pute a fixed-point for their postcondition (instead we just unroll the procedure
body once to execute it symbolically, resulting in a sound approximation of the
post-shape). Our approach runs in this way mainly because we want to minimise
the cost of such synthesis, compared with their relatively high cost of fixed-point it-
eration. A potential expense of this choice could be a coarsely generated post-shape
as the synthesis result; however such expense will be digested by our specification
refinement introduced in Chapter 4. Meanwhile, it is possible for us to employ fixed-
point calculation in the synthesis of post-shape; yet it is an orthogonal problem to
this approach as addressed in our other works (Luo et al., 2010b; Qin et al., 2010).
On the verification side, compared with the previous works (Berdine et al., 2005b;
Nguyen et al., 2007; Wies et al., 2006; Kuncak, 2007; Chatterjee et al., 2007;
Taghdiri, 2008), our verification is now even more distinguished than in the pre-
vious chapter because we further free users from writing specifications for loops and




In this chapter we augment our proposed approach to the refinement of specifications
by requiring only partial specification for primary procedures. Specifications for
loops and auxiliary procedures can then be systematically discovered, with the help
of information propagated from the primary methods. On the basis of this technique
we have slightly altered our framework of verification which now provides more





Verifying Programs with Unknown
Components
Verification of programs with invocations to unknown components is a practical
problem, because in many scenarios not all code of programs to be verified is avail-
able. Those unknown components also pose a challenge for their verification. This
chapter addresses this problem with an attempt to verify both memory safety and
functional correctness of such programs using pointer-based data structures. Pro-
vided with a Hoare-style specification {Φpr} prog {Φpo} where program prog con-
tains calls to some unknown components unknown, we infer a specification mspecu
for unknown from the calling contexts, such that the problem of verifying prog can
be safely reduced to the problem of proving that unknown (once its code is avail-
able) meets the derived specification mspecu. The expected specification mspecu
for unknown is automatically calculated using an abduction-based shape analysis




A recent prevalent trend of component-based software engineering (Kozaczynski
and Booch, 1998) poses great challenge for quality assurance and verification of
programs. This methodology involves the integration of software components from
both native development and third-parties, and thus the source code of some com-
ponents/procedures might be unknown for verification. This problem is quite prac-
tical and has multiple forms in various scenarios. For example, some programs may
have calls to third-party library procedures whose code is not accessible (e.g. in
binary form). Some components may be invoked by remote procedure calls only
with a native interface such as COM/DCOM (Sessions, 1998). Still, some compo-
nents could be used for dynamic upgrading of running systems whose cost of being
stopped/restarted is too expensive to bear (Szyperski, 2003). Other scenarios in-
clude function pointers (e.g. in C), interface method invocation (e.g. in OO) and
mobile code, which all contain procedures not available for static verification.
To verify such programs, existing approaches generally do not provide elegant solu-
tions:
• Black-box testing (Beizer, 1996) regards the unknown components as black-
boxes to test their functionality, which cannot formally prove the absence of
program bugs. Especially in safety-critical systems a bug failed to be found
by testing may cause catastrophic result, as described in Chapter 1.
• Likewise, specification mining (Ammons et al., 2002) discovers possible spec-
ifications for the (unknown part of the) program by observing its execution
and traces, which is also dynamically performed and bears the same problem.
• For static verifiers/analysers, SpaceInvader (Calcagno et al., 2009) simply as-
sumes the program and the unknown procedure have disjoint memory foot-
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prints so that the unknown call can be safely ignored due to the hypothetical
frame rule (O’Hearn et al., 2004), whereas this assumption does not hold in
many cases.
• Some methods (Emami et al., 1994; Gopan and Reps, 2007) try to take into
account all possible implementations for the unknown component; however
there can be too many such candidates in general, and hence the verification
might be infeasible for large-scaled programs.
• Finally, some verifiers will just stop at the first unknown procedure call and
provide an incomplete verification (Nguyen et al., 2007), which is obviously
undesirable.
Approach and contributions. Compared with the methods stated above, the
approach that we propose in this chapter is a different one to the verification of
programs that are partially available due to the unknown component/procedure
calls. Given a specification S = {Φpr} prog {Φpo} for the program prog containing
calls to an unknown component unknown, our solution is to proceed with the veri-
fication for the known fragments of prog, and at the same time infer a specification
Su that is expected for the unknown component unknown based on the calling con-
text(s). The problem of verifying the program prog against the specification S can
now be safely reduced to the problem of verifying the component unknown against
the inferred specification Su, provided that the verification of the known fragments
does not cause any problems. The inferred specification is subject to a later ver-
ification when an implementation or a specification for the unknown component
becomes available. This is essentially an improvement of our previous work (Luo
et al., 2010a) by extending the program properties to be verified from simple pointer
safety to functional correctness of linked data structures. Such properties include
structural numerical ones like size and height, relational numerical ones like sort-




• We propose a novel framework in a combined abstract domain (involving both
shape and pure properties) for the verification of memory safety and functional
correctness of partially available programs with unknown components.
• Our approach is essentially top-down, as it can be used to infer the specification
for callee procedures based on the specification for the caller procedure. Hence
it may benefit the general software development process as a complement for
current bottom-up approaches (Nguyen et al., 2007; Calcagno et al., 2009).
• We have invented an abduction mechanism which can be applied in this com-
bined domain. It not only can infer shape-based anti-frames for an entailment,
but also can discover corresponding pure information (numerical and/or mul-
tiset) as well. We also defined a partial order as a guidance for the quality of
abduction results.
Outline. Section 6.2 employs a motivating example to informally illustrate our
approach. Section 6.3 presents the programming language (catering for unknown
calls) for our analysis. Section 6.4 introduces our abductive reasoning. Section 6.5
depicts our verification algorithms, followed by some concluding remarks.
6.2 The Approach
In this section, we illustrate informally, via an example, how our approach verifies
a program by inferring the specification for the unknown procedure it invokes.
Example 6.2.1 (Motivating example) Our goal is to verify the program sort
against the given specification shown in Figure 6.1. According to the specification,
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2 if (x == null) return null;
3 else {
4 Node y = unknown(x);
5 Node z = y.next;
6 Node w = sort(z);
7 y.next = w;
8 return y;
9 } }
Figure 6.1: A program sort calling an unknown procedure unknown to be verified.
the procedure takes in a non-empty linked list (llB) x and returns a sorted list
(sllB) referenced as res. The (symbolic) content of these two lists are identical (S).
Note that sort calls an unknown procedure unknown at line 4. As we do not have
available knowledge about it, the discovery of its specifications is essential for both
the verification and our understanding of the program (such that we may find out
what sorting algorithm this program implements).
The verification process of the program is illustrated in Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3.
We conduct a forward analysis on the program body starting with the precondition
x::llB〈S〉 (line 0). The results of our analysis (e.g. the abstract states) are marked
as comments in the code. The analysis carries on until it reaches the unknown
procedure call at line 4.
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0 Node sort(Node x) requires x::llB〈S〉 ensures res::sllB〈S〉
1 { // res is the value returned by the procedure
1a // Forward analysis begins with current state σ : x::llB〈S〉
2 if (x == null) return null;
2a // σ : x::llB〈S〉 ∧ x=null ∧ res=null
2b // Check whether current state meets the postcondition: σ ` res::sllB〈S〉
2c // It succeeds, and verification on this branch terminates
3 else {
3a // σ : x::llB〈S〉 ∧ x6=null
3b // Unknown call appears afterwards; extract its precondition from σ
3c // Φupr := Local(σ, {x}) := x::llB〈S〉 ∧ x6=null
3d // Also distinguish the frame part not touched by unknown call
3e // R0 := Frame(σ, {x}) := emp ∧ x6=null
4 Node y = unknown(x);
4a // We know nothing about the effect of the unknown call, and thus
4b // begin to discover its post-effect starting from emp (saved in σ′)
4c // σ′0 : emp ∧ x=a ∧ y=resu σ := R0 ∗ σ′0 σ′ := σ′0
Figure 6.2: Verification of sort calling an unknown procedure unknown (part 1).
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As afore-shown, the current state before line 4 is x::llB〈S〉 ∧ x6=null (σ at line 3a),
from which we generate the precondition for the unknown call. We split σ into
two disjoint parts: the local part Φupr (line 3c) that is depended on, and possibly
mutated by, the unknown procedure; and the frame part R0 (line 3e) that is not
accessed by the unknown procedure. Intuitively, the local part of a state w.r.t. a
set of variables X is the part of the heap reachable from variables in X (together
with pure information); while the frame part denotes the unreachable heap part
(together with pure information). For example, for a program state x::Node〈a, w〉 ∗
y::Node〈b, z〉 ∗ z::Node〈c, null〉 ∧ w=z, its local part w.r.t. {x} is x::Node〈a, w〉 ∗
z::Node〈c, null〉∧w=z, and its frame part w.r.t. {x} is y::Node〈b, z〉∧w=z. We will
have their formal definitions in Section 6.5. Thus we take Φupr (line 3c) as a crude
precondition for the unknown procedure, since it denotes the part of program state
that is accessible, and hence potentially usable, by the unknown call. The frame
part R0 is not touched by the unknown call and will remain in the post-state, as
shown in line 4c.
At line 4c, the abstract state after the unknown call (σ) consists of two parts: one
is the aforesaid frame R0 not accessed by the call, and the other is the procedure’s
postcondition which is unfortunately not available. Our next step is to discover the
postcondition by examining the code fragment after the unknown call (lines 4d to
8e mainly in Figure 6.3). For this task, a traditional approach might be a backward
reasoning from the caller’s postcondition towards the unknown call’s postcondition.
However, this is proven infeasible for separation logic based shape domain by pre-
vious works (Calcagno et al., 2009), and hence we employ another approach with a
forward reasoning from the unknown call towards the caller’s postcondition, using
abduction to accumulate the unknown call’s postcondition.
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4d // Next instruction (y.next) requires y be a Node
4e // But entailment checking σ ` y::Node〈v, p〉 fails
4f // Therefore this must be part of the unknown call’s post-effect; we use
4g // abduction to find it and add it to current state and unknown call’s post
4h // σ ∗ [σ′1]¤ y::Node〈v, p〉 (s.t. σ ∗ σ′1 ` y::Node〈v, p〉 ∗ true)
4i // σ′1 : y::Node〈v, p〉 σ := σ ∗ σ′1 σ′ := σ′ ∗ σ′1
5 Node z = y.next;
5a // Current state σ : y::Node〈v, z〉
5b // Next instruction invokes this procedure recursively and requires its pre
5c // But σ ` z::llB〈S1〉 fails again due to lack of knowledge about unknown call
5d // Again we use abduction to find the missing part of unknown call’s post-effect
5e // σ ∗ [σ′2]¤ z::llB〈S1〉 (s.t. σ ∗ σ′2 ` z::llB〈S1〉 ∗ true)
5f // σ′2 : z::llB〈S1〉 σ := σ ∗ σ′2 σ′ := σ′ ∗ σ′2
6 Node w = sort(z);
6a // Current state σ : y::Node〈v, z〉 ∗ w::sllB〈S1〉 (w already refers to a sorted list)
7 y.next = w;
7a // Current state σ : y::Node〈v, w〉 ∗ w::sllB〈S1〉
8 return y;
8a // σ : y::Node〈v, w〉 ∗ w::sllB〈S1〉 ∧ res=y; it should imply sort’s postcondition
8b // But σ ` res::sllB〈S〉 still fails, suggesting more post-effect of unknown call
8c // A final abduction is conducted to find it: σ ∗ [σ′3]¤ res::sllB〈S〉
8d // σ′3 : S={v}unionsqS1 ∧ ∀u∈S1·v≤u σ := σ ∗ σ′3 σ′ := σ′ ∗ σ′3
8e // All abduction results will be combined at last to form unknown call’s post
9 } }
9a // Φupr : a::llB〈S〉 ∧ a6=null (a is the unknown procedure’s formal parameter)
9b // Φupo : resu::Node〈v, b〉 ∗ b::llB〈S1〉 ∧ S={v}unionsqS1 ∧ ∀u∈S1·v≤u
Figure 6.3: Verification of sort calling an unknown procedure unknown (part 2).
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Initially, we assume the unknown procedure having an empty heap σ′0 as its post-
condition1, and gradually discover the missing parts of the postcondition during
the symbolic execution of the code fragment after the unknown call. To do that,
our analysis keeps track of a pair (σ, σ′) at each program point, where σ refers to
the current heap state, and σ′ denotes the expected postcondition discovered so far
for the unknown procedure. The notations σ′i are used to represent parts of the
discovered postcondition.
At line 5, y.next is dereferenced, whose value is then assigned to z. For such
dereference to succeed, it requires that y be pointing to a node in the heap in the
current state. However, we only have an empty heap here (σ in line 4c). This
is not necessarily due to a program error; it might be attributed to the fact that
the unknown call’s postcondition is still unknown. Therefore, our analysis performs
an abduction (line 4h) to infer the missing part σ′1 for σ such that σ ∗ σ′1 implies
that y points to a Node. As shown in line 4i, σ′1 is inferred to be y::Node〈v, p〉,
which is accumulated into σ′ as part of the expected postcondition of the unknown
procedure. (We will explain the details for abduction in Section 6.4.) Now the heap
state combined with the inferred σ′1 meets the requirement of the dereference, and
thus the forward analysis continues.
At line 6, the procedure sort is called recursively. Here the current heap state still
does not satisfy the precondition of sort (as shown in line 5c). Blaming the lack of
knowledge about the unknown call’s postcondition, we conduct another abduction
(line 5e) to infer the missing part σ′2 for σ such that σ∗σ′2 entails the precondition of
sort w.r.t. some substitution [z/x]. Updated with the abduction result z::llB〈S1〉,
the program state now meets the precondition of sort, which is later transformed




to w::sllB〈S1〉 as the effect of sorting over z.
After that, line 7 links y and the sorted list w together. Then y is returned as
the procedure’s result at last. The corresponding state σ at line 8a is expected to
establish the postcondition of sort for the overall verification to succeed. However,
it does not (as shown in line 8b). Again this might be because part of the unknown
call’s postcondition is still missing. Therefore, we perform a final abduction (line
8c) to infer the missing σ′3 as follows:
(y::Node〈v, w〉 ∗ w::sllB〈S1〉 ∧ res=y) ∗ [σ′3]¤ res::sllB〈S〉
such that σ ∗ σ′3 implies the postcondition. In this case, our abductor returns σ′3 as
a sophisticated pure constraint S={v}unionsqS1 ∧ ∀u∈S1·v≤u as the result which is then
added into σ′, as shown in line 8d.
Finally, we generate the expected pre/post-specification for the unknown proce-
dure (lines 9a and 9b). The precondition is obtained from the local pre-state of
the unknown call, Φupr at line 3c, by replacing all variables that are aliases of a
with the formal parameter a. The postcondition is obtained from the accumulated
abduction result, σ′, after performing a similar substitution (which also involves
formal parameter resu). Our discovered specification for the unknown procedure
Node unknown(Node a) is:
Φupr : a::llB〈S〉 ∧ a6=null
Φupo : ∃b · resu::Node〈v, b〉 ∗ b::llB〈S1〉 ∧ S={v}unionsqS1 ∧ ∀u∈S1·v≤u
This derived specification has two implications. The first is that the entire program
is verified on the condition that unknown meets such specification. The second is a
hint of the behaviours of both the caller (sort) and the callee (unknown), that is,
unknown should take as input a list and returns another list with identical content
as the input, whose smallest element is exactly at its head. After calling it, sort
only needs to sort the rest of the list to accomplish the whole task of sorting. From
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this we may guess that sort could be a selection-sort algorithm if unknown always
selects the smallest element and puts it on the list head, or it could be bubble-sort
algorithm if unknown is a bubbling procedure to exchange two adjacent elements in
descending order. Therefore this enhances our understanding of the whole program,
and we can verify it as soon as we have the code of unknown.
6.3 Programming Language
To accommodate the unknown procedures, we augment the programming language
in Figure 3.1 with unknown components as in Figure 6.4. A program Prog still
consists of two parts: type declarations and procedure declarations. The type decla-
rations remains the same as in Chapter 3. The procedure declarations now include
meth and munk, of which the second contains invocations to unknown procedures
while the first does not.
The main part of the language is not altered much: it is still expression-oriented; e is
the (recursively defined) program constructor and d and d[x] are atomic instructions;
we still allow both call-by-value and call-by-reference method parameters, etc.
To address the unknown calls, we employ unknown constructors u and v to denote
expressions that involve invocations to the unknown procedures (unk(x,y)). An
unknown block v is defined as a sequence of normal expressions sandwiching an
unknown expression u, which can be a single unknown call, or a sequence of unknown
calls, or an if-conditional statement/while loop containing an unknown block. Our




Program Prog ::= tdecl meth munk
Type declaration tdecl ::= classt | spred | lemma
Class declaration classt ::= class c { field }
Field declaration field ::= t x
Type t ::= c | τ
Procedure declaration meth ::= t mn ((t x); (t y)) mspec {e}
Unknown proc. decl. munk ::= t mn ((t x); (t y)) mspec {v}
Built-in type τ ::= int | bool | void
Expression e ::= d heap-insensitive atomic
| d[x] heap-sensitive atomic
| v=e assignment
| e1; e2 sequence
| t x; e local variable
| if (x) e1 else e2
| while x {e} where Φpr ∗→Φpo
Heap-insensitive atomic d ::= . . . (Same as in Chapter 3)
Heap-sensitive atomic d[x] ::= . . . (Same as in Chapter 3)
Unknown expression u ::= unk(x;y)
| unk(x0;y0); e1; unk1(x1;y1); e2; . . . ;
en−1; unkn(xn;yn)
| if (x) v else e
| if (x) e else v
| if (x) v1 else v2
| while x {v} where Φpr ∗→Φpo
Unknown block v ::= e1;u; e2
Figure 6.4: A core (C-like) imperative language.
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The operational semantics of the programming language stays the same as in Chap-
ter 3. All the unknown procedure calls are regarded as invocations to procedures
whose effect over the pair (s, h) is not known to us. However, to retain the soundness
of our verification, we require that such effect conforms to the unknown procedures’
specifications once these specifications are discovered.
As we aim to verify both memory safety and functional correctness of programs, our
specification language also stays the same as in Chapter 3 in order to express the
multiple program properties (shape, numerical and content) and provide support
for reasoning over them.
6.4 Enhanced Abduction Mechanism
As shown in Section 6.2, when analysing the code after an unknown call, it is possible
that the current state cannot meet the required precondition for the next instruction
due to the lack of information about the unknown procedure. Therefore we need
to infer the unknown procedure’s specification with abduction (or abductive reason-
ing) (Giacobazzi, 1994; Calcagno et al., 2009). It works as follows: for a failed en-
tailment checking σ1 ` σ2 ∗ true, it attempts to compute an anti-frame σ′, such that
σ1 ∗ σ′ ` σ2 ∗ true succeeds. For instance, the entailment checking emp ` x::llB〈S〉
fails as the antecedent contains an empty heap. Then x::llB〈S〉 will be found to
strengthen the antecedent and validate the entailment emp ∗ x::llB〈S〉 ` x::llB〈S〉.
Compared with some previous works of abduction over the shape domain, such
as Calcagno et al. (2009) and our pure abduction in Chapter 4, the abduction de-
scribed here is more enhanced, as it tries to discover both shape and pure information
where applicable. Comparatively, the abduction in Calcagno et al. (2009) only works
on shape domain with the list segment predicate, and our pure abduction only finds
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pure constraints although it operates in a combined shape/pure domain.
An abduction σ1 ∗ [σ′]¤ σ2 can also be written as σ1 ∗ [σ′]¤ σ2 ∗ σ3, where σ′ is
the abduction result (the anti-frame), while σ3 is the frame part obtained with
entailment checking σ1 ∗ σ′ ` σ2 ∗ true. Its rules are exhibited in Figure 6.5.
σ 0 σ1 ∗ true σ1 ` σ ∗ σ′ σ ∗ σ′ ` σ1 ∗ σ2
σ ∗ [σ′]¤ σ1 ∗ σ2
σ 0 σ1 ∗ true σ1 0 σ ∗ true σ0 ∈ unroll(σ) data no(σ0) ≤ data no(σ1)
σ0 ` σ1 ∗ σ′ or σ0 ∗ [σ′0]¤ σ1 ∗ σ′ σ′′=XPure(σ′) σ ∧ σ′′ ` σ1 ∗ σ2
σ ∧ [σ′′]¤ σ1 ∗ σ2
σ 0 σ1 ∗ true σ1 0 σ ∗ true
σ1 ∗ [σ′1]¤ σ ∗ σ′ σ′′=XPure(σ′) σ ∧ σ′′ ` σ1 ∗ σ2
σ ∧ [σ′′]¤ σ1 ∗ σ2
σ 0 σ1 ∗ true σ1 0 σ ∗ true σ ∗ σ1 0 false
σ ∗ [σ1]¤ σ1 ∗ σ2
Figure 6.5: Abduction rules.
Our abduction deals with four different cases with their corresponding rules. The
first rule triggers when the LHS (σ) does not imply the RHS (σ1) but the RHS
implies the LHS with some formula (σ′) as the frame. This rule is quite general and
applies in many cases, such as the state immediately after an unknown call where
we start with emp as the heap state. For the example above emp 0 x::llB〈S〉, the
RHS can entail the LHS with frame x::llB〈S〉. The abduction then checks whether
σ plus the frame information σ′ implies σ1 ∗ σ2 for some σ2 (emp in this example),
and returns the result x::llB〈S〉.
In the case described by the second rule, neither side implies the other, e.g. for
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x::sllB〈S〉 as LHS (σ) and ∃p, u, v · x::Node〈u, p〉 ∗ p::Node〈v, null〉 as RHS (σ1).
As the shape predicates in the antecedent σ are formed by disjunctions accord-
ing to their definitions (like sllB), its certain disjunctive branches may imply σ1.
As the rule suggests, to accomplish abduction σ ∗ [σ′′]¤ σ1 ∗ σ2, we first unfold
σ (σ0 ∈ unroll(σ)) and try entailment or further abduction with the results (σ0)
against σ1. If it succeeds with a frame σ
′, then we first obtain a pure approx-
imation of σ′ with XPure (Nguyen et al., 2007), and confirm the abduction by
ensuring σ ∧ σ′′ ` σ1 ∗ σ2. For the example above, the abduction returns |S|=2 as
the anti-frame σ′ and discovers the nontrivial frame S={u, v} ∧ u≤v (σ2). Note the
function data no returns the number of object nodes in a state, e.g. it returns one
for x::Node〈v, p〉 ∗ p::llB〈T〉. The unroll unfolds all shape predicates once in σ, nor-
malises the result to a disjunctive form (
∨n
i=1 σi), and returns the result as a set of
formulae ({σ1, . . . , σn}). An instance is that it expands x::Node〈v, p〉 ∗ p::llB〈T〉 to
be {x::Node〈v, p〉∧p=null∧T=∅,∃u, q, T1 ·x::Node〈v, p〉∗p::Node〈u, q〉∗q::llB〈T1〉∧
T=T1∪{u}}. The XPure is a strengthened version of that in Nguyen et al. (2007),
as it also takes pure parts in σ′ and keeps them in the resulted pure constraints.
In the third rule, neither side entails the other, and the second rule does not apply,
for example ∃p, u, v·x::Node〈u, p〉∗p::Node〈v, null〉 as LHS (σ) and ∃S·x::sllB〈S〉 as
RHS (σ1). In this case the antecedent cannot be unfolded as they are already object
nodes. As the rule suggests, it reverses two sides of the entailment and applies the
second rule to uncover the constraints σ′1 and σ
′. Then it checks that the LHS (σ),
with σ′ added, does imply the RHS (σ1) before it returns σ′. For the example above,
the abduction returns u≤v which is essential for the two nodes to form a sorted list
(σ1).
When an abduction is needed, the first three rules should be tried first; if they do
not succeed in finding a solution, then the last rule is invoked to simply add the
consequence to the antecedent, provided that they are consistent. It is effective for
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situations like x::Node〈 , 〉 0 y::Node〈 , 〉, where we should add y::Node〈 , 〉 to the
LHS directly (since the other three rules do not apply here).
One observation on abduction is that there can be many solutions of the anti-frame
σ′ for the entailment σ1 ∗ σ′ ` σ2 ∗ true to succeed. For instance, false is always
a solution but should be avoided where possible. For all possible solutions to an
abduction, we can compare their “quality” with a partial order ¹ over SH defined
by the entailment relationship (`):
σ1 ¹ σ2 =df σ2 ` σ1 ∗ true
and the smaller (weaker) one in two abduction solutions is regarded as better. We
prefer to find solutions that are (potentially locally) minimal with respect to ¹
and consistent. However, such solutions are generally not easy to compute and
could incur excess cost (with additional disjunction in the analysis). Therefore, our
abductive inference is designed more from a practical perspective to discover anti-
frames that should be suitable as specifications for unknown procedures, and the
partial order¹ is used to guide the decision choices of our abduction implementation,
but not to find the theoretically best solution.
6.5 Verification
This section presents our algorithms to verify programs with unknown calls.
6.5.1 Main Verification Algorithm
Our main verification algorithm is given in Figure 6.6. It verifies an unknown block v
(the third parameter) against the given specificationsmspecv (the second parameter).
136
6.5. Verification
The first parameter includes the specifications of already available procedures which
might be invoked as well as the unknown ones in the program to be verified. Upon
successful verification, this algorithm returns specifications that should be met by
the unknown procedures in v. If the verification fails, it suggests that the current
program cannot meet one or more given specifications due to a potential program
bug. The specifications for unknown procedures will be expressed in terms of special
variables a, b, etc. as in the earlier example.
The algorithm initialises in the first two lines. It distinguishes the body of the
unknown block v (as an unknown expression u in between two normal expressions
e1 and e2), sets up the set mspecu to store discovered specifications (line 1), and
finds the program variables that are potentially accessed by v and u, respectively
(prog var in line 2). Note that x0 and x are the variables read by v and u, and y0
and y are those mutated. For example, if v contains an assignment y = x then x
will be in x0 and y in y0.
After the initialisation, for each specification (requires Φpr ensures Φpo) to verify
against (line 3), the algorithm works in three steps. The first step is to compute
the preconditions of u (lines 4–7). It first conducts a symbolic execution from Φpr
over e1 (the program segment before u) to obtain its post-state, from which the
preconditions for u will be extracted (line 4). The symbolic execution is essentially
a forward analysis whose details are presented later. If the post-states include false,
then it means the given Φpr cannot guarantee e1’s memory safety, and thus fail is
returned (line 5). Otherwise, each post-state of e1 is processed by function Local
as a candidate precondition for u (line 7). Intuitively, it extracts the part of each
σ reachable from the variables that may be accessed by u, namely, x and y. The
function Local is defined as follows:
Local(∃z · κ ∧ pi, {x}) =df ∃fv(σ) ∪ {z} \ ReachVar(κ ∧ pi, {x}) ·
ReachHeap(κ ∧ pi, {x}) ∧ pi
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Algorithm Verify(T ,mspecv, v)
1 Denote v as { e1;u; e2} ; mspecu := ∅
2 (x0,y0) := prog var(v) ; (x,y) := prog var(u)
3 foreach (requires Φpr ensures Φpo) ∈ mspecv do
4 S0 := |[e1]|T {Φpr ∧ y′0=y0}
5 if false ∈ S0 then return fail endif
6 foreach σ ∈ S0 do
7 Φupr := Local(σ, {x,y})
8 z := fv(Φupr) \ {x,y}
9 S := |[e2]|AT {([b/y]Frame(σ, {x,y})∧x=a∧y=b∧z=c, emp∧x=a∧y=b∧z=c)}
10 S′ := { (σ, σ′) | (σ, σ′)∈S ∧ σ ` Φpo ∗ true } ∪
{ (σ ∗ σ′′, σ′ ∗ σ′′) | (σ, σ′)∈S ∧ σ 0 Φpo∗true ∧ σ∗[σ′′]¤ Φpo∗true }
11 if ∃(σ, σ′)∈S′ . fv(σ′) * ReachVar(σ, {a, b}) then return (fail, σ′) endif
12 foreach (σ, σ′) ∈ S′ do
13 Φupr := [a/x, b/y, c/z] Φ
u
pr
14 Φupo := sub alias(σ
′, {a, b, c})
15 g := (fv(Φupr) ∩ fv(Φupo)) \ {a, b}




20 Tu := CaseAnalysis(T ,mspecu, u)
21 return T unionmultiTu
end Algorithm
Figure 6.6: The main verification algorithm.
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where fv(σ) stands for all free (program and logical) variables occurring in σ, and
ReachVar(κ ∧ pi, {x}) is the minimal set of variables satisfying the following relation:
{x} ∪ {z2 | ∃z1, pi1 · z1∈ReachVar(κ∧pi, {x}) ∧ pi=(z1=z2 ∧ pi1)} ∪ {z2 |
∃z1, κ1 · z1∈ReachVar(κ∧pi, v) ∧ κ=(z1::c〈.., z2, ..〉 ∗ κ1)} ⊆ ReachVar(κ∧pi, {x})
That is, it is composed of aliases of x as well as variables reachable from x. And
the formula ReachHeap(κ∧pi, {x}) denotes the part of κ reachable from {x} and is
formally defined as the ∗-conjunction of the following set of formulae:
{κ1 | ∃z1, z2, κ2 · z1∈ReachVar(κ∧pi, {x}) ∧ κ=κ1∗κ2 ∧ κ1=z1::c〈. . . , z2, . . .〉}
The second step is to discover the postconditions for u (lines 9–11). This is mainly
completed with another symbolic execution with abduction over e2 (line 9), whose
details are also introduced later. Here we denote u’s post-state as emp, since its
knowledge is not available yet. Therefore, the initial state for the symbolic execution
of e2 is simply the frame part of state not touched by u. The function Frame is
formally defined as
Frame(∃z · κ ∧ pi, {x}) =df ∃z · UnreachHeap(κ ∧ pi, {x}) ∧ pi
where UnreachHeap(∃z · κ ∧ pi, {x}) is the formula consisting of all ∗-conjuncts from
κ which are not in ReachHeap(∃z · κ ∧ pi, {x}).
The conjunctions x=a ∧ y=b ∧ z=c in line 9 are to keep track of variable snapshot
accessed by u using the special variables a, b and c. Then the symbolic execution
returns a set S of pairs (σ, σ′) where σ is a possible post-state of e2 and σ′ records the
discovered effect of u. However, maybe u still has some effect that is only exposed
in the expected postcondition Φpo for the whole program; therefore we need to check
whether or not σ can establish Φpo. If not, another abduction σ∗[σ′′]¤ Φpo is invoked
to discover further effect σ′′ which is then added into σ′.
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There can still be some complication here. Note that the effect discovered during
e2’s symbolic execution may not be attributed all over to u; it is also possible that
there is a bug in the program, or the given specification is not sufficient. As a
consequence of that, the result σ′ returned by our abduction may contain more in-
formation than what can be expected from u, in which case we cannot simply regard
the whole σ′ as the postcondition of u. For example, consider the code fragment
unk(x); z=y.next with the precondition x::Node〈 , null〉. Before the assignment
(and dereference of y.next) we use abduction to get y::Node〈 , 〉. However, noting
the fact y/∈ReachVar(σ, {x}) where σ = emp∗y::Node〈 , 〉 is the state immediately
after the unknown call with the abduction result, we know that from the unknown
call’s parameters (x), y is not reachable, and hence the unknown call will never es-
tablish a state to satisfy y::Node〈 , 〉. In that case we are assured that the program
being verified cannot meet its given specification.
To detect such a situation, we introduce the check in line 11. It tests whether the
whole abduction result is reachable from variables accessed by u. If not, then the
unreachable part cannot be expected from u, which indicates a possible bug in the
program or some inconsistency between the program and its given specification. In
such cases, the algorithm returns an additional formula that can be used by a further
analysis to either identify the bug or strengthen the specification. Recall the example
presented in the previous paragraph: since y::Node〈 , 〉 cannot be established by
the unknown call, if we add it to the precondition of the code fragment (to form a
new precondition x::Node〈 , null〉 ∗ y::Node〈 , 〉), then the verification with the new
specification can move on and will potentially succeed.
The third step (lines 12–17) is to form the derived specifications for u in terms
of variables a, b and g. Here g denotes logical variables not explicitly accessed by
u, but occurring in both pre- and postconditions (ghost variables). The formula
sub alias(σ′, {a, b, c}) is obtained from σ′ by replacing all variables with their aliases
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in {a, b, c}. It is defined as
sub alias(σ′, {x}) =df ({[x/x0] | x∈{x} ∧ x0∈aliases(σ′, x)} σ′)∧∧ {x = x0 | x, x0∈{x} ∧ x0∈aliases(σ′, x)}
where a set of substitutions before a formula σ′ denotes the result of applying each
of those substitutions to σ′ (where the ordering is not important), and aliases(σ′, x)
returns all the aliases of x in σ′.
Finally, at line 20, the obtained specifications mspecu for u are passed to the case
analysis algorithm (given in Figure 6.7) to derive the specifications of unknown
procedures invoked in u.
6.5.2 Case Analysis Algorithm
In order to discover specifications for unknown procedures invoked in u, the algo-
rithm in Figure 6.7 conducts a case analysis according to the structure of u. In the
first case (line 2), u is simply a single unknown call. In this situation, the algorithm
returns all the pre-/postcondition pairs from mspecu as the unknown procedure’s
specifications.
In the second case (line 4), u is an if-conditional and both branches contain an
unknown block. The algorithm uses the main algorithm to verify the two branches
separately with preconditions Φpr∧x and Φpr∧¬x respectively, where Φpr is one of
the preconditions of the whole if. The results obtained from the two branches are
then combined using the unionmulti operator:
R1 unionmultiR2 =df {(f,Refine(mspec1f ∪mspec2f )) | (f,mspec1f )∈R1 ∧ (f,mspec2f )∈R2}
where Refine is used to eliminate any specification (requires Φpr ensures Φpo) from
a set if there exists a “stronger” one (requires Φ′pr ensures Φ
′





Algorithm CaseAnalysis(T ,mspecu, u)
1 switch u
2 case unk(x;y)
3 return { (unk(x;y),mspecu)}
4 case if (x) v1 else v2
5 mspecT := {(requires Φpr∧x ensures Φpo) |
(requires Φpr ensures Φpo) ∈ mspecu}
6 mspecF := {(requires Φpr∧¬x ensures Φpo) |
(requires Φpr ensures Φpo) ∈ mspecu}
7 R1 := Verify(T ,mspecT , v1)
8 R2 := Verify(T ,mspecF , v2)
9 return R1 unionmultiR2
10 case if (x) v else e
11 mspecT := {(requires Φpr∧x ensures Φpo) |
(requires Φpr ensures Φpo) ∈ mspecu}
12 R := Verify(T ,mspecT , v)
13 if ∃(requires Φpr ensures Φpo) ∈ mspecu, σ ∈ |[e]|T {Φpr ∧ ¬x} ·
σ=false ∨ σ 0 Φpo∗true then return fail
14 else return R endif
15 case if (x) e else v (Similar to the previous case)
16 case while x { v} where ∆pr ∗→∆po
17 return Verify(T , requires ∆pr ensures ∆po, v)
18 case unk0(x0;y0) { ; ei; unki(xi;yi)}ni=1
19 return { (unki(xi;yi), SeqUnkCalls(T ,mspecu, u))}ni=0
end Algorithm
Figure 6.7: The case analysis algorithm.
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and Φpo¹Φ′po. It is defined as
Refine(∅) =df ∅
Refine({(requires Φpr ensures Φpo)} ∪ Spec) =df
if ∃(requires Φ′pr ensures Φ′po)∈Spec · Φ′pr¹Φpr ∧ Φpo¹Φ′po
then Refine(Spec) else {(requires Φpr ensures Φpo)} ∪ Refine(Spec)
and unionmulti is to refine the union of two specification sets.
The third and fourth cases (lines 10 and 15) are for if-conditionals which contain
only one unknown block in one of the two branches. This is handled in a similar
way as in the second case. The only difference is, for the branch without unknown
blocks, we need to verify it with the underlying semantics (line 13).
The fifth case is the while loop. As we assume that its specification (∆pr ∗→∆po)
is already given for verification in mspecu, we simply verify its body with the main
algorithm (line 17).
In the last case (line 21), where u consists of multiple unknown procedure calls in
sequence, another algorithm SeqUnkCalls is invoked to deal with it.
6.5.3 Verifying Sequential Unknown Calls
We provide a solution to the most complicated case (unknown procedure calls in
sequence) under a strong assumption, namely, we can find a common specification
to capture all these unknown procedures’ behaviours. First we illustrate the brief





{Φpr} {unk0(x0;y0); e; unk1(x1;y1)} {Φpo}
where e is the only known code fragment within the block. The algorithm works
in three steps. In the first step, it extracts the precondition for the first procedure,
say Φupr, from the given precondition Φpr by extracting the part of heap that may
be accessed by the call via x0 and y0, which is similar to the first step of the main
algorithm Verify. Aiming at a general specification for both unknown calls, it then
assumes that the second procedure has a similar precondition Φupr. In the second
step, it symbolically executes the code fragment e with the help of the abductor,
to discover a crude postcondition, say Φ0po, expected from the first unknown call.
This is similar to the second step of the main algorithm Verify, except that the
postcondition for e is now assumed to be Φupr. In the third step, the algorithm takes
Φ0po (with appropriate variable substitutions) as the postcondition of the second
unknown call, and checks whether or not the derived post (Φ0po) satisfies Φpo. If not,
it invokes another abduction to strengthen Φ0po to obtain the final postcondition Φ
u
po
for the unknown procedures. Note that this strengthening does not affect soundness:
the strengthened Φupo can still be used as a general postcondition for both unknown
procedures.
Figure 6.8 and Figure 6.9 present the algorithm to infer specifications for n (n ≥ 2)
unknown calls in sequence.
As aforementioned, given a block of (n+1) unknown procedure calls with n pieces
of known code blocks sandwiched among them (unk0(x0;y0) {; ei; unki(xi;yi)}ni=1
in line 1), and the specification (requires Φpr ensures Φpo) (line 3) for such a block,
our approach generally works in three steps: first, to compute a precondition for the
unknown calls; second, to verify each code fragment ei (i = 1, . . . , n) with abduction
to collect expected behaviour of the unknown calls (as part of their postcondition);
144
6.5. Verification
Algorithm SeqUnkCalls(T ,mspecu, u)
1 Denote u as unk0(x0;y0) {; ei; unki(xi;yi)}ni=1
2 R := ∅
3 foreach (requries Φpr ensures Φpo) ∈ mspecu do
4 Φupr := Local(Φpr, {x0,y0})
5 z0 := fv(Φ
u
pr) \ {x0,y0}
6 Φupr := [a/x0, b/y0, c/z0]Φ
u
pr
7 S′0 := {(Φpr ∧ y0′=y0, emp ∧ a=x0 ∧ b=y0 ∧ c=z0)}
8 for i := 1 to n do
9 Si := |[ei]|AT { (Φi−1po ∗ [b/yi−1] Frame(σi−1, {xi−1,yi−1}),Φi−1po ) |
(σi−1, σ′i−1)∈S′i−1 ∧ Φi−1po = ([xi−1/a,yi−1/b, zi−1/c] sub alias(
σ′i−1, {a, b, c})) ∧ a=xi−1 ∧ b=yi−1 ∧ c=zi−1} where zi−1 is fresh
10 S′i := {(σ, σ′) | (σ, σ′)∈Si ∧ ρσ ` ∃c · Φupr∗true} ∪ {(σ ∗ σ′′, σ′ ∗ σ′′) |
(σ, σ′)∈Si ∧ ρσ 0 ∃c · Φupr∗true ∧ ρσ∗[σ′′]¤ ∃c · Φupr}
where ρ=[a/xi, b/yi]
11 if ∃(σ, σ′)∈S′i · fv(σ′) * ReachVar(σ, {a, b}) then return (fail, σ′) endif
12 end for
Figure 6.8: Algorithm for sequential unknown calls (part 1).
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13 Sn+1 := { (Φnpo∗[b/yn]Frame(σn, {xn,yn}),Φnpo) | (σn, σ′n)∈S′n ∧
Φnpo = ([xn/a,yn/b, zn/c] sub alias(σ
′
n, {a, b, c})) ∧
a=xn ∧ b=yn ∧ c=zn} where zn is fresh
14 S′n+1 := {(σ, σ′) | (σ, σ′)∈Sn+1 ∧ σ ` Φpo∗true} ∪ {(σ ∗ σ′′, σ′ ∗ σ′′) |
(σ, σ′)∈Sn+1 ∧ σ 0 Φpo∗true ∧ σ∗[σ′′]¤ Φpo}
15 if ∃(σ, σ′)∈S′n+1 · fv(σ′) * ReachVar(σ, {a, b}) then return (fail, σ′) endif
16 foreach (σ, σ′) ∈ S′n+1 do
17 Φupo := sub alias(σ
′, {a, b, c})
18 g := fv(Φupr) ∩ fv(Φupo) \ {a, b}





Figure 6.9: Algorithm for sequential unknown calls (part 2).
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third, to guarantee that the collected postcondition satisfies Φpo. If not, then another
abduction is conducted to strengthen the gained postcondition to ensure this.
The first step is completed by lines 4 to 6. The local part of Φpr is extracted w.r.t.
the first unknown call’s parameters x0 and y0. Other free variables are distinguished
as z0, which may be ghost variables. Finally the precondition is found in terms of
special logical variables a, b and c.
The second step is performed over each ei; unki(xi;yi). Its main idea is to take the
postcondition generated for the last unknown call (Φi−1po ), plus the frame part during
the entailment check against Φi−1pr , as the post-state of unki−1(xi−1;yi−1), and try
to verify ei beginning with such a state, using abduction when necessary (line 9).
After the verification we get Si containing abstract states before unki(xi;yi), and we
want those states to satisfy its precondition Φupr subject to substitution. Note that
during the verification of ei and the last satisfaction checking we may use abduction
to strengthen the program state, whose results reflect the expected behaviour of
unki−1(xi−1; yi−1) and are accumulated as its expected postcondition. Hence we
achieve a sufficiently strong postcondition for each unknown call.
The third step is similar to the first algorithm: it checks whether the final abstract
state entails the postcondition of the whole block, and strengthens the final abstract
state with abduction if it cannot. Then the ghost variables are recognised and
processed analogously to the first algorithm. Finally the strongest specifications
discovered for those unknown procedures are returned.
Note that our current solution tries to find a common specification (requires Φpr
ensures Φpo) suitable for all the unknown procedures. Generally we may allow the
unknown procedures to have different specifications. In theory, this can be achieved
by a more in-depth analysis which examines the known code fragments in between
147
6.5. Verification
those unknown calls. That is, by analysing the code fragment ei we would hopefully
obtain a postcondition for the (i−1)-th procedure and a precondition for the i-th.
In the case of two unknown calls unk0(x0;y0); e1; unk1(x1;y1), the precondition for
unk0 and the postcondition for unk1 can be obtained as usual (by analysing the
code before unk0 and after unk1 respectively). To derive the postcondition Φ
0
po
for unk0 and the precondition Φ
1
pr for unk1, we initialise Φ
0
po to be emp to start a
forward analysis over e1 with abduction, to accumulate (via abduction) the expected
behaviour of unk0 (for e1 to be verified) as Φ
0
po, and extract a formula (which is
relevant to the footprint of unk1) from the abstract state at the end of e1 as Φ
1
pr.
However, our initial experiments show that, unless the fragment e1 is sufficiently
complex to expose enough information expected from unk0, the derived Φ
0
po and
Φ1pr can be rather weak. As a consequence, the derived specification for unk0 can
be too weak (with a weak postcondition) and the one for unk1 can be too strong
(with a weak precondition). It remains an open problem how we might tune the
derived results to obtain more reasonable specifications. We conjecture that certain
heuristics might help and we will explore this further in our future work.
6.5.4 Abstract Semantics
As shown in the algorithms, we use two kinds of abstract semantics to analyse the
program: an underlying semantics and another semantics based on both the first
one and abduction to improve the postcondition of unknown calls.
Our underlying abstract semantics is generally similar as the one in Chapter 4 yet
with some subtle differences (such as procedure invocation). Its type is defined as
|[e]| : AllSpec→ PSH → PSH
where AllSpec contains procedure specifications (extracted from the program Prog).
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For some expression e, given its precondition, the semantics will calculate the post-
condition.
The foundation of the semantics is the basic transition functions from a conjunctive
abstract state (σ) to a conjunctive or disjunctive abstract state (σ or ∆) below:
unfold(x) : SH→ PSH[x] Unfolding
exec(d[x]) : AllSpec→ SH[x]→ SH Heap-sensitive execution
exec(d) : AllSpec→ SH→ SH Heap-insensitive execution
where SH[x] denotes the set of conjunctive abstract states in which each element
has x exposed as the head of an object node (x::c〈v〉), and PSH[x] contains all the
(disjunctive) abstract states, each of which is composed by such conjunctive states.
Here unfold(x) rearranges the symbolic heap so that the cell referred to by x is ex-
posed for access by heap sensitive commands d[x] via the second transition function
exec(d[x]). The third function defined for other (heap insensitive) commands d does
not require such exposure of x.
The unfolding function is defined by the following two rules:
isobj(c)
σ ` x::c〈v〉 ∗ σ′
unfold(x)σ Ã σ
isspred(c) σ ` x::c〈u〉 ∗ σ′
root::c〈v〉≡Φ
unfold(x)σ Ã σ′ ∗ [x/root,u/v]Φ
The test isobj(c) returns true only if c is an object node and isspred(c) returns true
only if c is a shape predicate.
The symbolic execution of heap-sensitive commands d[x] (i.e. x.fi, x.fi := w, or




isobj(c) σ ` x::c〈v1, . . . , vn〉 ∗ σ′
exec(x.fi)(T )σ Ã σ′ ∗ x::c〈v1, . . . , vn〉 ∧ res=vi
isobj(c) σ ` x::c〈v1, . . . , vn〉 ∗ σ′
exec(x.fi := w)(T )σ Ã σ′ ∗ x::c〈v1, . . . , vi−1, w, vi+1, . . . , vn〉
isobj(c) σ ` x::c〈u〉 ∗ σ′
exec(free(x))(T )σ Ã σ′
The symbolic execution rules for heap-insensitive commands are as follows:
exec(k)(T )σ Ã σ ∧ res=k exec(x)(T )σ Ã σ ∧ res=x
isobj(c)
exec(new c(v))(T )σ Ã σ ∗ res::c〈v〉




i=1) requires Φpr ensures Φpo ∈ T
ρ = [x′i/ui]
m
i=1 ◦ [y′i/vi]ni=1 σ ` ρΦpr ∗ σ′
ρo = [ri/vi]
n
i=1 ◦ [x′i/u′i]mi=1 ◦ [y′i/v′i]ni=1 ρl = [ri/y′i]ni=1 fresh logical ri
exec(mn(x1, . . . , xm; y1, . . . , yn))(T )σ Ã (ρlσ′) ∗ (ρoΦpo)
Note that the first three rules deal with constant (k), variable (x) and object node
creation (new c(v)), respectively, while the last rule handles method invocation. In
the last rule, the call site is ensured to meet the precondition of mn, as signified by
σ ` ρΦpr ∗ σ′. In this case, the execution succeeds and the post-state of the method
call involves mn’s postcondition as signified by ρoΦpo.












Based on the transition functions above, we can define the abstract semantics for a
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program expression e as follows:
|[d[x]]|T∆ =df exec†(d[x])(T ) ◦ unfold†(x)∆
|[d]|T∆ =df exec†(d)(T )∆
|[e1; e2]|T∆ =df |[e2]|T ◦ |[e1]|T∆
|[x := e]|T∆ =df [x1/x′, r1/res](|[e]|T∆) ∧ x′=r1 fresh logical x1, r1
|[if (v) e1 else e2]|T∆ =df (|[e1]|T (v∧∆)) ∨ (|[e2]|T (¬v∧∆))
∆ ` Φpr ∗ R
|[while x {e} where Φpr ∗→Φpo]|T∆ =df R ∗ Φpo ∧ ¬x
Next we define the abstract semantics with abduction used in our analysis, whose
type is
|[e]|A : AllSpec→ P(SH× SH)→ P(SH× SH)
It takes a piece of program and a specification table, to map a (disjunctive) set of
pair of symbolic heaps to another such set (where the first in the pair is the current
state and the second is the abduction result).
This semantics also consists of the basic transition functions which compose the
atomic instructions’ semantics and then the program constructors’ semantics. Here
the basic transition functions are lifted as
Unfold(x)(σ, σ′) =df
let ∆=unfold(x)σ and S={(σ1, σ′) |σ1 ∈ ∆}
in if (false /∈ ∆) then S
else if (∆ ` x=a for some a∈SVar) and
(σ′ 0 a::c〈y〉 ∗ true for fresh {y}⊆LVar)
then S ∪ {(σ1 ∗ x::c〈y〉, σ′ ∗ x::c〈y〉) |σ1 ∈ ∆}
else S ∪ {(false, σ′)}
Exec(ds)(σ, σ′) =df let σ1=exec(ds)σ in {(σ1, σ′)}
where ds is either d[x] or d, except procedure call
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In the definition of Unfold we view ∆ as a disjunctive set of conjunctive formulae,
and mean by σ ∈ ∆ that σ is one branch of ∆. Meanwhile SVar is a set of special
logical variables used to record the program’s footprint. In the definition of Exec we
need special treatment for instructions that may alter variable values, say procedure
call. As can be seen in the rule below, when a call-by-reference variable y is assigned
to a new value after the call, the original value is still preserved with a substitution
ρ = [y0/y] where y0 is fresh. Doing this allows us to keep the connection among the
history values of a variable and its latest value, which may be essential as a link
from the unknown procedure’s postcondition to its caller’s postcondition.




i=1) requires Φpr ensures Φpo ∈ T
ρ = [x′i/ui]
m
i=1 ◦ [y′i/vi]ni=1 σ ` ρΦpr ∗ σ1 and σ′1=emp, or σ ∗ [σ′1]¤ ρΦpr ∗ σ1
ρo = [ri/vi]
n
i=1 ◦ [x′i/u′i]mi=1 ◦ [y′i/v′i]ni=1 ρl = [ri/y′i]ni=1 fresh logical ri
Exec(mn(x1, .., xm; y1, .., yn))(T )(σ, σ′)Ã {(σ2, ρo(σ′ ∗ σ′1)) |σ2 ∈ (ρlσ1)∗(ρoΦpo)}






Exec†(ds)(T ){(σi, σ′i)} =df
⋃
(Exec(ds)(T )(σi, σ′i))
Based on the above transition functions, the abstract semantics with abduction is
as follows:
|[d[x]]|AT {(σ, σ′)} =df Exec†(d[x])(T ) ◦ Unfold†(x){(σ, σ′)}
|[d]|AT {(σ, σ′)} =df Exec†(d)(T ){(σ, σ′)}
|[e1; e2]|AT {(σ, σ′)} =df |[e2]|AT ◦ |[e1]|AT {(σ, σ′)}
|[if (v) e1 else e2]|AT {(σ, σ′)} =df (|[e1]|AT {(v∧σ, σ′)}) ∪ (|[e2]|AT {(¬v∧σ, σ′)})
|[e]|AT {(σ, σ′)} = {(σ1, σ′1)} ρ = [x1/x′, r1/res] fresh logical x1, r1
|[x := e]|AT {(σ, σ′)} =df {((ρσ1) ∧ x′=r1, ρσ′1)}
σ ` Φpr ∗ σR and σ′1=emp, or σ ∗ [σ′1]¤ Φpr ∗ σR for each (σ, σ′)
|[while x {e} where Φpr ∗→Φpo]|T {(σ, σ′)} =df {(σR ∗ σpo ∧ ¬x, σ′ ∗ σ′1) |σpo∈Φpo}




Informally, in the presence of unknown procedure calls, the soundness of the veri-
fication signifies that, a program is successfully verified against its specifications, if
all the unknown procedures that it invokes conform to the specifications discovered
by the verification algorithm. Therefore, the correctness of the program depends on
a (possible) further verification for the unknown procedures. It can be defined as
follows:
Definition 6.5.1 (Soundness) Suppose that for specification table T , program to
be verified v = {e1;u; e2} and its specifications mspecv, our verification succeeds and
returns Tu as the specification table for unknown procedures invoked in v. We say
our verification is sound, if the following holds:
∀σ ∈ |[e1;u; e2]|T unionmultiTU ([x0/a,y0/b]Φpr) · σ ` [x0/a,y0/b,y′0/b′]Φpo ∗ true
which means that, with respect to the underlying semantics, if all the unknown pro-
cedures can be verified to satisfy their specifications in Tu, then the whole program v
should meet all the specifications in mspecv.
The soundness of our verification algorithm is guaranteed with several aspects: the
soundness of the entailment checking, the soundness of our abduction, and the
soundness of our abstract semantics. The proof for entailment checking is by struc-
tural induction over abstract domain (Nguyen et al., 2007). For abduction, as its
rules show, the abduction result σ′ is always checked together with the antecedent
σ such that they can entail the consequence, and hence its soundness follows that
of entailment checking’s. Finally, the soundness of abstract semantics is proven by
induction over program constructors. Therefore we have




Detailed proof can be found in Appendix A.
6.6 Summary
It is a both practical and challenging problem to verify both memory safety and func-
tional correctness of heap-manipulating imperative programs with unknown proce-
dure calls. We propose an approach to solving it by inferring expected specifications
for unknown procedures from their calling contexts. Then the program is proven
correct on condition that the invoked unknown procedures meet the inferred specifi-
cations. We employ a forward program analysis over a combined domain and invent
a novel abduction for it to synthesise the specifications of the unknown procedure.
As a proof of concept, we have also implemented a system to test the viability of
the proposed approach, whose results will be discussed in the next chapter. Our
main future work is to explore more general solution for unknown calls in sequence




This chapter presents the experimental results from the systems we implemented as
a proof of theory, and the evaluations of this thesis’ work according to the criteria
proposed in Chapter 1.
7.1 Experimental Results
7.1.1 Partial Specification Refinement
We have implemented a verification system with Objective Caml to evaluate our ap-
proach to partial specification refinement. Our experimental results were achieved
with an Intel Core 2 CPU 2.66GHz with 8Gb RAM. The four columns in Table 7.1
and Table 7.2 describe respectively the analysed programs, the analysis time in sec-
onds, and the methods’ (given and inferred) preconditions and postconditions. All
formulae with a grey background are inferred by our analysis. For some programs,
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Prog. Time Pre Post
create∗
0.379 emp ∧ n≥0 res::llB〈S〉 ∧ n=|S| ∧ ∀v∈S·1≤v≤n
1.752 emp ∧ n≥0 res::dllB〈r,S〉∧ n=|S|∧∀v∈S·1≤v≤n
0.954 emp ∧ n≥0 res::sllB2〈S〉∧ n=|S|∧∀v∈S·1≤v≤n
sort ∗
insert
0.591 x::ll〈n〉 ∧ n≥1 x::ll〈m〉 ∧ m=n+1
0.789 x::dll〈p, n〉 ∧ n≥1 x::dll〈q, m〉 ∧ n≥1 ∧ m=n+1 ∧ p=q




0.566 x::ll〈n〉 ∧ n≥1 x::ll〈m〉 ∧ m=n+1




0.522 x::ll〈n〉 ∧ n≥1 x::ll〈m〉 ∧ m=n+1
0.830 x::dll〈p, n〉 ∧ n≥1 x::dll〈q, m〉 ∧ m=n+1 ∧ p=q
— x::sll〈n, xs, xl〉∧ (fail) x::sll〈m, mn, mx〉∧ (fail)
delete
0.630 x::llB〈S〉 ∧ |S|≥2 x::llB〈T〉 ∧ ∃a.S=Tunionsq{a}
1.024 x::sllB〈S〉 ∧ |S|≥2 x::sllB〈T〉 ∧ ∃a.S=Tunionsq{a}
delete 1.252 x::dllB〈p, S〉 ∧ |S|≥2 x::dllB〈q, T〉 ∧ ∃a.S=Tunionsq{a} ∧ p=q
travrs
0.296 x::ll〈m〉∧ n≥0∧m≥n x::ls〈p, k〉 ∗ res::ll〈r〉 ∧ p=res∧
k=n ∧ m=n+r
2.205 x::sllB〈S〉 ∧ n≥0∧|S|≥n
x::slsB〈p, T〉 ∗ res::sllB〈S2〉∧ p=res
∧|T|=n∧S=TunionsqS2∧∀u∈T,v∈S2·u≤v
append∗
0.512 x::ll〈xn〉∗y::ll〈yn〉∧ xn≥1 x::ll〈m〉 ∧ m=xn+yn
0.660
x::dll〈xp, xn〉 ∗
y::dll〈yp, yn〉 ∧ xn≥1
x::dll〈q, m〉 ∧ m=xn+yn ∧ q=xp
0.948
x::sll〈xn, xs, xl〉∧ xl≤ys
∗ y::sll〈yn, ys, yl〉
x::sll〈m, rs, rl〉 ∧ yl=rl∧
m≥1+yn ∧ m=xn+yn
dispatch3 0.786 lst::ll2〈n, s〉 gtl
′::ll2〈n1,s1〉∗ltl′::ll2〈n2,s2〉∧ n=
n1+n2∧s=s1+s2∧s1≥3n1∧s2<3n2+1
Table 7.1: Experimental results for list-processing programs.
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Prog. Time Pre Post
travrs 0.532 x::bt〈S, h〉 x::bt〈T, k〉 ∧ S=T ∧ h=k
count 0.709 x::bt〈S, h〉 x::bt〈T, k〉 ∧ res=|S| ∧ S=T ∧ h=k
height 0.913 x::bt〈S, h〉 x::bt〈T, k〉 ∧ res=h=k ∧ S=T
insert 1.276 x::bt〈S, h〉 ∧ |S|≥1 ∧ h≥1 x::bt〈T, k〉 ∧ T=Sunionsq{v} ∧ h≤k≤h+1
delete 0.970 x::bt〈S, h〉 ∧ |S|≥2 ∧ h≥2 x::bt〈T, k〉∧ ∃a·S=Tunionsq{a}∧h−1≤k≤h





x::bst〈mn, mx〉 ∧ (v<sm∧v=mn∧
lg=mx ∨ lg<v∧v=mx∧sm=mn∨
sm=mn∧lg=mx)





Table 7.2: Experimental results for tree-processing programs.
we have verified them with different pre/post shape templates. Programs with star
∗ have different versions for various data structures.
The results highlight the refinement of both pre- and postconditions based on user-
provided shape specifications, even for complicated data structure such as AVL trees.
Firstly, our approach can compute non-trivial pure constraints for postcondition.
For example, the program create’s code is listed as follows:
Node create(int n) {
if (n == 0) return null;
else {
Node r = create(n - 1);





After the refinement we obtain the value range in the created list (between one and
n). For delete which removes a random node from the list, we know the content of
the result list is subsumed by that of the input list. For a sample program dispatch3
from Bouajjani et al. (2010) which divides a list into two lists where one only con-
tain values no less than three and the other less than three, we obtain a detailed
quantitative relationship n=n1+n2∧s=s1+s2∧s1≥3n1∧s2<3n2+1. For list-sorting
algorithms, we confirm the content of the output is the same as that of the input.
For tree-processing programs (insert, delete and avl ins), we obtain that the
height difference between the input and output trees is at most one. Meanwhile, we
can calculate non-trivial requirements in precondition for memory safety or func-
tional correctness. For many programs we can get the constraints for precondition
such that the input list/tree should have at least one (or two) nodes for the sake of
memory safety. A more interesting example is the travrs method which takes in a
list with length m and an integer n and then traverses towards the tail of the list for
n steps:
Node travrs(Node x, int n) {
if (n == 0) return x;
else return travrs(x.next, n - 1);
}
For this program, the analysis discovers m≥n in the precondition to ensure memory
safety. Another example is the append method concatenating two sorted lists into
one:
void append(Node x, Node y) {
158
7.1. Experimental Results
Node w = x.next;
if (w == null) x.next = y;
else append(w, y);
}
To ensure that the result list is sorted, the analysis figures out that the minimum
value in the second list must be no less than the maximum value in the first list.
Without those discovered constraints the program will either cause memory violation
or cannot meet the specification.
A second highlight is our flexibility by supporting multiple predicates. Our analysis
tries to refine different specifications for the same program at various correctness lev-
els (with different predicates), for instance sort insert, tail insert and append.
For rand insert, which inserts a node into a random place (after the head) of a
list, we confirm that the list’s length is increased by one, but cannot verify the list
is kept sorted if it was before the insertion, as the result indicates.
We have also tried our approach over part of the FreeRTOS kernel (Barry, 2006). For
its list processing programs list.h and list.c (472 lines with intensive manipulation
over composite sorted doubly-linked lists) it took 2.85 seconds for our system to
refine all the specifications given for the main functions, which further confirms the
viability of our approach.
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Prog. Time Pre Post
create (main) emp ∧ n≥0 res::sllB2〈S〉∧ n=|S|∧∀v∈S·1≤v≤n
alloc 0.214 emp res::Node〈n, r〉
travrs (main) x::sllB〈S〉 ∧ n≥0∧|S|≥n
x::slsB〈p, T〉 ∗ res::sllB〈S2〉∧ p=res
∧|T|=n∧S=TunionsqS2∧∀u∈T,v∈S2·u≤v
next 0.135 x::sllB〈S〉 ∧ |S|≥0 x::Node〈v, res〉 ∗ res::sllB〈S1〉 ∧
S={v}unionsqS1
append (main) x::ll〈xn〉∗y::ll〈yn〉∧ xn≥1 x::ll〈m〉 ∧ m=xn+yn
travrs 0.619 x::ll〈n〉 ∧ n≥1 x::ls〈res, m〉 ∗ res::Node〈v, null〉
Sorting (main) x::llB〈S〉 ∧ |S|≥1 res::sllB〈T〉 ∧ T=S (‡)
merge 4.107 x::sllB〈Sx〉 ∗ y::sllB〈Sy〉 res::sllB〈T〉 ∧ T=SxunionsqSy
flatten 2.693 x::bstB〈S〉 res::sllB〈T〉 ∧ T=S
insert 0.824 r::sllB〈S〉 ∗ x::Node〈v, 〉 res::sllB〈T〉 ∧ T=Sunionsq{v}
Table 7.3: Experimental results for list-processing programs.
7.1.2 Specification Synthesis for Auxiliary Methods
and Loops
For specification synthesis, we have extended the system in the previous section for
evaluation purpose. Our experimental results were achieved with the same hard-
ware environment. The four columns in Table 7.3 describe respectively the analysed
programs, the analysis time in seconds, and the methods’ (given and inferred) pre-
conditions and postconditions. The programs whose names have (main) denote the
primary procedures (without a timing report as most of them are already shown
in the previous section). The programs with time information exhibit the auxil-
iary procedures whose specifications are wholly synthesised and inferred (as their
background is totally grey).
For the experimental results, it can be seen that our approach effectively reduces
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x::bst〈mn, mx〉 ∧ (v<sm∧v=mn∧
lg=mx ∨ lg<v∧v=mx∧sm=mn∨
sm=mn∧lg=mx)
alloc 0.255 emp res::Node2〈v, null, null〉
avl ins (main) x::avl〈S, h〉 res::avl〈T, k〉∧ T=Sunionsq{v}∧h≤k≤h+1









head::sdlB〈null, q, Sh〉 ∧ end=tail∗
root::sdlB〈p, tail, Sr〉 ∧ S=ShunionsqSr∧
(∀x∈Sh, y∈Sr·x≤y) ∧ 0≤|Sh|−|Sr|≤1
Table 7.4: Experimental results for tree-processing programs.
user annotations by synthesising specifications for auxiliary methods, given raw
specifications of primary methods. For example, we have manually set some of the
instructions in the programs in the previous section as auxiliary procedures and tried
to generate their specifications, such as alloc, next and travrs in list-processing
programs and alloc for bst insert. For new test suites, we have analysed a number
of list-sorting algorithms with at least one auxiliary method each. Note that all the
list-sorting algorithms have the same specification for their primary methods (line ‡),
while the annotations found by our approach for auxiliary methods are diverse (the
grey lines below ‡). From the automatically derived specifications, we can see that
the auxiliary method merge for merge sort merges two sorted lists into one, and the
auxiliary method flatten for tree sort flattens a binary search tree into a sorted
list. As another example, avl ins also has some auxiliary (recursive) methods such
as calculation of tree’s height and double rotation, which are automatically analysed
as well.
One observation over the experimental results is that some of the derived specifica-
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tions are quite complex if written by hand, for example loop1. If we require users
to provide these specifications for auxiliary methods (even shape-only), it is still
quite tedious and error-prone. On the contrary, the users now have the option to
leave such work for our system, which witnesses the value of our improvement of the
verification process.
7.1.3 Verification of Programs with Unknown Components
For the verification of program with unknown components, we have implemented the
verification algorithms and the abstract semantics with Objective Caml and eval-
uated them over some heap-manipulating programs. The results are in Table 7.5,
Table 7.6, Table 7.7, Table 7.8 and Table 7.9. In each table, the first and sec-
ond columns denote the programs used for evaluation and their time consumption,
respectively. During the experiments, we manually hide some instructions in the
original programs as calls to unknown procedures, whose specifications we try to
discover during the verification process. Accordingly, the third column in the first
two tables contain both the specifications of the programs to be verified (upper line),
and the derived specifications for the unknown procedure (lower line). For the third
table, as we use the same specification x::llB〈S〉 ∗→ res::sllB〈T〉∧T=S to verify all
the sorting algorithms, the third column (from the second line on) states the discov-
ered specification for the unknown call only. Similar as previous examples, some of
the programs with the same name have different versions, say, the ones processing
(sorted) singly-linked lists (ll and sll) are different from their counterparts for
doubly-linked lists (dll).
It can be seen that all programs are successfully verified, with some obligations on
the unknown calls discovered. We note down two observations on the experimental
results. The first is that the discovered specifications for the unknown procedures
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Prog. Time Main spec. (Φpr ∗→Φpo) & Derived unknown spec. (Φupr ∗→Φupo)
create∗
0.405
emp ∧ n≥0 ∗→ res::llB〈S〉 ∧ n=|S| ∧ ∀v∈S·1≤v≤n
emp ∧ a≥1 ∗→ res::Node〈c, b〉 ∧ 1≤c≤n
1.895
emp ∧ n≥0 ∗→ res::dllB〈rp, S〉 ∧ n=|S| ∧ ∀v∈S·1≤v≤n
emp ∧ a≥1 ∗→ res::Node2〈c, d, b〉 ∧ 1≤c≤n
1.020
emp ∧ n≥0 ∗→ res::sllB2〈S〉 ∧ n=|S| ∧ ∀v∈S·1≤v≤n




x::ll〈n〉 ∧ n≥1 ∗→ x::ll〈m〉 ∧ m=n+1
a::Node〈b, c〉 ∗ c::ll〈d〉 ∗→ a::Node〈b, e〉 ∗ e::ll〈d+1〉
0.842
x::dll〈p, n〉 ∧ n≥1 ∗→ x::dll〈q, m〉 ∧ n≥1 ∧ m=n+1 ∧ p=q
a::Node2〈b, g, c〉 ∗ c::dll〈a, d〉 ∗→ a::Node2〈b, g, e〉 ∗ e::dll〈a, d+1〉
0.764
x::sll〈n,xs,xl〉 ∧ v≥xs ∗→





x::ll〈n〉 ∧ n≥1 ∗→ x::ll〈m〉 ∧ m=n+1
a::Node〈b, null〉 ∗→ a::ll〈2〉
0.627
x::sll〈n, xs, xl〉 ∧ v≥xl ∗→
x::sll〈m, mn, mx〉 ∧ v=mx ∧ mn=xs ∧ m=n+1




x::ll〈n〉 ∧ n≥1 ∗→ x::ll〈m〉 ∧ m=n+1
a::Node〈b, c〉 ∗ c::ll〈d〉 ∗→ a::Node〈b, e〉 ∗ e::ll〈d+1〉
0.697
x::dll〈p, n〉 ∧ n≥1 ∗→ x::dll〈q, m〉 ∧ m=n+1 ∧ p=q
a::Node2〈b, g, c〉 ∗ c::dll〈a, d〉 ∗→ a::Node2〈b, g, e〉 ∗ e::dll〈a, d+1〉
Table 7.5: Experimental results (lists, part 1).
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Prog. Time Main spec. (Φpr ∗→Φpo) and Derived unknown spec. (Φupr ∗→Φupo)
delete∗
0.646
x::llB〈S〉 ∧ |S|≥2 ∗→ x::llB〈T〉 ∧ ∃a·S=Tunionsq{a}
a::Node〈b, c〉 ∗ c::Node〈d, e〉 ∗ e::llB〈E〉 ∗→ a::Node〈b, e〉 ∗ e::llB〈E〉
0.916
x::sllB〈S〉 ∧ |S|≥2 ∗→ x::sllB〈T〉 ∧ ∃a·S=Tunionsq{a}
a::Node〈b, c〉 ∗ c::Node〈d, e〉 ∗ e::sllB〈E〉 ∧ ∀f∈E·b≤d≤f ∗→
a::Node〈b, e〉 ∗ e::sllB〈E〉 ∧ ∀f∈E·b≤f
1.430
x::dllB〈p, S〉 ∧ |S|≥2 ∗→ x::dllB〈q, T〉 ∧ ∃a·S=Tunionsq{a} ∧ p=q
a::Node2〈b, f, c〉 ∗ c::Node〈d, a, e〉 ∗ e::dllB〈c, E〉 ∗→
a::Node〈b, f, e〉 ∗ e::dllB〈a, E〉
append
0.523
x::ll〈xn〉 ∗ y::ll〈yn〉 ∧ xn≥1 ∗→ x::ll〈m〉 ∧ m=xn+yn
a::ll〈b〉 ∗→ a::ls〈res, c〉 ∗ res::ll〈d〉 ∧ b=c+d
0.861
x::sll〈xn, xs, xl〉 ∗ y::sll〈yn, ys, yl〉 ∧ xl≤ys ∗→
x::sll〈m, rs, rl〉 ∧ yl=rl ∧ m≥1+yn ∧ m=xn+yn
a::sllB〈A〉 ∗→ a::slsB〈A1〉 ∗ res::sllB〈R〉 ∧ A=A1unionsqR ∧ ∀b∈A1,c∈R·b≤c
Table 7.6: Experimental results (lists, part 2).
are usually more general than what we expect. Bear in mind that we have replaced
some instructions from those programs with unknown calls. We have compared the
inferred specifications for those unknown calls with the original instructions. The re-
sults show that the specifications derived by our algorithm not only fully capture the
behaviours of those instructions, but also suggest other possible implementations.
A case in point is list’s append:
void append(Node x, Node y) {
Node w = unknown(x);
if (w.next == null) w.next = y;
else append(w.next, y);
}
As can be seen in the code, its “unknown call” was originally an evaluation of x.
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Prog. Time Main spec. (Φpr ∗→Φpo) and Derived unknown spec. (Φupr ∗→Φupo)
Binary tree processing programs
travrs 0.417
x::bt〈S, h〉 ∗→ x::bt〈T, k〉 ∧ S=T ∧ h=k
a::bt〈A, b〉 ∧ a6=null ∗→ a::Node2〈c, d′, e′〉 ∗ d′::bt〈D, f〉 ∗ e′::bt〈E, g〉 ∧
A={c}unionsqDunionsqE ∧ b=max(f,g)+1, or
a::bt〈A, b〉 ∧ a6=null ∗→ a::Node2〈c, e′, d′〉 ∗ d′::bt〈D, f〉 ∗ e′::bt〈E, g〉 ∧
A={c}unionsqDunionsqE ∧ b=max(f,g)+1
count 0.705
x::bt〈S, h〉 ∗→ x::bt〈T, k〉 ∧ res=|S| ∧ S=T ∧ h=k
a::bt〈A, b〉 ∧ a6=null ∗→ a::Node2〈c, d′, e′〉 ∗ d′::bt〈D, f〉 ∗ e′::bt〈E, g〉 ∧
A={c}unionsqDunionsqE ∧ b=max(f,g)+1, or
a::bt〈A, b〉 ∧ a6=null ∗→ a::Node2〈c, e′, d′〉 ∗ d′::bt〈D, f〉 ∗ e′::bt〈E, g〉 ∧
A={c}unionsqDunionsqE ∧ b=max(f,g)+1
height 0.821
x::bt〈S, h〉 ∗→ x::bt〈T, k〉 ∧ res=h=k ∧ S=T
a::bt〈A, b〉 ∧ a6=null ∗→ a::Node2〈c, d′, e′〉 ∗ d′::bt〈D, f〉 ∗ e′::bt〈E, g〉 ∧
A={c}unionsqDunionsqE ∧ b=max(f,g)+1, or
a::bt〈A, b〉 ∧ a6=null ∗→ a::Node2〈c, e′, d′〉 ∗ d′::bt〈D, f〉 ∗ e′::bt〈E, g〉 ∧
A={c}unionsqDunionsqE ∧ b=max(f,g)+1
insert 1.354
x::bt〈S, h〉 ∧ |S|≥1 ∧ h≥1 ∗→ x::bt〈T, k〉 ∧ T=Sunionsq{v} ∧ h≤k≤h+1
a::Node2〈b, null, null〉 ∗→ a::bt〈A, 2〉 ∧ A={b, c}
delete 1.019
x::bt〈S, h〉 ∧ |S|≥2 ∧ h≥2 ∗→ x::bt〈T, k〉 ∧ ∃a · S=Tunionsq{a} ∧ h−1≤k≤h
a::Node2〈b,c,null〉∗c::Node2〈d,null,null〉 ∗→ a::Node2〈b,null,null〉, &
a::Node2〈b,null,c〉∗c::Node2〈d,null,null〉 ∗→ a::Node2〈b,null,null〉
Table 7.7: Experimental results (trees, part 1).
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Prog. Time Main spec. (Φpr ∗→Φpo) and Derived unknown spec. (Φupr ∗→Φupo)
Binary search tree and AVL tree processing programs
search 1.851
x::bst〈sm, lg〉 ∗→ x::bst〈mn, mx〉 ∧ sm=mn ∧ lg=mx ∧ 0≤res≤1




x::bst〈sm, lg〉 ∗→ x::bst〈mn, mx〉 ∧ (v<sm∧v=mn∧lg=mx∨
lg<v∧v=mx∧sm=mn ∨ sm=mn∧lg=mx)
a::Node2〈b, null, c〉 ∗ c::bst〈d, e〉 ∧ f<b<d ∗→ a::bst〈f, e〉, and
a::Node2〈b, c, null〉 ∗ c::bst〈d, e〉 ∧ e<b<f ∗→ a::bst〈d, f〉
avl ins 5.202
x::avl〈S, h〉 ∗→ res::avl〈T, k〉 ∧ T=Sunionsq{v} ∧ h≤k≤h+1
a::avl〈A, b〉 ∗→ a::avl〈A, b〉 ∧ res=b
sdl2nbt 5.238
x::sdlB〈p,q,S〉 ∧ |S|≥1 ∧ p=null ∧ q=tail ∗→ res::nbt〈T〉 ∧ T=S
a::sdlB〈null, c, A〉 ∧ a=b=d ∗→ a::sdlB〈null, b, A1〉 ∗ b::sdlB〈e, c, B〉 ∧
d=c ∧ A=A1unionsqB ∧ (∀f∈A1, g∈B·f≤g) ∧ 0≤|B|−|A1|≤1
Table 7.8: Experimental results (trees, part 2).
Armed with list segment predicates and corresponding lemmas, we are able to infer
that the unknown call may actually traverse the list for arbitrary number of nodes,
provided it does not go beyond the list’s tail. To conclude, our verification always
tries its best to find a sound (with respect to the program being verified) and general
(with respect to the unknown call) specification for unknown procedures invoked.
The second observation is that the precision of specifications discovered for unknown
procedures depends on their callers’ given specification. As can be seen we have
verified several list-processing programs where each one has various specifications.
Within these programs we want to point out that the ones with specifications of
both normal lists and sorted lists share the same code (but just with two different
specifications). Such examples include create, sort insert, delete, and so on.
For create, it creates a list containing numbers from 1 to n in descending order:
Node create(int n) {
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Prog. Time Main spec. (Φpr ∗→Φpo) or Derived unknown spec. (Φupr ∗→Φupo)
Sorting (main) x::llB〈S〉 ∗→ res::sllB〈T〉 ∧ T=S
merge 4.099 a::sllB〈A〉 ∗ b::sllB〈B〉 ∗→ res::sllB〈R〉 ∧ R=AunionsqB
flatten 2.680 a::bstB〈A〉 ∗→ res::sllB〈R〉 ∧ R=A
insert 1.667 a::sllB〈A〉 ∗ b::Node〈c, d〉 ∗→ res::sllB〈R〉 ∧ R=Aunionsq{c}
unknown 1.824 a::llB〈A〉∧a6=null ∗→ res::Node〈c, b〉∗b::llB〈B〉∧A={c}unionsqB∧∀d∈B·c≤d
Table 7.9: Experimental results (sorting).
if (n == 0) return null;
else {
Node r = create(n - 1);




We can see from this program that once incorporated with llB as specification
predicates, the unknown call is expected to return a node whose value c is within
1 to n. Comparatively, when verified for sortedness, c is inferred to be between
a−1 and a, as for sortedness to hold. For delete’s sorted version, we also have the
extra information that the list with one node removed is still a sorted list (with the
multiset value constraints), whose result is stronger than the normal list version.
7.2 Evaluation
The main contribution of this thesis consists of mechanisms for program verification
based on only partial information (either specifications or program code). The miss-
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ing part of information is inferred with some program analysis techniques making
use of information available to the verifier. Our verification system captures program
properties over a combined domain of both structural properties and quantitative/-
content features, for which we have exploited new techniques such as fixed-point
calculation and abductive reasoning over the combined domain. We now evaluate
such contributions against the criteria set out in Chapter 1 as follows.
• For the first objective to allow users to provide only partial specifi-
cations for verification, in order to reduce the amount of annotations
provided by users, we provide a specification refinement framework
to enable the verifier to accept partial specifications. Under our frame-
work, users are asked to provide only shape information about data structures
but not the information on numerical/content part. Our verifier takes over
the rest of the work to refine the specification by inferring the missing part
with an analysis of the program, such that the specification becomes sound
with respect to the program being verified. To achieve this, we design a fixed-
point computation process for the various program properties which we are
interested in. With the help of entailment checking (Chin et al., 2010), the
proposed process reduces the fixed-point computation over the combined do-
main down to the fixed-point calculation over a traditional numerical/content
domain which we could deal with existing theorem provers. Meanwhile, for
the unsoundness brought in by the incomplete specifications, we develop an
abductive reasoning to discover the missing constraints and complete such
specifications.
• Meanwhile, for the first objective, we still stride one step further to
reduce even more user-provided specifications by designing a mech-
anism to infer auxiliary methods’ specifications, such that we can
verify such methods without annotations. In such situation where the
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methods of a program are divided into primary and auxiliary ones, users may
choose to provide partial specifications only for the primary methods. Then
we try to infer specifications for the remaining auxiliary methods that the
primary methods invoke to allow the verification to continue. The technical
contributions include specification synthesis (based on the prior point) and its
induced flexible user-guided verification.
• For the second objective to verify partially available programs with
unknown components, we develop a framework to discover necessary
obligations for those unknown components. When the program code is
only partially available because of the unknown components, we propose a
novel verification framework by inferring a specification for its unknown part
from the program contexts, such that the problem of verifying the whole pro-
gram can be safely reduced to the problem of proving that the unknown part
(once its code is available) meets the derived specification. The expected spec-
ification for the unknown program part is automatically calculated using an
abduction-based shape analysis specifically designed for our combined domain.
Meanwhile this approach is essentially top-down, as it can be used to infer the
specification for callee procedures based on the specification for the caller pro-
cedure. Hence it may benefit the general software development process as a
complement for current bottom-up approaches to verification (Nguyen et al.,
2007; Calcagno et al., 2009).
• For the third objective of experiments over heap-manipulating pro-
grams, we have accomplished them with the results presented earlier
in this chapter. From the results it can be seen that all three approaches
that we have developed can successfully verify those programs which are cor-
rect according to given specifications, and report failures for the programs
which will never meet the specifications supplied. The programs cover a wide
range of classical algorithms (insertion, deletion, sorting, etc.) for common
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data structures (lists and trees, and their sorted and/or balanced versions).
Their properties that we verified are also quite rich, from shape information of
data structure to numerical information such as size and height, and from re-
lational information like minimum/maximum values, to multiset information
as content.
On the basis of the contributions above, we review the evaluation criteria proposed
in Chapter 1. For the first objective, we have completely fulfilled it with our spec-
ification refinement and synthesis mechanisms. For the second objective, we have
developed an initial solution where a certain set of programs with unknown compo-
nents can now be verified against our interested shape and pure properties, whereas
there is still some space for improvement to enlarge the set of programs that can
be verified. For the third objective, we have successfully proven the soundness and
basic feasibility of our designed theories with the experiments; an ongoing work is
to test our verifier with larger-sized systems for its scalability. To conclude, we have
accomplished the core part of the requirements stated in the criteria in Chapter 1,
and especially all the requirements for the first object. We will discuss possible
improvement to this thesis in the next chapter.
7.3 Summary
This chapter has reported the experimental results obtained from our implemented
systems, where the results exhibit the soundness and feasibility of our approach.
Based on the results we investigated our achievement in terms of the previously pro-
posed evaluation criteria, with the conclusion that our contributions have generally




The goal of this thesis is to build a verification system for both memory safety
and functional correctness of programs manipulating pointer-based data structures,
which can deal with two scenarios where only partial information about the program
is available. In one of the scenarios, the program is annotated only with partial
specifications; in the other scenario the program’s code is partially available due to
invocations to unknown components. This thesis aims to solve these two problems
of program verification.
8.1 Main Results
To handle the two scenarios stated above, this thesis clearly defines a programming
language as the target to be verified, which is simple yet has the essential prop-
erties of a practical programming language that can manipulate heap-based data
structures. The operational semantics of such language is also declared. To capture
various levels of program correctness, we exploit a specification language based on
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separation logic, which allows users to define their own predicates to specify the
program properties that they want to verify. This language is quite expressive as it
covers aspects from shape to numerical and from relational to content. Its semantic
model is introduced as well. Such programming language and specification language
serve as the foundation of this thesis’ work.
Based on the two languages, this thesis develops solutions to the aforesaid two
scenarios. For the first scenario, we propose a new approach to program verifica-
tion allowing users to provide only partial specification with shape information to
methods. Our approach will then refine the given annotations into more complete
specifications by discovering missing constraints. The discovered constraints may
involve both quantitative and multiset properties that could be later confirmed or
revised by users. On the basis of this result, we further augment our approach by
requiring only partial specification to be given for primary methods of a program.
Specifications for loops and auxiliary methods can then be systematically discov-
ered by our augmented mechanism, with the help of information propagated from
the primary methods. This work is aimed at verifying beyond shape properties,
with the eventual goal of analysing both memory safety and functional properties
for pointer-based data structures.
For the second scenario, we have proposed a top-down verification framework to
deal with the verification of such heap-manipulating programs with invocations to
unknown components. Provided with a Hoare-style specification {Φpr} prog {Φpo}
where program prog contains calls to some unknown procedure unknown, we infer a
specification mspecu for unknown from the calling contexts, such that the problem
of verifying prog can be safely reduced to the problem of proving that the procedure
unknown (once its code is available) meets the derived specification mspecu. The
expected specification mspecu is automatically calculated using an abduction-based
shape analysis specifically designed for a combined abstract domain.
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As a proof of both theories, we have implemented systems to validate their viability.
It has been confirmed with experiments that, in the first scenario, we can automat-
ically refine partial specifications with non-trivial constraints, thus making it easier
for users to handle specifications with richer properties; in the second scenario, we
can verify a considerable set of programs with unknown components with specifi-
cations of such unknown components discovered. With comparisons between preset
evaluation criteria and our achievements, we draw the conclusion that our objectives
are generally met to a large extent. Meanwhile, there are also some aspects of the
work that can be further improved, which are introduced in the following section.
8.2 Future Works
In this section, we propose some suggestions on the limitations of this thesis and
how to improve them further.
8.2.1 Arrays
In this thesis, we address verification of programs manipulating pointer-based linked
data structures but not general “heap-manipulating programs”, because our current
work cannot handle programs which make use of arrays. So far, we have employed
reasoning tools for reachability and its relevant properties, described in the form
of predicates in our specification language. To handle arrays and pointer arith-
metics, we will have to exploit some other techniques, such as Calcagno et al. (2006)
and Gulwani et al. (2008). The work (Calcagno et al., 2006) is founded on sepa-
ration logic, where some restrictions are added over pointer arithmetics such that
they are under control of the verification. Gulwani et al. (2008) constructs a lifted
173
8.2. Future Works
abstract domain which is capable of representing universally quantified facts such
as “∀i · (0≤i<n)→ a[i]=0”. It might be possible to incorporate these techniques to
arrays in our verifier in order to verify a wider class of heap-manipulating programs.
8.2.2 Automation Level
We verify programs with partial specifications by refining such specifications and
dividing procedures into primary and auxiliary ones. Its aim is to increase the
automation level of the verification and to release users from writing complicated
annotations. Following this path, one potential future work is to raise its automa-
tion further with more in-depth program analysis techniques. We have investigated
this facet as a loop invariant inference (Luo et al., 2010b; Qin et al., 2010). Different
from the work reported in this thesis, it conducts a fixed-point iteration process
directly over the combined abstract domain, equipped with newly designed abstrac-
tion mechanism, and join and widening operators. Using these techniques and the
abduction defined in Chapter 6, we intend to build a verification system similar
as Calcagno et al. (2009), such that users do not need to annotate anything; instead
all the possible specifications of a program will be computed automatically for users
to choose from. This approach can be regarded as “fully automatic”; however a
significant problem that we can foresee is its scalability —- as our domain is far
more sophisticated than that of Calcagno et al. (2009), our analysis will be much
more expensive than theirs accordingly. We envisage that this analysis should re-
quire some heuristics for better performance, or users may provide some hint for
the analysis to conduct abstraction. We have now achieved some results Luo et al.




We already allow users to interact with our verification system by supplying anno-
tations as they want to. However, it is still possible to enable users to interact with
the system in other forms, such as dynamic program execution, or rather testing.
As aforementioned in Chapter 2, static program verification and analysis generally
provides more coverage of program execution paths as well as a proof of absence of
bugs; yet it is generally more expensive and less accessible to end users, whereas
testing is simpler and more broadly applied in software quality assurance processes.
Therefore if there are ways to combine them for our verifier such that the verifi-
cation result can be improved, then it will be a real advantage. In this proposed
aspect of improvement, we want to allow users to provide either static constraints
as refinement (in which our analysis may degenerate down to a “pure” verification)
or testing data to discharge some of the complexity of the verification to run-time
checks. This idea shares some similarity with Gupta et al. (2009), where the authors
strengthen static constraint generation with information from both static abstract
interpretation (analysis) and dynamic execution of the program (testing). Such
strengthening brings in additional linear constraints that may simplify the solver’s
work and make constraint solving more scalable. If we can successfully apply such
idea to our combined domain for shape, numerical and multiset properties, then it
should benefit greatly the whole verification process.
8.2.4 Sequential Invocations to Unknown Components
The most challenging part of our verification for partially available programs is the
verification of sequential invocation to unknown components. Our current solution
tries to find a common specification (requires Φpr ensures Φpo) suitable for all the
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unknown procedures. Generally we may allow the unknown procedures to have
different specifications, possibly with a more in-depth analysis which examines the
available code fragments in between those unknown calls. In the case of two unknown
calls unk0(x0;y0); e1; unk1(x1;y1), the precondition for unk0 and the postcondition
for unk1 can be obtained as usual (by analysing the code before unk0 and after unk1
respectively). To derive the postcondition Φ0po for unk0 and the precondition Φ
1
pr for
unk1, we initialise Φ
0
po to be emp to start a forward analysis over e1 with abduction,
to accumulate (via abduction) the expected behaviour of unk0 (for e1 to be verified)
as Φ0po, and extract a formula (which is relevant to the footprint of unk1) from
the abstract state at the end of e1 as Φ
1
pr. However, our initial experiments show
that, unless the fragment e1 is sufficiently complex to expose enough information




pr can be rather weak. As a consequence,
the derived specification for unk0 can be too weak (with a weak postcondition)
and the one for unk1 can be too strong (with a weak precondition). It remains
an open problem how we might tune the derived results to obtain more reasonable
specifications. We conjecture that certain heuristics might help and we will explore
this further in our future work.
8.3 Summary
This chapter summarises the whole thesis with its achieved results and potential
ways of improvement. The results include the solutions to the verification of heap-
manipulating programs with partial specifications and partial code, respectively.
The improvement concerns the following facets: an enlarged set of programs with
arrays to verify, more automation level, improved user interaction, and the verifica-
tion of programs with sequential invocations to unknown components. These facets
depict a roadmap for future works of this thesis.
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A.1 Soundness of Specification Refinement
We have defined the underlying operational semantics of our language in Chapter 3.
Its concrete program state consists of stack s and heap h. We have also defined the
relation s, h |= ∆ and the transition 〈s, h, e〉↪→∗〈s′, h′, ν〉. Before proceeding to the
soundness definition, recalling that we have both unprimed variables (for their initial
values in abstract states) and primed ones (for their current values), we realise that
the concrete program states should always be linked to the primed ones. For this
reason we have the following definition:
Definition A.1.1 (Poststate) Given an abstract state ∆, Post(∆) captures the
relation between primed variables of ∆. That is,
Post(∆) =df ρ(∃V ·∆), where
V = {v1, . . . , vn} denotes all unprimed program variables in ∆, and
ρ = [v1/v
′
1, . . . , vn/v
′
n].
For example, for ∆ = x′::Node〈v′, y′〉 ∧ v′=v ∧ y′=null, we have Post(∆) =
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x::Node〈v, y〉 ∧ y=null.
Then we define the soundness of our refinement as follows:
Definition A.1.2 (Soundness) For a method definition t mn ((t u); (t v)) {e},
if our verification refines its specification as t mn ((t u); (t v)) requires Φpr en-
sures Φpo {e}, then for all s, h |= Post(Φpr), if 〈s, h, e〉↪→∗〈s′, h′, -〉, then we have
s′, h′ |= Post(Φpo).
The soundness of our verification is ensured by the soundness of the following: the
entailment prover, the pure fixed-point calculation, the pure abstraction derivation,
and the abstract semantics (w.r.t. the concrete semantics). Among the above,
the soundness of the entailment prover and pure fixed-point calculation are already
confirmed (Chin et al., 2010; Nipkow et al., 2002; Popeea and Chin, 2006), and hence
we will concentrate on the soundness of abstract semantics and pure abstraction
derivation.
Lemma A.1.3 (Sound pure abduction) If σ1 ∧ [σ′]¤ σ2 ∗ σ3, then ∀s, h |=
Post(σ1 ∧ σ′), we have s, h |= Post(σ2 ∗ σ3).
Proof This is ensured by the entailment relationship in the premise of each of
the pure abduction rules and the soundness of the entailment checking (Chin et al.,
2010). 2
Lemma A.1.4 (Sound abstract semantics) If |[e]|T (∆, 0) = (∆1, 0), then for all
s, h, if s, h |= Post(∆) and 〈s, h, e〉↪→〈s1, h1, e1〉, then there always exists ∆0 such
that
s1, h1 |= Post(∆0) and |[e1]|T (∆0, 0) = (∆1, 0)
Proof The proof is done by structural induction over program constructors:
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• Case null | k | v | v.f . Straightforward.
• Case v = e. There are two cases according to the operational semantics:
– e is not a value. From operational semantics, there is e1 s.t. 〈s, h, e〉↪→〈s1,
h1, e1〉, and 〈s, h, v=e〉↪→〈s1, h1, v=e1〉. From abstract semantics for as-
signment, if |[e]|T (∆, 0) = (∆2, 0), and ∆1=[v1/v′, r1/res](∆2)∧v′=r1. By
induction hypothesis, there exists ∆0, s1, h1 |= ∆0 and |[e1]|T (∆0, 0) =
(∆2, 0). It concludes from the assignment rule that |[v = e1]|T (∆0, 0) =
(∆1, 0).
– e is a value. Trivial.
• Case new c(v). From abstract semantics for new, we have |[new c(v)]|T (∆, 0) =
(∆1, 0), where ∆1 = ∆ ∗ res::c〈v′1, . . . , v′n〉. Let ∆0 = ∆1. From the opera-
tional semantics, we have 〈s, h, new c(v)〉↪→〈s, h+[ι 7→ r], ι〉, where ι /∈ dom(h).
From s, h |= ∆, we have s, h+[ι 7→ r] |= ∆0. Moreover, |[ι]|T (∆0, 0) = (∆1, 0).
• Case v1.f = v2. Take ∆0 = ∆. It concludes immediately from the exec rule
for field update and the underlying operational semantics.
• Case free(x). Denote ∆ as ∨i(x::c〈yi〉 ∗ σi) and ∆0 as ∨i σi, then from free’s
operational semantics we know that if s, h |= Post(∆) and 〈s, h, free(x)〉 ↪→
〈s1, h1, -〉, then s1, h1 |= Post(∆0) and ∆0 = ∆1.
• Case e1; e2. We consider the case where e1 is not a value (otherwise it is
trivial). From the operational semantics, we have 〈s, h, e1〉↪→〈s1, h1, e3〉. From
the abstract semantics rule for sequence, we have ` {∆}e1{∆2}. By induction
hypothesis, there exists ∆0 s.t. s1, h1 |= Post(∆0), and ` {∆0}e3{∆2}. By the
sequential rule we have |[e3; e2]|T (∆0, 0) = (∆1, 0).
• Case if (v) e1 else e2. There are two possibilities in the operational seman-
tics:
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– s(v)=true. We have 〈s, h, if (v) e1 else e2〉↪→〈s, h, e1〉. Let ∆0=(∆∧v′).
It is obvious that s, h |= ∆0. From the if-conditional rule of abstract se-
mantics, we have:
|[e1]|T (∆0, 0) = (∆2, 0)
|[e2]|T (∆∧¬v′, 0) = (∆3, 0)
And we also have (due to sound weakening of postcondition)
|[e1]|T (∆0, 0) = (∆2∨∆3, 0)
That is, |[e1]|T (∆0, 0) = (∆1, 0).
– s(v) = false. Analogous.
• Casemn(v1...n). For the method invocation rule, we know ∆`[v′j/vj]nj=1Φipr ∗∆i,








pr∗∆i. From the operational se-
mantics and the above heap entailment, we have s1, h1 |= ∆0. Then the
method invocation rule implies ∀i∈1 . . . p · |[e1]|T ([v′j/vj]nj=1Φipr∗∆i, 0) =
(∆i∗Φipo, 0). Therefore we have |[e1]|T (∆0, 0) = (∆1, 0) which concludes.
• Case while (v) {e}. It can be converted to tail-recursive method call with all
parameters passed by reference, and thus follows the above case. 2
Lemma A.1.5 (Sound pure constraint abstraction) Given a method with pre/
post shape templates pre and post, if our analysis successfully computes a constraint
abstraction Q in the first step without abduction, and derives a pure constraint P in
the second step, then we have Q ` post ∧ P.
Proof This proof follows directly our procedure to compute the pure constraint
abstraction from the shape one, plus the soundness of entailment checking and





and the provided post-shape post, we use
Qi ` post ∧ Pi
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Then based on the discussion above we have:
Theorem A.1.6 (Soundness) Our verification is sound with respect to the under-
lying operational semantics.
We have one more note about the post verification conducted in line 12 of our main
algorithm in Figure 4.4. Such verification is used to confirm that the strength-
ened precondition can guarantee memory safety. This added precaution is because
sometimes our refinement of precondition might not be sufficient for the program
to execute without inappropriate memory access, which could be attributed to the
fact that users have not provided a good enough predicate to describe the obliga-
tion of memory safety. For example, if our verification is only supplied with a list
predicate which does not contain its length information, then we can never obtain
the prerequisite “the input length should be at least n”, even if the memory safety
requires that. Hence our post verification will rule out this case. However it does
not affect the soundness of our verification: the memory violation will incur false
as an abstract state which implies any postcondition we may discover. The only
reason we need it is as aforesaid —- to leave only meaningful refined specifications
(which has safety guarantee for the program) in our results.
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A.2 Soundness of Shape Specification Synthesis
The soundness definition of shape specification synthesis follows the one in the pre-
vious section, referring to the underlying operational semantics:
Definition A.2.1 (Soundness) For a method definition t mn ((t u); (t v)) {e},
if our analysis refines its specification as t mn ((t u); (t v)) requires Φpr ensures
Φpo {e}, then for all s, h |= Post(Φpr), if 〈s, h, e〉↪→∗〈s′, h′, -〉, then we have s′, h′ |=
Post(Φpo).
Therefore the soundness of the whole approach can be reduced to the soundness
of our synthesis of shape specifications. To prove this, we need to review our pre-
condition/postcondition synthesis algorithms. From these two algorithms, we can
see that our synthesised pre-shape must satisfy the abstract state at the calling
context (because of the entailment relationship), and the post-shape is checked to
see whether it could possibly be abstracted as the execution result of the unfolded
program. From the soundness of entailment checking and abduction, we have
Theorem A.2.2 (Soundness) Our verification is still sound with respect to the
underlying operational semantics, with the specification synthesis mechanism added.
Proof The soundness is proven with the following claims:
• For pre-shape synthesis, we can see in line 3 of Figure 5.6 that for each chosen
shape candidate σC , we always have σ ` [x/u,y/v]σC where σ is the abstract
state in the calling context.
• For post-shape synthesis, line 5 of Figure 5.7 suggests that the chosen shape
candidate σC has the potential to establish the expected post-state ∆ (the sym-
bolic execution result of the unfolded program), possibly with some additional
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pure constraints σ (which are to be discovered by the following refinement
process, should the refinement succeed).
• Finally, we already know that the entailment checking, the pure abduction,
the symbolic execution and the refinement are all sound with respect to the
underlying semantics. This concludes the proof. 2
A.3 Soundness of Verification for Programs with
Unknown Components
Informally, in the presence of invocations to unknown components, the soundness
of the verification signifies that, a program is successfully verified against its specifi-
cations, if all the unknown procedures that it invokes conform to the specifications
discovered by the verification algorithm. Therefore, the correctness of the program
depends on a (possible) further verification for the unknown procedures. It can be
defined as follows:
Definition A.3.1 (Soundness) Suppose that for specification table T , program to
be verified v = {e1;u; e2} and its specifications mspecv, our verification succeeds and
returns Tu as the specification table for unknown procedures invoked in v. Then we
say our verification is sound, if the following holds:
∀σ ∈ |[e1;u; e2]|T unionmultiTU{[x0/a,y0/b]Φpr} · σ ` [x0/a,y0/b,y′0/b′]Φpo ∗ true
which means that, with respect to the underlying semantics, if all the unknown pro-
cedures can be verified to satisfy their specifications in Tu, then the whole program v
should meet all the specifications in mspecv.
201
A.3. Soundness of Verification for Programs with Unknown Components
To prove that our verification is sound, we proceed with the soundness of three
aspects, that is, entailment checking, abduction and abstract semantics for forward
analysis. The soundness of entailment checking is already stated in Section A.1. For
the soundness of abduction, we have
Lemma A.3.2 (Sound abduction) If σ1 ∗ [σ′]¤ σ2 ∗ σ3, then ∀s, h |= Post(σ1 ∗
σ′), we have s, h |= Post(σ2 ∗ σ3).
Proof This is ensured by the entailment relationship in the premise of each of
the first three abduction rules and the soundness of the entailment checking (Chin
et al., 2010). For the last rule, it is sound as well because σ ∗ σ1 ` σ1 ∗ true. 2
Lemma A.3.3 (Sound underlying abstract semantics) If |[e]|T∆ = ∆1, then
for all s, h, if s, h |= Post(∆) and 〈s, h, e〉↪→〈s1, h1, e1〉, then there always exists ∆0
such that
s1, h1 |= Post(∆0) and |[e1]|T∆0 = ∆1
Proof The proof is done by structural induction over program constructors:
• Case null | k | v | v.f . Directly obtained from definition.
• Case new c(v). From abstract semantics for new, we have |[new c(v)]|T∆ =
∆1, where ∆1 = ∆ ∗ res::c〈v′1, . . . , v′n〉. Let ∆0 = ∆1. From the operational
semantics, we have 〈s, h, new c(v)〉↪→〈s, h+[ι 7→ r], ι〉, where ι /∈ dom(h). From
s, h |= ∆, we have s, h+[ι 7→ r] |= ∆0. Moreover, |[ι]|T∆0 = ∆1.
• Case free(x). Denote ∆ as ∨i(x::c〈yi〉 ∗ σi) and ∆0 as ∨i σi, then from free’s
operational semantics we know that if s, h |= Post(∆) and 〈s, h, free(x)〉 ↪→
〈s1, h1, -〉, then s1, h1 |= Post(∆0) and ∆0 = ∆1.
• Case v1.f = v2. Take ∆0 = ∆. It concludes immediately from the exec rule
for field update and the underlying operational semantics.
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• Case v = e. There are two cases according to the operational semantics:
– e is a value. Straightforward.
– e is not a value. From the underlying operational semantics, there is e1
s.t. 〈s, h, e〉↪→〈s1, h1, e1〉, and 〈s, h, v=e〉↪→〈s1, h1, v=e1〉. From abstract
semantics for assignment, if we have ∆1=[v1/v
′, r1/res](∆2)∧v′=r1 where
|[e]|T∆ = ∆2, By induction hypothesis, there exists ∆0, s1, h1 |= ∆0 and
|[e1]|T∆0 = ∆2. It concludes from the assignment rule that |[v = e1]|T∆0 =
∆1.
• Case e1; e2. We consider the case where e1 is not a value (otherwise it is
straightforward). From the operational semantics, we have 〈s, h, e1〉 ↪→ 〈s1, h1,
e3〉. From the abstract semantics rule for sequence, we have ` {∆}e1{∆2}. By
induction hypothesis, there exists ∆0 s.t. s1, h1 |= Post(∆0), and ` {∆0}e3{∆2}.
By the sequential rule we have |[e3; e2]|T∆0 = ∆1.
• Case if (v) e1 else e2. There are two possibilities in the operational seman-
tics:
– s(v)=true. We have 〈s, h, if (v) e1 else e2〉↪→〈s, h, e1〉. Let ∆0=(∆∧v′).




And we also have (due to sound weakening of postcondition)
|[e1]|T∆0 = ∆2∨∆3
That is, |[e1]|T∆0 = ∆1.
– s(v) = false. Same.
• Casemn(v1...n). For the method invocation rule, we know ∆`[v′j/vj]nj=1Φipr ∗∆i,








pr∗∆i. From the operational se-
mantics and the above heap entailment, we have s1, h1 |= ∆0. Then the
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method invocation rule implies ∀i∈1 . . . p · |[e1]|T [v′j/vj]nj=1Φipr∗∆i = ∆i∗Φipo.
Therefore we have |[e1]|T∆0 = ∆1 which concludes.
• Case while (v) {e}. It can be converted to tail-recursive method call with all
parameters passed by reference, and thus follows the above case. 2
Lemma A.3.4 (Sound abstract semantics with abduction) If |[e]|AT (emp,
emp) = (∆1,∆
′
1), then for all s, h, if s, h |= Post(∆′1) and 〈s, h, e〉↪→〈s1, h1, e1〉, then
there always exists ∆0 such that
s1, h1 |= Post(∆0) and |[e1]|T∆0 = ∆1
Proof Generally there are two types of constructors which may alter the result
from abduction: heap-sensitive commands d[x] and procedure invocation. We in-
vestigate them respectively.
• Case d[x]. As we know that |[d[x]]|AT (emp, emp) =df Exec†(d[x])(T ) ◦ Unfold†(x)
(emp, emp), we consider the lifted unfolding operation (Unfold) to produce the
abduction result. From its definition (Section 6.5.4), since the current abstract
state is emp, the unfold must fail and false ∈ ∆. Then in the remaining
two cases of if in its definition, the second one is the trivial case where we
conclude with ∆0 = false. For the first one, as x::c〈y〉 is added to both the
current state and the abduction result, from the induction assumption proven
in Lemma A.3.3 we know that we can find such ∆0, and the conclusion holds.
• Case mn(x1, . . . , xm; y1, . . . , yn)(T )(σ, σ′). There are two scenarios here: σ `
ρΦpr ∗ σ1 and σ′1=emp, or σ ∗ [σ′1] ¤ ρΦpr ∗ σ1. In the first scenario, the rule
degenerates to the case in the underlying semantics. In the second one, ∆′1 is
assigned by the abduction, where the entailment relationship ∆′1 ` ρΦpr ∗ true
is established. Therefore this case follows the induction assumption from
Lemma A.3.3. 2
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On the basis of above we have
Theorem A.3.5 (Soundness) Our verification of programs with unknown compo-
nents is sound.
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Appendix B
Shape Predicates and Program
Code Used in Experiments
This chapter presents the definitions of shape predicates and program code used in
the experiments which are not introduced in the previous chapters. These predi-
cates and code mainly constitute a proof of theory over the classic algorithms ma-
nipulating data structures, and for the sake of length does not include the part of
FreeRTOS (Barry, 2006), whose code can be found in its website.
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B.1 Shape Predicate Definitions
Below are the definitions of the shape predicates not previously defined:
dll〈p, n〉 ≡ (root=p ∧ n=0) ∨
(root::Node2〈v, p, q〉 ∗ q::dll〈root, n1〉 ∧ n=n1+1)
dllB〈p, S〉 ≡ (root=p ∧ S=∅) ∨
(root::Node2〈v, p, q〉 ∗ q::dllB〈root, S1〉 ∧ S=S1unionsq{v})
sll〈n, mn, mx〉 ≡ (root=null ∧ n=0 ∧ mn=mx) ∨
(root::Node〈v, q〉 ∗ q::sll〈n1, k, mx〉 ∧ n=n1+1 ∧ mn≤k)
sllB2〈S〉 ≡ (root=null ∧ S=∅) ∨
(root::Node〈v, q〉 ∗ q::sllB2〈S1〉 ∧ S={v}unionsqS1 ∧ (∀x∈S1·v≥x))
slsB〈p, S〉 ≡ (root=p ∧ S=∅) ∨
(root::Node〈v, q〉 ∗ q::slsB〈p, S1〉 ∧ S={v}unionsqS1 ∧ (∀x∈S1·v≤x))
bt〈S, h〉 ≡ (root=null ∧ S=∅ ∧ h=0) ∨ (root::Node2〈v, p, q〉 ∗
p::bt〈Sp, hp〉 ∗ q::bt〈Sq, hq〉 ∧ S=SpunionsqSq ∧ h=1+max(hp, hq))
bst〈sm, lg〉 ≡ (root=null ∧ sm=lg) ∨
(root::Node2〈v, p, q〉 ∗ p::bst〈sm, mn〉 ∗ q::bst〈mx, lg〉 ∧ mn<v<mx)
avl〈S, h〉 ≡ (root=null ∧ S=∅ ∧ h=0) ∨ (root::Node2〈v, p, q〉 ∗ p::bt〈Sp, hp〉 ∗
q::bt〈Sq, hq〉 ∧ S=SpunionsqSq ∧ h=1+max(hp, hq) ∧ −1≤hp−hq≤1)
B.2 Program Code
Below is the program code that we have done experiments with, which is not men-
tioned in the main text:
Node2 create2(int n) {




Node2 r = create2(n - 1);
Node2 s = new Node2(n, null, r);




void sort_insert(Node x, int v) {
if (x.next == null)
x.next = new Node(v, null);
else if (v <= x.next.val)




void sort_insert2(Node2 x, int v) {
if (x.next == null)
x.next = new Node2(v, x, null);
else if (v <= x.next.val) {





void tail_insert(Node x, int v) {
if (x.next == null)
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void rand_insert(Node x, int v) {
int a, b;
if (x.next == null)
x.next = new Node(v, null);
else if (a == b)




void rand_insert2(Node2 x, int v) {
int a, b;
if (x.next == null)
x.next = new Node2(v, x, null);
else if (a == b) {





void delete(Node x) {
int a, b;









void delete2(Node2 x) {
int a, b;
if (x.next.next == null)
x.next = null;






void append2(Node2 x, Node2 y) {
Node2 w = x.next;






void travrs2(Node2 x) {




if (x.next != null)
travrs2(x.next);
}
int count(Node2 x) {
int l = 0, r = 0;
if (x.prev != null)
l = count(x.prev);
if (x.next != null)
r = count(x.next);
return 1 + l + r;
}
int height(Node2 x) {
int l = 0, r = 0;
if (x.prev != null)
l = height(x.prev);
if (x.next != null)
r = height(x.next);
if (l >= r)
return 1 + l;
else
return 1 + r;
}
void insert2(Node2 x, int v) {
Node2 p = x.prev;




if (a == b) {
if (p != null)
insert2(p, v);
else
x.prev = new Node2(v, null, null);
} else {
if (q != null)
insert2(q, v);
else
x.next = new Node2(v, null, null);
}
}
void delete2(Node2 x) {
Node2 p = x.prev;
Node2 q = x.next;
int a, b;
if (a == b) {













int search(Node2 x, int v) {
Node2 p = x.prev;
Node2 q = x.next;
if (x.val == v)
return 1;
else if (v < x.val) {











void bst_ins(Node2 x, int v) {
Node2 p = x.prev;
Node2 q = x.next;
if (v < x.val) {
if (p == null)






if (q == null)





Node2 avl_ins(Node2 x, int v) {
if (x == null)
return new Node2(v, null, null);
else if (v < x.val) {
x.prev = avl_ins(x.prev, v);
if (height(x.prev) - height(x.next) == 2) {






x.next = avl_ins(x.next, v);
if (height(x.next) - height(x.prev) == 2) {










Node append3(Node x, Node y) {
if (x == null) return y;
else {




Node flatten(Node2 x) {
if (x == null)
return null;
else {
Node r = flatten(x.prev);
Node s = flatten(x.next);
Node t = new Node(x.val, null);
Node a = append3(r, t);




Node merge_sort(Node x) {
if (x == null){
return x;
} else if (x.next == null) {
return x;
} else {
int half = length(x) / 2;
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Node ctr = split(x, half);
// Same split as the loop in Figure 4.2
Node l = merge_sort(x);




Node merge(Node x, Node y) {
if (x == null)
return y;
else if (y == null)
return x;
if (x.next == null)
return insert(y, x);
// Same insert as the one in Figure 4.1
else if (y.next == null)
return insert(x, y);
else if (x.val <= y.val) {











Node2 create2(int n) {
if (n == 0) return null;
else {
Node2 r = create2(n - 1);
Node2 s = unknown(n, r);




void sort_insert(Node x, int v) {
if (x.next == null)
x.next = new Node(v, null);





void sort_insert2(Node2 x, int v) {
if (x.next == null)
x.next = new Node2(v, x, null);





void tail_insert(Node x, int v) {
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void rand_insert(Node x, int v) {
int a, b;
if (x.next == null)
x.next = new Node(v, null);





void rand_insert2(Node2 x, int v) {
int a, b;
if (x.next == null)
x.next = new Node2(v, x, null);





void delete(Node x) {
int a, b;









void delete2(Node2 x) {
int a, b;
if (x.next.next == null)
x.next = null;





void travrs3(Node2 x) {
Node2 y, z;
unknown(x; y, z);
if (y != null)
travrs3(y);
}
int count(Node2 x) {
Node2 y, z;
int l = 0, r = 0;
unknown(x; y, z);




if (z != null)
r = count(z);
return 1 + l + r;
}
int height(Node2 x) {
Node2 y, z;
int l = 0, r = 0;
unknown(x; y, z);
if (y != null)
l = height(y);
if (z != null)
r = height(z);
if (l >= r)
return 1 + l;
else
return 1 + r;
}
void insert2(Node2 x, int v) {
Node2 p = x.prev;
Node2 q = x.next;
int a, b;
if (a == b) {







if (q != null)
insert2(q, v);
else
x.next = new Node2(v, null, null);
}
}
void delete2(Node2 x) {
Node2 p = x.prev;
Node2 q = x.next;
int a, b;
if (a == b) {











int search(Node2 x, int v) {
Node2 p, q;
unknown(x; p, q);




else if (v < x.val) {











void bst_insert(Node2 x, int v) {
Node2 p = x.prev;
Node2 q = x.next;
if (v < x.val) {













Node2 avl_ins(Node2 x, int v) {
if (x == null)
return new Node2(v, null, null);
else if (v < x.val) {
x.prev = avl_ins(x.prev, v);
if (unknown(x.prev) - height(x.next) == 2) {






x.next = avl_ins(x.next, v);
if (height(x.next) - height(x.prev) == 2) {








Node merge_sort(Node x) {
if (x == null){
return x;





int half = length(x) / 2;
Node ctr = split(x, half);
Node l = merge_sort(x);
Node r = merge_sort(ctr);
return unknown(l, r);
}
}
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